

PHILOSOPHICAL CURRENTS
OF THE
PRESENT DAY

Philosophical Currents

of the

Present Day

By
DR. LUDWIG STEIN
O. Ö. Professor of Philosophy, University of Bern

Translated by
SHISHIRKUMAR MAITRA, M.A.
Late Director, Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner

Vol. II



Published by
The University of Calcutta
1919

PRINTED BY ATULCHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA
AT THE CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS, SENATE HOUSE, CALCUTTA

CONTENTS

VI.—The neo-realistic movement

The popularity of "the philosophy of the unconscious." Pessimism stands no more on the foreground of philosophical interest. Since the appearance of *Kategorienlehre* V. Hartmann has been a strict philosopher. The transcendental realism of V. Hartmann. Will and idea as attributes of the unconscious. Nature tends to become the breeding place of the spirit. V. Hartmann's posthumous "System of philosophy in outline." Correlativism or the conformity system. V. Hartmann as vitalist. Philosophers are the friends of disturbance of the human race. Philosophers of eternal inspiration coin a "formula." The scientists come near the philosophy of V. Hartmann. V. Hartmann's fight against Darwinism. Only Darwin's theory of origin is correct. V. Hartmann sticks to the mechanical world-view. V. Hartmann abandons "life-force." Leibniz brings teleology again to a position of honour. Transition of scientific inquiry from atomism to dynamism. Mathematical and biological methods. The principle of life must be conceived dynamically. A residue of unnoticed anthropomorphism. Teleological causality creates only relative but no absolute order. The neo-realists from the time of Trendelenburg. Lotzean "occasionalism." Franz Erhardt and Ludwig Busse. The correlativists as masked idealists. O. Külpe on Eduard V. Hartmann. The problem of reality. Pp. 235-273

VII.—The evolutionistic movement.

Herbert Spencer's relation to Darwin. How Spencer received the *Origin of Species*. "Natural Selection" and "Survival of the fittest." George Henry Lewes on Herbert Spencer. Carlyle's relation to Spencer. How Spencer

characterises Carlyle. Carlyle's affinity with English feeling-philosophy. Spencer's relation to Guyau Spencer and Spinoza. Spencer's relation to Comte. Lewes and George Eliot appear for Comte. Spencer's personal meeting with Comte. Spencer denies catagorically the influence of Comte. Spencer acknowledges Hegel and Oken as his precursors. Spencer's relation to German philosophy. Spencer's relation to Leibniz. Spencer's relation to Kant. Kant's subjectivising of space and time is repugnant to him. Where Spencer and Kant touch each other. Spencer ignores contemporary German thinkers. Spencer's relation to K. E. v. Baer. The essence of Spencerian philosophy. Spencer's relation to Schelling. Spencer's relation to Hegel. Mach and Ostwald are the legitimate heirs of Spencer. Pp. 274-306

VIII.—The individualistic movement.

Voltaire as "the man of the century." Joseph Popper's (Lynkeus's) *Voltaire*. Contribution to Voltaire-literature. Voltaire and Nietzsche. Nietzsche as "poet-philosophier." The Nietzsche-cult in Weimar. Raoul Richter's *Nietzsche Book*. Relation of poetry to philosophy. The individualism of Max Stirner. Stirner and the later Sophists. Stirner and Nietzsche. Walter Calé and Count Keyserling on individuality. Pp. 307-325

IX.—The mental science movement.

Dilthey demands a theory of knowledge of "mental sciences." The doctrine of "double truth." Characteristics of the Scholastic method of thought. God, spirit, nature as ways of truth. "History as the path of truth." Universal history as teacher of mankind. Dilthey's attitude towards the "historical school." Dilthey demands a psychology instead of a metaphysics of history. Specialisation in the philosophy of the present day. Dilthey's relation to Trendelenburg and

Schleiermacher. The relation of the history of philosophy-movement to system-building. Dilthey's relation to romanticism. Dilthey and the new Hegel-inquiry. Dilthey's share in the great edition of Kant's works. Dilthey's Poetics as well as his *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung*. Every poetical work is the representation of an individual occurrence. Dilthey renders the philosophy of history fruitful. Historical and philosophical self-reflexion. Dilthey and Feuerbach. Dilthey and Comte. Dilthey's "Critique of historical reason." Metaphysics as science is impossible. Dilthey and the German philosophy of to-day. Among systematic thinkers Dilthey and Wundt take the lead. The collection of essays *Systematische Philosophie* in the *Kultur der Gegenwart*. For Dilthey philosophy is the doctrine of the world-view. Art, poetry and metaphysics. Pp. 326-362

X.—The history-of-philosophy movement.

Eduard Zeller and the Tübingen School. Zeller's *Philosophy of the Greeks*. Diels and Windelband on Eduard Zeller. Zeller's activity in Switzerland. The Neo-Kantian catchword: Back to Kant. Zeller as teacher and thinker. Zeller's penetration into the spirit of antiquity. Zeller as man. Zeller's habits as a teacher. The starting of the "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie." Zeller as systematic thinker. The history-of-philosophy movement in the service of creative synthesis. Zeller and the neo-Kantians. All real knowledge is to come from experience. Space, time, number and causality. Zeller separates himself from Kant and approaches Lotze and Trendelenburg. Every age has its philosophy. Zeller as philosopher of religion. Eduard Zeller the philosopher of the "middle line." Zeller showed the movement of the history of philosophy the way. Riehl and the history-of-philosophy movement. Pp. 363-393

CHAPTER VI.

THE NEO-REALISTIC MOVEMENT.

*(The transcendental realism of Eduard v. Hartmann
and the correlativism of to-day).*

Three metaphysical world-formulae have in the last decade gripped the philosophical world firmly—Schopenhauer's will to life, Nietzsche's will to power and v. Hartmann's will to consciousness. None of them belonged to the academically trained class of thinkers, but all three have been cheerfully accorded by a sort of plebiscite the crown and the sceptre. It was not learned academies that sanctioned from above this philosophical triad and recommended it to the educated public, but it was literary clubs, cafés, editors' desks, salons and boudoirs which "discovered" these philosophers. Thus, the educated laymen first demanded imperatively the elevation of these three thinkers to the rank of the leading spirits of the nation and at last succeeded unopposed in securing compliance with their demand. Academic philosophers have found themselves compelled, after long resistance and opposition, to grant academic recognition, that is, give the rights of academic philosophers to the thinkers who have been proclaimed by the lower ranks and elected by the common people. This rebellion of the philosophical laity against the clergy which began with the armed rising of Schopenhauer and has since been carried on energetically, only shows that we have been democratised in all provinces, even in intellectual ones.

Eduard v. Hartmann's philosophical career does not run along a straight line but along a perceptibly zigzag path. While Schopenhauer's star was in the ascendant when the

spark of his life was almost extinguished and Nietzsche blazed suddenly like a meteor, Eduard v. Hartmann went to bed on a fine day as an invalid officer of twenty-four without any prospect and awoke another fine morning to find himself a celebrated German philosopher. In the year 1868 appeared *Die Philosophie des Unbewussten* over which the lame young officer worked incessantly for three years in the midst of heroically borne misery without at first having any idea where the path taken by him would lead him, and this book had, not only on account of the pessimistic tendency originated by the cult of Schopenhauer, but also on account of the freshness and directness of his mode of expression, unheard-of success for a German publication. In his collected studies and essays of the year 1876, as well as in an autobiographical sketch which Eduard v. Hartmann published through the "Gesellschaft" managed by Conrad, one finds the unutterable surprise with which v. Hartmann was seized at the unexpected success of his *Philosophie des Unbewussten*.

This unexpected success produced at first an unfavourable effect. The tragical fate of becoming a fashionable philosopher, of being solicited, petted, worshipped by the public, left a deep mark upon his soul. Owing to the fanaticism of rashness into which our excitable age has fallen, a secure position is shown not by *being* an idol but by *remaining* so. Worship of gods can keep us engaged for weeks, but image-breaking can keep us engaged for months and years. Our hyper-critical *blasé* condition tolerates no gods who do not prove themselves logical or show the passport of criticism, far less philosophical fashionable gods to whom the vulgar people make a pilgrimage. We have a cruel pleasure of *faire le mal pour le plaisir de le faire* (doing wrong for the pleasure of doing it) when the question is of bringing great men into contempt, removing authority from its pedestal, exposing the wonderful heroes of action and will to view as weak or effeminate persons. And then the crowd is delighted at the

exciting sight of people destroying their pets and demonstrating to all that even a genius has a nether region.

Eduard v. Hartmann has to some extent to thank himself for his fall from the pedestal of popularity. As a nervous disease of the knee confined him to his room and made his contact with the world one through writing only, an easy and elegant style became an absolute necessity. He wrote *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*. Soon every important periodical contained something from his pen; every year brought at least one book. The "selected works" have since 1885 reached twelve volumes. Thus v. Hartmann did not confine himself to his own special department, philosophy, but his unusually productive—because undisturbed by the distractions of the life of a citizen—literary capacity handled every phenomenon of the day, from modes of dress to corn duties, from "spiritism" to "fundamental social questions". On account of the encyclopædic knowledge which brings V. Hartmann close to his philosophical model Leibniz, the temptation came naturally to him to conquer the world from his *cabinet d'étude*. Thus, especially, periodicals and their publishers—his favourite organ was for a considerable time the "Gegenwart"—vied with one another in bringing out V. Hartmann's essays. And so by his writings he gradually lowered himself, as Friedrich Strauss once said of himself, "in the estimation of the German people". Ruling spirits should, like dynasties, make themselves rare. Grave dignity, studied reserve, strict secrecy are what people expect from their kings, even the kings of literature. Ubiquitousness and taking sides with regard to the trifles of every-day life weaken one's popularity instead of strengthening it. And so Eduard von Hartmann would have been to-day wholly forgotten and people would not have been surprised at the news that he died recently but at the news that he once lived, if his title to immortality had only been based upon the much admired (but long placed among historical records) "Philosophy of the

Unconscious". For we men of to-day have other problems and interests. The pessimistic wave which with Schopenhauer, Bahnsen and v. Hartmann, swept over the preceding generation, has begun again to ebb from the time of Nietzsche. We have no more any longing for the sleeping, enervating, spirit-destroying *nirvāna* of the pessimistic thinkers of Buddhistic tendencies, but we sigh for acts and thirst for the Iranian doctrines of the religion of light of Zarathustra which Nietzsche has revived for us, that is, for life. The pessimistic poison of our philosophical Buddhists with which a generation ago a whole age was infected, so that every one exhibited a pessimistic tendency, is to-day counteracted by the antitoxin of the super-man doctrine. But pessimism has long ceased to be the personal note of v. Hartmann. Only wearily did he drag pessimism through old tradition. Indeed, v. Hartmann himself found his way—the more he proceeded, the more clearly did he find his way—out of pessimism which obtained in his personal tragical experience a complete support and justification, to that evolutionistic optimism which we share with him. Only to the profane view of those who stand outside, is Eduard v. Hartmann still that philosopher of the unconscious whom Fritz Mauthner caricatured as the philosopher of the "unconscious corn (on the foot)".

"Public opinion" has long forsaken its spoilt child, v. Hartmann, but the much-maligned professors of philosophy have for this reason received him with honour. Since the appearance of his *Kategorienlehre* (Theory of categories), there has been a complete change in the professional philosophical world in the estimation in which it holds Eduard v. Hartmann. His *Asthetik* (1886-87) was received with respect. The *Kategorienlehre*, however, placed Eduard v. Hartmann at once in the front rank of contemporary thinkers, so that only Wilhelm Wundt could in any way compete with him for the philosophical leadership. What v. Hartmann published during the last ten years of his life—namely, his two-volumed

Geschichte der Metaphysik (History of Metaphysics), his *Moderne Psychologie* (Modern Psychology), his *Weltanschauung der modernen Physik* (World-view of modern physics) and lastly, and especially, his *Problem des Lebens* (Problem of Life), (Haacke, Sachsa in Harz)—shows the thinker in his highest maturity and perfection. The spirit of the *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (Philosophy of the Unconscious), the *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins* (Phenomenology of ethical consciousness) 1879, *Das religiöse Bewusstsein der Menschheit im Stufengang seiner Entwicklung* (The religious consciousness of mankind in the process of its development), 1881, *Religion des Geistes* (Religion of the Spirit) 1882, which once excited the philosophical reading public and led to outbursts of joy, has been repeated in the purely professional writings of the last ten years which exhibit a thorough mastery of the whole field of knowledge. Regarding Hartmann's *Weltanschauung der modernen Physik* (World-view of modern physics), for instance, Chwolson, the celebrated Petersburg physicist, says that physicists can, regarding many questions, learn more from the philosopher Eduard v. Hartmann than from their own professional inquirers. And the same can be said of his *Problem des Lebens*—regarding the mastery of biological literature. With all branches of natural and spiritual sciences he is most perfectly familiar. From a dilettante and self-constituted instructor, as the first edition of *Philosophie des Unbewussten* showed him, v. Hartmann has not only risen by incessant research work to be a great scholar, but what is more, from a popular philosopher of doubtful merit, having many of the faults of a writer, he has risen through the force of his genius to be one of the greatest German philosophers. As low as he descended in the middle of the nineties in the scale of public opinion, so high has he risen since the appearance of *Kategorienlehre* in the opinion of the professional world.

V. Hartmann's philosophy is often called eclecticism. And he himself gives us the naïve characterisation that his

system is "a synthesis of Hegel and Schopenhauer with the predominance of the former, completed through the application of the doctrine of principles of Schelling's positive philosophy and the concept of the unconscious in Schelling's first system: the still abstract result is then merged in the Leibnizian individualism and modern scientific realism and made into a concrete monism". The ingredients of his thought are here acknowledged frankly by him. If one, however, takes him to task for this and gives his philosophy the nickname of eclecticism, one should reflect that an exactly similar confession has been made by Leibniz, his great model. Even Leibniz calls his system a mixture of Democritus, Plato, Aristotle and the Scholastics. But with Leibniz, as with v. Hartmann, the philosophical ideas of the previous thinkers are not placed side by side mechanically, as they were done by the Alexandrian eclectics, but they are organically united with one another. Every system owes its foundation to the previous world-constructions. As the painter with a few fundamental colours creates the illusion of an innumerable number of shades by reason of his possessing the secret of mixing colours, so Eduard v. Hartmann possessed the great secret of the right mixture of thoughts.

Let us extract the fundamental thoughts of v. Hartmann's metaphysics, the transcendental realism as he calls it, to mark its contrast with the transcendental idealism of Kant, out of the great mass of non-essential and auxiliary products. Hegel's panlogism stood absolutely opposed to Schopenhauer's panthelism. That was the philosophical situation, as v. Hartmann found it. For Hegel the universe was, as it once was for Plotinus, Ficinus or Giordano Bruno, the expression of a gradually self-realising (and in its acts), self-revealing All-reason (Logos). Consequently, everything permanent is rational and everything rational, permanent; especially, out of a world-principle fixed as reason, nothing but reason can emanate. The opposite is the case

with Schopenhauer, the romanticist and irrationalist. The primitive ground of things as blind and irrational could not suffice to make intelligible all the hurry and bustle, all the storm and stress, all the ruins and destructions which his bilious temperament offered as "world". Schopenhauer's world-will was without reason, as Hegel's world-intelligence or logos was without energy. Between these lay the aesthetic pantheism of Schelling in his youthful days who taught an ideality of the subject and the object in the Absolute, and thereby, true romanticist as he was, gave the living preference over the non-living, and conceived the organic as prior to the inorganic. Here v. Hartmann steps in. He moves diagonally between Schopenhauer and Hegel. The world is neither an auto-movement of the blind will, as Schopenhauer will have us believe, nor an auto-movement of the world-intelligence, as Hegelian panlogism teaches us: it is neither illogical nor logical. If the world was, as Hegel thought, a purely logical process, it would be thoroughly purposive, a thing which is manifestly untrue for the pessimist Hartmann. If the world was, on the contrary a creation of an absolutely illogical principle, of a blind will, any relative purposiveness which is undoubtedly exhibited in the world of organism, would be absolutely unintelligible. And so everything tends towards that synthesis of the Absolute which Schelling called "the eternally unconscious". The monism of the unconscious or the "panpneumatism" of v. Hartmann finds the following way out of the dilemma of rationalism and irrationalism. Underlying the eternal opposition between reason and non-reason, between the logical and the illogical, there is a point of unity, a neutral third, namely, the unconscious. Just as Spinoza degraded the two substances of Descartes, extension and thought into two attributes (eternal properties of God) and merged both in his one Substance (God-Nature), so according to Hartmann, will and idea, the illogical and the logical, being and thought represent the two fundamental

properties of the Unconscious or Substance which are identical in the Absolute. Only the process of the unfolding or development of the world is not a logical one, as Spinoza and Hegel hold, but an illogical one, as Schopenhauer says. The two attributes, will and idea, strive with each other for being or non-being. From this struggle arises the antagonism of forces in nature and spirit, the opposition between attraction and repulsion in physics, between affinity and resistance to combination in chemistry, between assimilation and dissimilation in biology. The eternal struggle in nature is only the model after which the Darwin-Spencerian formula of "the struggle for existence" has been fashioned. The unceasing struggle among men is only a special case of the unavoidable struggle between the two attributes of the Unconscious, will and idea. While, however, the unrelieved pessimism of Schopenhauer makes the prophecy, with regard to the result of this Titanic struggle, that Idea will be finally defeated and the all-ruler Will will triumph in Nirvana, the evolutionistic optimism of Eduard v. Hartmann which gradually overcomes pessimism, lets the intellect with the advance of civilization finally master the will.

In a letter v. Hartmann sketches the cosmic process of the formation of the world in the following words which exhibit a leaning towards religious myth. In the original consciousness will and idea lay undifferentiated from each other. In an unconscious moment, Will, this blind partner, makes, as if impelled by a demon, the false step of uniting itself with Idea or Reason. Our world is to be looked upon as a product of this unequal union. It is thus the melancholy product of a clumsy, evil father, namely, Will, and of a sublime, magnanimous mother, namely, Idea. As the result of this false step our world is now loaded with unhappiness. It is true the good mother, idea, tries through art and science to make existence bearable to her only child, world. But unfortunately, it cannot counteract the operation of the evil

father, will, producing sorrow, misery, unhappiness and privation. But idea helps us to bear sorrow with courage and thus prepares the way for the self-emancipation of the self which will lead us back to the primitive condition of *nirvana*, of blessed unconsciousness. Consequently, there was at first a neutral something, unconsciousness, then a masculine something, will, and finally something feminine, idea. The metaphysical primitive pair, Adam and Eve, are here, as it were, overheard in their abode, Paradise. The apple is symbolised by the pleasures of existence which v. Hartmann resolves into three stages of illusions. If this is not conceptual poetry, pure and simple, nay, even, a dialectical Robinson Crusoe, then I don't know what speculative metaphysics is. The coarse anthropomorphism which shows itself in every line, the serious thinker v. Hartmann has of course noticed as well as anybody who tries to pick holes in this poetic cosmogony. Hartmann will reply to us: The subjective world of appearance is only a reflex of nature in our own spirit. Such anthropomorphic analogies, he will further say in reply to us, scientists make in dozens everyday when they speak of force or energy which is only another name for will. Nature is thus from the beginning ordained for becoming "the breeding-ground of the spirit." Nature-mechanism is only a means, no doubt the most important means, which the all-embracing world-purpose employs for attaining its final end of self-revelation. Nature is the necessary preparatory stage of the spirit (noo-centric view of the world). What we call matter is only a system of atom-forces or individual forces. What, however, the physicist calls force is given by the metaphysician the designation *will*. In the inorganic world the punctual atom-force is the individual, in the organic the cell. Here all thought begins with instinct, which is nothing else than purposive action without consciousness of the purpose or even conscious willing of the means to an unconsciously

willed end. And thus every organism is "an architectonic work of art." Reflex movements and automatic acts are unconscious teleological reactions of lower nerve-centres. Consciousness itself is no doubt connected with a central nervous system, but everything logical is, according to Hartmann, as according to Windelband or James, also teleological, and mechanical causality, such as science demands, is, thus, only a special case of teleological causality.

If, however, the "omniscient unconsciousness" has brought forth this world of ours, Leibniz is right against Spinoza. This world is the best of all possible worlds, even if it has some defects. It would have been better if there had been no world, but as there must be some world, it is well that there exists this world rather than any other. For from will arises only the 'that' of things, the blind force, the mechanico-causally working energy, but from idea arises the 'what' of things, their essence and purpose that is always becoming more and more conscious. The meaning of this world-process can therefore be nothing else than science and philosophy which teach us to enter consciously into the whole process of the evolution of the world. Schopenhauer stood at the beginning but Hegel stands at the end of that evolutionistic optimism to which Eduard v. Hartmann has gradually with energy worked himself up and which he has with greater and greater zeal accepted.

Out of the heaps of writings and counter-writings for and against Hartmann which have grown to the bulk of a State library, we cannot help extracting the beautiful and creditable study which his enthusiastic disciple and indefatigable apostle, Arthur Drews, has dedicated to Hartmann, namely, *Eduard v. Hartmanns Philosophie im Grundriss* (Edward V. Hartmann's Philosophy in outline, 1902). The greater half of the posthumous work *System der Philosophie im Grundriss* (System of philosophy in outline) has appeared (Published by Haacke in Bad Salza). Vol. I contains the outlines of the

theory of knowledge, Vol. II the outlines of nature-philosophy, Vol. III the outlines of psychology, Vol. IV the outlines of metaphysics (1908). So far the publication of the grand posthumous work containing the life-work of the powerful thinker and giving it a final expression, has proceeded up to July, 1908.* The next four volumes will contain the following: Vol. V will contain the outlines of axiology, Vol. VI those of ethical principles, Vol. VII those of the philosophy of religion, Vol. VIII the outlines of aesthetics. An appreciative, in the best sense popular, estimate of Edward v. Hartmann is given by Theodor Kappstein in his introduction to his thoughts which forms the lectures delivered at the Berlin Free High School (Gotha, 1907).

One side of his philosophical work has been placed in the foreground of philosophical discussion in these days by recent philosophers (Erhardt, Busse, Wentscher, Külpe) and that is that correlativism or conformity-system which has again to-day begun to create a school, of which Eduard V. Hartmann is and will always remain the founder and most important representative. Here v. Hartmann opposes the logicians of the school of Kant (of which Cohen is the head) with as much energy and resolution as the psychologists (Brentano) and pure phenomenologists (Mach). V. Hartmann opposes all monism of consciousness which resolves the real world, the real, and indeed everything objective into phenomena of consciousness, whether into eternal ideas with Plato, Kant and Cohen, or into a complex of sensations with Protagoras, Berkeley, Hume and Mach. The final result of such a subjectivism, Hartmann says, is and always remains such as is represented most clearly by the Austrian thinker, v. Schubert-Soldern. But even the immanence philosophy of Schuppe and Rehmke is not viewed

* The present work, it must be remembered, was written in September, 1908.—
Translator.

with favour by Hartmann. If one takes one's stand with Kant upon the principle that we can know only phenomena and never things-in-themselves, solipsism is the inevitable consequence. Hartmann opposes to this transcendental idealism (Cohen) as well as to phenomenalism (Mach), his realism or correlativism. Consequently, the properties and reciprocal relations of things are to be regarded as very real and not as purely phenomenal, because thing and appearance are eternally combined in the transcendental causality of the unconscious. Hartmann accepts for this hypothesis neither the doctrine of parallelism of Spinoza nor the pre-established harmony of Leibniz, but he calls his dualistic solution a conformity-system. The existence-form of things and the thought-form of intellect agree eternally with each other because they coincide in the Absolute, the Unconscious. Hence also the universal rule of logical laws. Reality of consciousness and the external world do not exclude but imply each other; the whole world-process, especially, realises this eternal thought-process of inner and outer, of subject and object, of idea and will in a purposive nature-regularity which realises the tendencies of the unconscious in strict rhythm. With these epistemological discussions Hartmann has thrown himself energetically and successfully into the struggle of the philosophical views of to-day.

As we have been gradually accustomed, ever since the Leibnizian discovery of infinitesimals, of the summation of endlessly small effects, to see in every apparent state of rest only an infinitely small motion, so long-forgotten scientific theories lead an infinitely small life till a philosophical reviver appears who again kindles the flame of life smouldering in the ashes into a bright glow. Such a revival realism experiences to-day, and this realism v. Hartmann calls transcendental realism, while mention is made of the similar attempts of important correlativists (Erhardt, Wentscher, Busse). The problem of life is, however, the central problem of v.

Hartmann. From this point the best view can be obtained of his philosophy, especially, his neo-realism. The mechanical theory of life which sought to refer absolutely all phenomena of life to physico-chemical processes and thus to resolve all biology finally into mechanics, had so ruled unchecked a whole generation that all vitalism, as we have already seen, was placed under a ban.

At the Göttingen Conference of scientists of the year 1854 "life-force" stood in the centre of the great debate which divided all science into two camps. The religious disputes of the Middle Ages and the religious congresses of to-day are not more heated or passionate than the disputes among scientists in those days. No doubt shortly before this (1852) Rudolf Wagner's *Physiologische Briefe* had appeared. Jakob Moleschott's *Kreislauf des Lebens* and Karl Vogt's *Bilder aus dem Tierleben* expressed the scientific tendency of the day. The two fiery works on the dispute regarding materialism, Karl Vogt's *Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft* and Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff* appeared first after the scientific conference which ought to be regarded as of great importance for the question of life-force.

The movement against a special "life-force" was stirred into activity by Hermann Lotze's articles "Life" and "Life-force" in Wagner's *Handwörterbuch der Physiologie*, Vol. I. Lotze could so little gain the reputation of being a materialistic fire-brand that Karl Vogt denounced him as a shock-headed Peter and a "co-manufacturer of the true Göttingen soul-substance." If Lotze's article "Life-force" had such a great effect that it destroyed, to use a word of Friedrich Albert Lange, the phantom of life-force and worked in the lumber-room of superstition, it is no wonder that the derivation of life from a special life-force was finally abandoned. To crown everything, the lamps of science—Rudolf Virchow and Emil du Bois-Reymond—gave the vitalistic theory the official death-certificate and so no scientist dared hold

a brief for this theory which lay in the mausoleum of science. Whoever dared in the eighties, when Darwin and Haeckel made a triumphal march through the region of science, make a vitalistic confession, was at once silenced by the order of the materialists, "Crucify him". It is still an old experience that the negative dogmatists who in the radicalism of their youthful days have fought with vigour and energy for the "freedom of science" become arch-fanatists as soon as their theories become the ruling dogmas of the age and a bold questioner has the audacity to examine critically the radicalism of these theories hardened into a dogma.

It is not the scientific men who stand under the sway of a ruling theory who have generally the courage for anachronism but the philosophers who make the theories. Philosophers are the born disturbers of thought and kindlers of feeling. Where others see solutions, they perceive problems. The full stops of scientists and marks of exclamation of theologians have very often been transformed secretly by the philosophers into pure signs of interrogation. While scientists occupy themselves with atom and ether, with the law of energy and the parallelogram of forces, with mechanical causality and final solution of the "world-riddle," they awaken most the epistemologically-grounded philosopher from his naïve dogmatic slumber. While theologians try to stop all problems which agitate us by such words as Divine Order of the world, omnipotence, omniscience, all-comprehending goodness of the creator, philosophers won't rest here before they have boldly examined their contents and found whether they contain true down or only sea-weed. And thus these eternal friends of disturbance of the human race do not allow themselves to be imposed upon by any dogmas, whether a positive Church dogma or a negative materialistic one. The most pronounced atheist has as much need of showing his creed to the philosopher as the orthodox believer in Church doctrines. The agreement among masses, the *sensus communis*,

is no decisive argument. For if it were, then the generals of the holy army would boast of an altogether different set of followers from that of the field-m Marshals of science. The compelling authority of number, of "current," of "direction," of "school," of "style," of "party" does not in the least overawe the philosopher. He has the courage to be on the side of the minority and this minority may dwindle down to one person, namely, he himself. The secret of his assured future is his will to stand on his own legs.

Eduard v. Hartmann, the philosopher of the "unconscious," now shows the thinker's great courage of standing on his own legs. After he had made us a present of a "History of Aesthetics" and a history of "Metaphysics" he came in big works to a settlement with the world-view of "modern psychology" and of "modern physics." Then he published (through the publishers Hermann Haacke, Bad Sachsa in Harz) his biological study *Das Problem des Lebens* (The problem of Life) in which he came to an understanding with Darwinism and the anti-vitalistic tendency of the biology of to-day with as much combative spirit as quietness of perception.

Eduard v. Hartmann had from the beginning of his philosophical career, from the time of the appearance of the first edition of the *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (Philosophy of the Unconscious) maintained firmly against all mechanists and anti-vitalists the thesis that the physico-chemical forces and laws are not competent to produce the phenomena of life. Though recognising the results of scientific research as well as of that inductive-experimental method to which they in great measure owe their origin, v. Hartmann, as the straggler and last representative of Schelling's philosophy, which he accepts in great part with certain reservation, has never been compelled to surrender to the mechanical world-view. He himself vigorously and determinedly takes his stand upon exact science. Since the death of Herbert Spencer

there has been hardly any philosopher who can be placed by the side of v. Hartmann as an all-round thinker, except Wilhelm Wundt who stands on the same level with him, so far as the mastery of natural science is concerned, and excels him principally in the mastery of mental sciences (especially in his great work *Folk psychology*). If one, however, understands by *philosophy* the conception of a new formula, the introduction and consistent development of a powerful central thought which from the metaphysical centre of its basic principle sends out rays to the periphery of our whole knowledge, to Nature and history, Eduard v. Hartmann's *Unconscious* comes under consideration by the side of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. For his philosophy can be squeezed into one word having the terseness of a formula, exactly like the criticism of Kant, the ethical pantheism of Fichte, the identity-hypothesis of Spinoza or Schelling, the panlogism of Hegel or the panthelism of Schopenhauer. A world-view of eternal form which comprehends whole provinces of thought leads like a pyramid of knowledge to a highest point, namely, its formula. This is as true of the "atom" of Democritus as of the "becoming" of Heraclitus, the "being" of the Eleatics or the "idea" of Plato. Great philosophical world-views which have to explain in a comprehensive manner all the three kingdoms of nature and along with them the whole province of history, that is, which have to interpret the world of values and ends and systematically incorporate it in the structure of total knowledge, crown the hierarchy of their concepts with a 'highest,' and this 'highest' is the metaphysical formula of the world. Generally, they are not satisfied with the position of a president of a republic; they claim unlimited autocratic rule, the right of self-determination. And thus their formula is for a world-view something akin to what in the ideal of a universal monarchy, according to Th. Campanella or Auguste Comte, *summus episcopus*, whether spiritual or monarchical,

signified. Such a formula Herbert Spencer finally coined in agnosticism and evolutionism. Whoever accepted this fundamental thought became a philosophical citizen, exactly as one is classified in religious matters as soon as one accepts Jehova, Christ, Luther or Muhammad. A catchword like "one God" "Son of God," "trinity," "prophet" suffices to characterise exhaustively a whole religious world-view.

What happens in the case of religious conceptions happens also to metaphysics. The principle of economy of force in the spiritual region requires the tracing back of a world-view to a highest expression. In this respect there is no one among modern thinkers who can be placed by the side of v. Hartmann who could satisfy fully this requirement owing to the brevity and freedom from ambiguity of his "formula." Wundt's voluntarism, Mach's phenomenalism, Ostwald's energism, of which one could think in this connexion have not at all the pointedness suitable to a programme which Eduard v. Hartmann's "unconscious" has. Whatever be the relation of one's own creed to Hartmann's "unconscious," everyone familiar with these things can understand at once from the catchword "unconscious" of what view of the world which can lay claim to inner logical completeness the question is. The philosopher of the "unconscious" was and remained throughout his life a vitalist, in spite of Darwin and Haeckel, du Bois and Kölliker. And the vitalistic hermit saw towards the end of his days with proud satisfaction a good number of neo-vitalistic fellow-combatants gathered round him who now calmly, now loudly accepted Eduard v. Hartmann. There can be no talk, v. Hartmann says clearly, of a victory of vitalism at present. The biologists who openly declare themselves in favour of it, such as Driesch and Reinke, stand isolated still. But the self-certainty of natural sciences, in comparison with which they ridicule vitalism as a perfectly unscientific, antiquated and refuted standpoint, is already powerfully shaken. In biological works and professional writings vitalism has

again become a problem for discussion, while for thirty years it was subjected to violent criticism and belief in it sufficed to discredit a thinker as a scientifically irresponsible visionary. He who has suffered throughout his life, says v. Hartmann further, from this tendency of the age will know how to value this moderate change; he foresees especially, in the subsequent course of the twentieth century a triumphant success of vitalism.

That in the circle of strict scientists people to-day remember the philosopher Eduard v. Hartmann is in keeping with that great effort of our exact inquirer to reflect once more upon the highest culture-values and to insist upon the final connections in nature and spirit. Wittily did Friedrich Ratzel, the founder of "anthropo-geography" once remark, "After we have come to know the scientific view of the world as a cover which is too small and has besides some holes, we have been forced to turn again to philosophy." This return to philosophy is to-day as much a characteristic of nature-philosophers (of the physicists, Mach and Boltzmann, of the chemist, Ostwald, of the zoologist, Haeckel and the botanists, Wiesner and Reinke) as half a century ago, after the rapid decline and fall of Hegelianism, turning away from philosophy was the principle of the exact scientists. No doubt philosophy has become to-day in its methods and its claims different from what it was in the middle of the last century. It neither pretends, as before, to be the central sun of all the particular sciences nor does it consider it beneath its dignity to learn from the particular sciences. Not to pass by them but to go into them is, as Ostwald Külpe tells us, the new principle of philosophy. The particular sciences begin on their side to understand the necessity and utility of a unification of their activity through philosophy. And so Eduard v. Hartmann became again in his unceasing struggle against Darwinism and in his attempt to establish a vitalistic interpretation of the phenomena of life, honoured even in the circle of strict

scientists. For more than a generation he swam against the current and before his death he very nearly succeeded in attaining his object. His opposition to mechanism and Darwinism, that is, to the purely mechanical interpretation of the phenomena of life, as the Darwin-Spencerian formula of the struggle for existence along with natural selection and choice of the fittest seems to represent, stood deeply rooted in the structure of his system as early as 1866 and thus before the appearance of the *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (First Edition 1868). In the seventies (1873 and 1874) he took up the cudgels against the triumphantly pressing Darwinism which was engulfing with elemental force all the exact special sciences. In his works *Wahrheit und Irrtum im Darwinismus* (Truth and Error in Darwinism) and *Das Unbewusste vom Standpunkt der Physiologie und Deszendenztheorie* (The Unconscious from the standpoint of Physiology and Descent-theory), the latter of which owing to its attempt at a mystification of the public (the work appeared first anonymously under the mask of a scientist who violently criticised Hartmann, whereas in reality it proceeded from him) created bad blood and for a long time remained a blot in v. Hartmann's character, he vehemently opposed Darwin and Haeckel. Hartmann perceived well at that time in the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence, a purely mechanical principle, not however in natural selection, because this works destructively only on the ill-adapted and not in a creative or beneficial manner upon the better adapted. To the idea of evolution, however, v. Hartmann at that time surely stuck fast, so that he came inwardly close to Herbert Spencer who got at second-hand through Coleridge the philosophy of Schelling. His principle of evolution was immanent and unconsciously purposive, so that the idea of "striving for an end" introduced by Karl Ernst von Baer underlay the structure of his thought. And no wonder. Undoubtedly v. Baer, Herbert Spencer and Eduard v. Hartmann represented

new philosophical virile impulses of Schellingian nature-philosophy, late shoots in the tree of philosophy for which the organic is prior to the inorganic. And the neoromantic tendency of our aesthetic literature is in its deepest root quite in keeping with the revival of Schellingian "nature-philosophy" among our exact scientists. Thus the zoologist O. Hamann in his book *Entwicklungslehre und Darwinismus* (The doctrine of evolution and Darwinism), 1892, and the botanist Johannes Reinke in his *Welt als Tat* (World as act) and *Einleitung in die theoretische Biologie* (Introduction to theoretical Biology), 1901, take up decidedly the position which Eduard v. Hartmann more than forty years ago (1866) represented.

About ten years ago Darwinism reached its highest point. The recent biological theory, the mutation doctrine of the Holland scientist, Hugo de Vries, has dealt a death-blow to it. Hermann Friedmann in his *Konvergenz der Organismen* (Convergence of Organisms), 1904, opposed to the Darwinian divergence-theory, according to which production of organism must be explained by the divergence of type from the common ancestors, a convergence-theory which sees, on the contrary, in uniformity, in "homology," the primary factor. Consequently, we are again brought close to Schelling's "mathematics of nature". For Friedmann's convergence-theory traces all development to inner mathematical laws of forms. With this agrees excellently Victor Goldschmidt's discovery (*Harmonie und Komplikation*, 1901). Goldschmidt has not only found strict numerical relations between colours and tones, but he has recently discovered ("Harmonie im Weltenraum" in Ostwald's "Annalen der Natur-philosophie," 1905), a strict proportion between the laws of crystal-formation and the laws of musical harmony which probably extends to the planetary system as a morphologico-rhythmic basic law. And so our recent scientists turn away as much from the purely mechanical, strictly antivitalistic

interpretation of life, as Darwinism retires behind its last entrenchments. A daring skirmisher, E. Dennert, a disciple of the vigorous anti-Darwinian, Albert Wigand, collects his essays under the defiant title *On the death-bed of Darwinism*. But even the leader of our younger German biologists, H. Driesch in Heidelberg, has the audacity to assert that to the clear-sighted, Darwinism is long dead; what now is said for it is not much more than a funeral oration. Out of the voluminous anti-Darwinistic literature of the last five years, Eduard v. Hartmann therefore draws the conclusion that the theory of descent is well-founded but the selection theory of Darwin has nothing positive to offer us. By Hugo de Vries saltatory variations are shown, so that new species *can* but not *must* arise through minimal variations. Instead of the "chance" of Darwin, there always appears more clearly and more markedly an "evolutionary tendency guided by a plan through inner causes." What Darwin's formula would and should do, namely, explain purposive results from mechanical causes, has been shown to be incapable of being done. The Spencerian formula of survival of the fittest retains as before its meaning of "preservation of the equilibrium of adaptation of the parts of the organism to one another and of the organism to its environment" but has no more the significance of a fundamental insight into the mechanism of life; it retains rather the meaning of "a latch or coupling chain".

From the time of Democritus, the typical representative of mechanical causality, and Anaxagoras, the discoverer of a purposive world-spirit (Noûs), we have been perpetually oscillating between mechanism and teleology. Wave follows wave. A current of the mechanical view of the world (Democritus, Galileo, Hobbes, Spinoza, "Système de la Nature") is always followed by a teleological current (Aristotle, Leibniz). Conformity to law or conformity to an end—so has run the *aut-aut* of contending philosophical schools and Church-parties for nearly two thousand and three hundred years. If

strict (mechanical) world-laws rule in nature, then there is no room for any world-intelligence working with purpose. If, on the other hand, a demiurge, a Divine world-architect, constructs a universe full of plan, meaning and end, where can there be anything imperfect, purposeless, irrational in nature and spirit? Mechanical causality cannot explain whence the relatively purposeful, whence beauty and harmony, order and rhythm, in short, the mathematics of nature arise; transcendental teleology, the so-called finality, on the other hand, is choked by the problem of theodicy. It cannot render intelligible how the illogical and irrational, the erroneous and the clumsy, the miserable and the spoilt, in short, "evil" or the "bad" could enter the world. Or, should there be an intermediate synthesis between the eternal opposites, mechanism and teleology? Should the whole problem *Mechanism vs. Teleology* be placed in the end not upon an *aut-aut* but upon a *vel-vel*, as Giordano Bruno thought? Would it be in the end perfectly conceivable that all mechanical causality is to be looked upon as only a special case of an all-embracing world-purposiveness? If it would, then surely could the opposed pair be reconciled with each other and the world-dissonance resolved into a harmonious accord.

This is in fact the reconciliatory or intermediary aspect of Eduard v. Hartmann's standpoint which brings him close to Bruno and Leibniz. One has no logical right to call him a strict vitalist or even a champion of "life-force". He denied mechanism so little that he rather, like his scientific model Leibniz, unhesitatingly and entirely took it for granted. But as once for Schelling life was the primary thing, so that all matter, everything dumb and apparently lifeless was regarded only as extinguished life, and as Leibniz showed all rest to be only imperceptible motion, so Eduard v. Hartmann tried to represent pure mechanism as inadequate for the complete derivation of all the phenomena of life from geology, physics, chemistry and physiology. By this, however, the efficiency

of mechanism was not denied: only the province of its validity became more limited. Mechanism stops before the problem of life. Here steps in the neo-vitalistic movement of the present day. Already Lotze, the valiant champion of the mechanical interpretation of life-process and highly honoured dragon-killer of "life-force", perceived that a pure mechanism of action could not guarantee a wholly satisfactory, self-contained world-view. For "the machinery of occurrences" does show ends and values which it has to realise. The existence of the world as well as the law of its evolution which we find before us points to ends whose being it is. If thus mechanism is the "externally appearing legal form" of occurrences, the deep meaning and inner significance of mechanism will only be clear when one looks upon it as a special case of a comprehensive world-purpose. And thus the physiologist v. Bunge in Basel says in his *Lehrbuch der Physiologie des Menschen* (Text-book of human physiology), 1901 Vol. I, p. 3: In the smallest cell there already lie before us all the mysteries of life and in the investigation of the smallest cell we have attained what we can with the help of what has hitherto served us as tools. Self-observation, inner sense should therefore come to the aid of physics, while we proceed from the known, the inner world, in order to explain the unknown, the outer world. In the later editions of his *Text-book* he uses the name *idealism* in place of the coined words *vitalism* and *life-force*.

In fact, "life-force" is a disreputable thing so far as nature-philosophy is concerned. Ever since the days of the *spiritus animalis* (*esprits animaux* of Descartes and Leibniz) of the Stoics and the entelechy of Aristotle, these life-spirits have appeared in a hundred forms and in the most varied company. The "spiritual fluid" or "life-spirit" of Paracelsus, the "life-force" of Haller, the "formative impulse" of Blumenbach etc. are all, as Hartmann points out, so many shades of the old vitalism which has completely lost its scientific credit. One comes near the magicians and alchemists when one postulates

instead of a scientifically adequate derivation of a *vera causa* in the sense of Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo, a *qualitas occulta*, a "hidden force". A presupposed "life-force" is a *petitio principii* and thus no answer but a further evasion.

The neo-vitalists of the school of Hartmann absolutely give up the old name *life-force*. Since the declaration of its bankruptcy by Lotze no vitalist dares give it a *restitutio in integrum*. Nay, the leader of the neo-vitalists, Bunge, himself says, "It would be a mistake to expect that we could with the same senses ever discover in living Nature anything which could not be found in lifeless Nature. Of a restoration of "life-force" which has been destroyed by Lotze, the neo-vitalists even do not at all speak. But Lotze himself, the man who read the funeral oration of "life-force", found himself compelled to concede to the teleological view of the world a place by the side of the mechanical. For life, according to Herbert Spencer, is "movement, adapted to ends" and thus this self-adaptation to the end of self-preservation or equilibrium is no more a mechanical principle of choice, as Spencer thought, but a phenomenon which is to be looked upon as thoroughly teleological. If K. Ernst v. Baer's "striving for an end" which Herbert Spencer with true enthusiasm welcomed, gave the teleological along with the mechanical view the scientific right to exist, Fechner clearly said that the causal and the teleological view should be looked upon as supplementing each other and not, as was often done, as such that one was to be rejected for the sake of the other. Only the defective exposition of the teleological view, such as we find in such eminent thinkers as Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, has led to this, that the strictly mechanical seventeenth century which moved essentially along the paths of Democritus and Galileo conceived a formless "horror teleologiae" which Kant himself in his *Judgment* so far shared that he saw in teleology only a way in which men look at things but no way in which Nature itself works,

and thus only a regulative and heuristic and no constitutive principle. Leibniz alone had the great courage of thought to stand unhesitatingly for a teleology in the sense of the Aristotelian-Stoic doctrine.

It is, moreover, not an accident that Leibniz brought the teleological view of the world again to a position of honour, so that Lotze and Fechner, Herbart, Wundt and Eduard v. Hartmann stand nearer to Leibniz than any philosopher of the seventeenth century. Leibniz was in fact the only *biologist* among the philosophers of his age. The discovery of micro-organisms by the Dutchmen Swammerdam and Leewenhoek, as well as by the Italian Malpighi exercised, as we already know, the greatest influence upon Leibniz and gave a most important turn to the formulation of his doctrine of monads. Associated with the infinitesimal, the infinitely small motion, there stood for him the unconscious, that is, infinitely small representations and micro-organisms or infinitely small living beings. All this taken together, led him to the theory of monads, that is, to infinitely small force or energy-points. Into this point of unity, life, motion, sensation and even unity of end (Aristotelian entelechy) are put. No doubt Leibniz was too great a scientist to reject the most happy principle of explanation which the human spirit has conceived for mastering the forces of nature which stand above it, namely, mechanism. But mechanism is with him not primary but secondary; the teleological principle of explanation is placed above the causal. Mechanical causality is one of the ways, perhaps the most important way, in which the all-comprehending Divine end, finality, attains its hidden objects. And thus there appears that reconciliation of the opposition between causality and finality, between mechanism and teleology which appears triumphantly to-day in the neo-vitalistic movement under the lead of Eduard v. Hartmann: teleology is the highest concept, the highest principle of order, the logical generic concept in which

mechanism as a subordinate species is incorporated and under which it is subsumed. Teleology is *also* causal, that is, conformable to an end, but not *simply* causal, that is not conformable to purely natural law. Natural laws and laws of ends are no opposites, but they are related to each other as the parts to the whole, as the individual to the race, as species to genus. Natural law is contained as a special case in the law of ends, as in its highest generic concept ; this is so true that the comprehensive world-end or God can with the help of mechanism, that is, the mechanico-causal conformity to natural laws, attain in the best and surest way the ends fixed by it.

What put fresh blood into the neo-vitalistic movement and brought it very close to Leibniz, was the movement of our scientists from atomism to dynamism, from the dead constancy of the smallest particles of body to the equilibrium of energies or force-points. According to Ostwald, life is to be regarded as a special quality of energy which according to the principle of energy develops from inorganic forms of energy and is transformed back into them. Purposive, says Ostwald, is everything which increases the duration of a thing, purposeless, everything which diminishes it. In the more highly developed creatures, a new form of energy appears, namely, "nerve-energy". In place of the old "life-force" there appears thus in Ostwald "nerve-energy", in Johannes Reinke "formative dominant" (the Stoic *ἡγεμονιχόν*), in H. Driesch, lastly, "vital agent" (the Aristotelian *εντελεχεια*). For the concept of entelechy which Driesch interprets as "intensive manifoldness", see especially, his *Organische Regulationen*, 1901, p. 203 as well as his article *Das Leben und der zweite Energiesatz* in Ostwald's "Annalen der Naturphilosophie," Vol. VII, July, 1908, p. 202. The mathematician Heinrich Weber introduces his *Enzyklopädie der elementaren Algebra und Analyse* (Encyclopaedia of Elementary Algebra and Analysis) with the words: The human spirit

has the capacity in the flow of impressions, sensations, representations, thoughts working upon one another, to set a certain group over against all others and to conceive it as a unity. This limitation exists wholly in our arbitrary will; we let ourselves for this reason be guided by purposive grounds. Even the unity of self appears to the nature-philosophers of to-day to be a "unity of end". The more the physics of to-day, by virtue of the discoveries of helium and radium which have destroyed our hitherto prevalent conception of atom, tends towards the ion and electron theories, to the electro-magnetic view of the world, the more, that is, the dynamic view of the world becomes prominent, the more grist is put into the neo-vitalistic mill. Even an energetic opponent of all neo-vitalism, Edmund König *Ueber Naturzwecke* (On the ends of nature), Wundt's "Philos. Studien" 1902 p. 418) felt bound to admit that the neo-vitalistic and anti-Darwinistic opposition which about ten years ago had been so feeble had now become a powerful movement which would probably end in the victory of teleology. I see in the neo-vitalistic movement of to-day a justifiable counter-movement, an unceasing re-action against one-sided mechanism and materialism, against naturalism and positivism. I am, however, fully conscious that in mechanism, as in teleology, we have to do only with anthropomorphism. The causal view generalises the constant elements, the purposive view the changeable elements of our inner life. This teleological thought is, as Mach says, a purposive form of thought. In causality, as P. N. Cossmann very well remarks, human knowledge, in teleology, human will is projected outside and put into nature. If the understanding predominates; we incline to the causal form of anthropomorphism, if, on the other hand, feeling or will predominates, there appears the teleological view.

It will thus be understood why the great rationalists of the type of Spinoza place in the front rank the mathematical

method, whereas scientific thinkers of the type of Leibniz and Eduard v. Hartmann give preference to the biological method and thus always lead back to empirical teleology or even to final ends. And the crisis in the philosophy of the present day is to be traced to this, that biological problems which have stood for half a century in the foreground of scientific interest have deprived the materialistic view of the world which is built on mechanical causality, of its strongest support. Not the rest of atoms or matter, but the motion of energies or force-points satisfies at present our need for a starting-point in the world. The physicists have mostly to do with phenomena the succession of which represents a constant quantity, and consequently, they often favour the concept of substance of Spinoza or Democritus; the biologists, on the other hand, have for the most part to do with phenomena the recurrence of which represents a variable quantity and they therefore naturally incline to Leibniz or Aristotle. As biology at present takes the lead, the star of Spinoza dwindles before that of Leibniz and Eduard v. Hartmann.

Human knowledge moves, above all, in spirals. So long as materialism, naturalism and Darwinism led the way in natural science, so that they over-ruled all philosophical counter-arguments, a special life-principle, as every teleological view in general, was absolutely rejected. To-day the scientist himself resolves matter either into a permanent complex of sensations (Mach) or into a product of forces (Tyndall, or lastly, into an equilibrium of energies. The dynamism of Boscovich and Ampère to which Kant also adhered with Leibniz, leads to the mechanism of Huyghens and Hertz, in order in its turn to make room for the energism of Mach, Helm and Ostwald. The "substantial mass" as the fundamental concept of physics is retiring from the whole line of scientific research work with the dynamico-energistic physics, however, a teleologically inclined biology goes hand in hand. Biology, says Eduard v. Hartmann, has begun to

perceive that it has stormed only the outer walls of the fortress to be conquered with the physico-chemical methods of inquiry, and has not at all penetrated to the inner region, the essence of life. The physico-chemical laws of inorganic nature are the strong foundation on which the proud structure of biology, the theory of life, must be built. One will therefore never again accept with the older vitalists a special life-substance, a separate fluid or elixir, as the alchemists did. The "Paracelsian conception" of a purely materialistic type may haunt the "occultists and theosophists", but it has no scientific value, as the principle of life does not break the physico-mechanical laws or do away with them, but only supplements and extends them. One should not, however, with coarse anthropomorphism ascribe to this principle any conscious end. For that would be making this life-principle a "personal demon" which people would apriorise after the manner of Platonic anamnesis, through hasty anticipation of all knowledge of the laws of nature. As little will one fall again into the Schellingian pantheism with an aesthetic colouring. Lastly, this life-principle cannot be conceived as an individual; as little can we represent it "as a given something allotted to every individual in a certain proportion along with the path of life". For out of the impregnated germ the life-principle blossoms forth, then stops and disappears completely with death. Consequently, the life-principle, according to the neo-vitalistic formula of Eduard v. Hartmann, must be immaterial, unconscious and over-individual. As an immaterial principle it can neither be matter nor a material exerting mechanical force, nor a dimensionless point (the central monad of Leibniz, the real of Herbart) moving through life, but it must be a dynamic principle which is not connected with any matter, which does no work, does not work from a fixed point (centre of force), is not subject to energistic and mechanical laws, but respects the energistic laws in the organism and places

itself under the mechanical laws of the atoms of the body.

This clear conception of Hartmann's neo-vitalism is, however, disturbed by a remnant of unperceived anthropomorphism. If the vital agent, that life-principle which supplements mechanical causality, is not "in its turn" subject to mechanical laws, how is it that the energistic laws in the organism are "respected"? Is not an echo of an anthropomorphic tendency not yet overcome found in this 'respecting'? Here I cannot go with Edward v. Hartmann, although I regard v. Hartmann's *Problem des Lebens* (Problem of Life) as one of the most illuminating, fruitful and conclusive works in the whole realm of biological literature. Why the life-principle, the essence of which V. Bunge has sought in "activity", quietly takes for granted and recognises mechanism and chemism in our organism, is not made clear by a simple "respect". It must be clearly understood that I do not find fault with Eduard v. Hartmann for this "anthropomorphism". Only one must know clearly that one meets it. I rather, as I have repeatedly said, look upon every explanation of the world as a finer or coarser anthropomorphism. It is always the unity of our own self which we lend to the hypostatised unity outside, the unity of the world-ground, of the universe or God. Both types of metaphysical systems, mechanism and teleology, feel the inner necessity of thought for objectifying the unifying function of consciousness, projecting it to something transsubjective, to something external, and by virtue of the immanent need of unity or order of mankind, for thinking of this, which has been projected outside by it, as existing in something external, whether this 'external' is called atom, matter, not-I or nature.

In reality we carry always only the order in the succession of our inner experience over to this necessarily conceived 'external'. In our inner experience, however, two series of order appear clearly. The first is a strong, perfectly connected

order which does not allow any violations or departures in the flow of the association of representations and this spiritual constant we join to our highest law or universal concept or a universal proposition or category, namely, causality. Causality is thus nothing else than an expression, condensed into a concept, of an infallible constancy not admitting of any exception in the flow of our representations. What we regard as necessarily appearing we formulate either physically, as the real ground (through nature-necessity), or logically as the ground of knowledge (through thought-necessity.) We ascribe thereby the laws of association within the world of our representations to the conceived motion of this 'external'. By the side of this strict order, this logical fate to which the emotional religious thought has ascribed the characteristics, prevision, predestination, *kismet*, and to which rational thought has given the name determinism, we observe a second series in the flow of our representations which appears much more loose, unconnected and movable. The second series shows no doubt also a fixed rhythm in the flow of representations but not such a fixed and unchanging one as the first. And this second order-series makes itself evident when we put this flow of representations under the point of view of the end. The end is related to the means as cause to effect, as stimulation to sensation, as reason to consequence. Only, whereas the three last introduced causal forms belong to the first order-series which allows no exception in the sequence of consciousness, the relation of end and means admits very well of exceptions. Otherwise expressed, logical, psychological and physical causality shows an *absolute*, teleological causality only a *relative* order, an order in the flow of our inner experiences. There, the process of association in our consciousness represents a constant quantity; here, a variable one.

Causal explanation will always be effective where the question is of a past occurrence which is under our scientific

control, while the teleological mode of interpretation is in place where the question is of deducing the actual present, not from the past but from the future, the plan and the end. In the human sperm, for example, the egg-cell, the whole past of the race, looked backwards, is condensed; looked forwards, on the other hand, the whole anatomico-physiological course of evolution of the living being in question is foreshadowed in it. In this previously indicated end of the egg-cells the separate organs gradually grow according to mechanical laws. The structure of the cells or the organism of the element (Brücke) is, as it were, the herald of ends and purposes. The limbs and organs of man are potentially contained in the germ-plasm from which it springs. If one takes as fundamental the concept of cause, the parts are earlier than the whole; if one places, however, the concept of end in the foreground, the whole (plan, end) is earlier than the parts. As we, however, predominantly think *more biologico* because occupation with the phenomena of life rules all our scientific interest, it is only natural that our custom of thinking inclines again to the teleological meaning of events. For "the problem of life" is—as Eduard v. Hartmann has once for all shown—not at all to be solved without the help of the view of end.

The neo-realistic movement of the present day which is connected with Herbart's "reals," the idealism of v. Kirchmann, further, the transcendental realism of v. Hartmann, the correlativism of Busse, Wentscher and Erhardt, the reality-standpoint of O. Külpe and E. Dürr all proceed—most of them without knowing it, all of them without willing it—from Trendelenburg who first brought Aristotle again to our view, just as once Descartes did against the Ramists, sceptics and followers of Bacon. As Aristotle, in opposition to his master Plato, set up dualism and rescued experience, sensation, the concrete particular thing, the independence of matter by the side of the form, and thereby became a teleologist and

vitalist, so Trendelenburg defended the right of "realities," of "objects," of "facts". The "thing-in-itself" of Kant has, it is true, been allowed to fall in order the more thoroughly to let in "things-in-themselves". Rudolf Eucken has in a most pointed manner (Speech on the occasion of the centenary in Eutin on the 29th November, 1902, published in the "Deutsche Rundschau", Vol. 29, 1902, No. 3 pp. 448-454,) brought to our notice how deep the marks are which Trendelenburg, in spite of his one-sided Aristotelianism, probably even on account of this intentional one-sidedness, has left on modern thought, especially on the neo-realistic mode of thinking. What Kant has done for Plato, Trendelenburg has done for Aristotle. His *Logische Untersuchungen* (Logical Inquiries), Third Edition, 1870, is and will always remain the groundwork of that realistic counter-movement which Trendelenburg has introduced against the Platonising Kant as also against all one-sided idealism. In the celebrated dispute between Trendelenburg and Kuno Fischer which Windelband recently in his Festschrift entitled *Kuno Fischer und sein Kant* so excellently parodied, there stood at first in mutual opposition both the interpretations of Kant which form to-day the shibboleth of the Kantian philologists. As Cohen has brought into prominence the Platonic-idealistic element, so Riehl has rendered prominent the realistic element in Kant. But Trendelenburg could not stop at a mere interpretation of Kant but proceeded to attack Kant's doctrine of space and time in its subjective-phenomenalistic structure.

In the *Logische Untersuchungen* (Logical Inquiries), as well as in his *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie* (Historical Contributions to Philosophy), pp. 216 sq., Trendelenburg opposes the elimination and phenomenalisation of the world of things, as Lotze perhaps did. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel bring out the idealistic, Herbart, Trendelenburg and Lotze the realistic side with great emphasis. The former represent a genial-speculative metaphysics: the latter an empirico-inductive

metaphysics based on the results of the sciences of reality. The former operate only with "appearances," the latter emphasise the right of the world of things. Especially, according to Herbart, the proposition holds good: As much appearance, so much reference to being. The Lotzean "occasionalism" especially, which opposes to the psycho-physical parallelism of Spinoza the theory of the reciprocal action between the body and the soul, tries with the help of the theory of "local signs" and the acceptance of "topogenic elements" of the outer world, to master the problem whence the anticipation of reality on the part of the logical functions of our understanding can arise. In "reality", the "external", the "real", "things," there are, according to Lotze, elements which lead us to our functions of space, time and causality. The origin of these functions is traced to the influence of external things upon our senses, although its validity goes far beyond that of the series with their 'here' and 'now.'

Still more resolutely does Trendelenburg oppose the subjectivo-phenomenalistic interpretation of Kant. If one even admits, thinks Trendelenburg, that space and time are subjective conditions which in us precede perception and experience, still it can in no way be proved that they cannot also be at the same time objective forms. Trendelenburg may be wrong in his reproach of Kant that Kant did not think of the possibility that they could be both at the same time as Kant naturally did not only know this possibility but emphatically rejected it as an "amphiboly of reflective concepts." Every kind of concordance or correspondence of the outer and the inner, whether it is the occasionalistic one of Geulincx and Malebranche, or the solution of Spinoza's parallelism, or, lastly, the pre-established harmony of Leibniz is directly rejected owing to the "amphiboly of reflective concepts". On the other hand, Trendelenburg is right when against Kant he objects that "in the proposition Space and time are 'only' something

subjective" the exclusive particle 'only' is not justified". Trendelenburg rather arrives at the result that we can in no way deny space and time to things simply because Kant found them in thought. The two do not exclude each other but rather help each other in healthy intercourse. And Eduard v. Hartmann takes his stand wholly on the Trendelenburgian standpoint against Kant. Nothing, according to v. Hartmann, stands in the way of our admitting that the impulse to space-conception proceeds from things-in-themselves which impel the soul to the creation of space (This question is the starting-point of the article of Dr. J. Sinnreich, *Der transzendente Realismus oder Korrelativismus unserer Tage* (The transcendental realism or correlativism of the present day) in my *Berner Studien zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte*. (Bern Studies on Philosophy and its History Vol. 40, 1905 p. 29 sq.)

The reality of things is emphasised more strongly by the recent metaphysicians, Erhardt and Ludwig Busse than by v. Hartmann. The latter might, it is true, always be a transcendental realist, still through his monism of the unconscious he was metaphysically forced to take reality as an attribute of the unconscious. But the recent metaphysicians do not shrink from a dualism in the Cartesian sense. If we proceed from a critique of psychophysical parallelism which through Fechner and Wundt has become the ruling doctrine in modern psychology, the advantages of the Lotzean hypothesis of reciprocal action are brought into view.

Franz Erhardt (*Metaphysik und Erkenntnistheorie* Vol. I, 1894; *Mechanismus und Teleologie* 1890; *Psychophysischer Parallelismus und erkenntnistheoretischer Idealismus* 1901) defends against v. Hartmann the ideality of space and time but questions the validity of the Kantian doctrine of categories. Only in this Erhardt and Busse are agreed with v. Hartmann, that there must be things-in-themselves (not

the Kantian noumenon, "thing-in-itself") as otherwise it would not be possible to understand where the differences among phenomena lay. Causality is thus not limited to appearances but refers to things-in-themselves which underlie them. From the constancy of the effects upon our senses, a constancy of the "affecting things" must be inferred. If there were nothing in objects which was conformable to a law, then the same objects could not always affect us in the same way and different objects in different ways. The problem of "affection" was as before the crux of the Kantian philosophy and has brought upon its head the following bad term of ridicule: Without the thing-in-itself one does not arrive at the Kantian philosophy, but with it one cannot remain in it.

The problem of "affection" leads Fichte to strict idealism but it leads the correlativists to dualism, *i.e.*, to the recognition of the reality of the external world. Maimon, Fichte and v. Hartmann have taken the unconscious to be the source of "affection"; whoever, however, absolutely rejects the unconscious must seek the ground of the "affection" in the objects themselves. Thereby clearly the Cartesian fundamental question regarding the relation between the body and the soul again makes its appearance. But the correlativists do not shun the old struggle: they only try to perceive new aspects of the old question.

Ludwig Busse (*Philosophie und Erkenntnistheorie* Leipzig 1894, *Geist und Körper, Seele und Leib* 1903; *Die Weltanschauungen der grossen Philosophen der Vorzeit* "Aus Natur und Geist" Vol. 56 Leipzig, Teubner 1906), takes up a hostile attitude, not only in the works mentioned above but also in a series of vigorous writings (at first in the "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie," later in the "Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik" edited by him till 1908), towards Spinozistic parallelism in the

sense of Lotze's theory of reciprocal action. Mechanical psychology is no less represented by Busse than pluralistic psychology. The soul-substance which had come into great disrepute, so that even panpsychists of the type of Paulsen who continued Fechner's empirical metaphysics had for it the term of ridicule *Wirklichkeitsklötzchen* (Reality-blocks), was again brought to a position of honour by Busse with estimable frankness, nay, with speculative courage. But for Busse the not-self, the world *extra mentem* is just as real as the self. Busse places before us the following alternative. Either being is only 'I' without the thought of the 'not-I,' or it is the 'I' with the thought of the 'not-I.' The recognition of the reality of the outer world is in his eyes the only way to escape the otherwise inevitable solipsism. With regard to space Busse makes, it is true, great concessions to Kantian subjectivism, but not with regard to time. Time is real. If one wishes to save the concepts, progress, development, end and freedom, one must accept time as real.

Masked idealists undoubtedly the so-called correlativists are, in spite of their assertion of the reality of the external world. Von Hartmann himself can be spoken of as a monist of the "unconscious" and yet only as an idealist. Busse therefore with reason places him among the idealists; especially, the "philosophy of identity" of Schelling was and always remained the model for v. Hartmann. Even Lotze gradually transformed his view of the world which was in the beginning dualistic, into a monistico-spiritualistic one. No better success has met Erhardt to whom experience is no doubt the starting-point but is nevertheless not the end of inquiry. If he also accepts the outer world as real, he still reaches in his metaphysics a system of immaterial forces which reminds one of Leibniz, as even Herbart and Lotze lead from Kant to Leibniz. Lastly, Ludwig Busse also accepts an idealistico-spiritualistic world-view, whilst he takes for the fundamental constituent of reality a single world-ground, namely, God, as

an omniscient, omnipotent and holy personality. The reality of the outer world he only requires for the basis of the historical and empirical sciences. But he remains an apriorist for logical values that have thought-necessity no less than for absolute ethical values and aesthetic norms.

And thus the correlativism or transcendental realism of the present day is properly no dualism. Just as Descartes called his doubt only "doute hyperbolique," so I might call correlativism in all its three forms mentioned here, an hyperbolic dualism. As in Descartes, doubt forms only the methodological roundabout way to the epistemological establishment of the self-certainty of one's own self as well as of the self of the world, *i.e.* of God, so shows itself in correlativism the claimed reality of the world as a foil which sets off a critically grounded monistico-idealistic world-view. The correlativists all exhibit a leaning towards experience and they take therefore the course of the sciences of reality but they soon lose their breath and in their speculative starting-point they come close to that idealism against which they have in vain fought so bravely.

In his comprehensive criticism of Eduard v. Hartmann, O. Külpe (*Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland* (The philosophy of the present day in Germany), 3rd Edition, 1905, p. 94 sq.) arrives at the result that one must say this to the credit of Hartmann's metaphysics, that it clearly perceives that the reality of consciousness and the reality which we recognise and seek to determine in the sciences of reality are two altogether different things. Hartmann's metaphysics forms an important opposite of immanent philosophy (Schuppe, Rehmke, Kaufmann, v. Schubert-Soldern), of phenomenalism (Mach) and positivism (Avenarius, Göring, Dühring, Laas). "It is true the epistemological basis of transcendental realism is not a satisfactory one and the use of transcendental causality is erroneous.....But Hartmann is undoubtedly one of the most energetic and clear defenders of realism in its struggle

with the anti-metaphysical tendencies in the ranks of scientists and philosophers of to-day." Külpe's critical attitude towards Kant we have already learnt. In his *Grundriss der Psychologie* (Outlines of Psychology), Leipzig, 1893, he still stood near Avenarius but he separated himself in his *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Introduction to Philosophy) and especially, in his *Kant* (1907) gradually from positivism which he had already in his *Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Philosophy of to-day), Leipzig, 1905, pp. 14-37, renounced critically in order to allow the "reality-standpoint" at which he had now arrived, to emerge with a clear outline. Kant's theory of knowledge Külpe will only allow as holding good as a theory of formal sciences which construct, put and determine their own objects. A theory of real sciences, their proper methods and principles, people first attained in very recent times. It lies still always before us as an unexplored land. Külpe therefore divides all sciences into formal and real disciplines. Rationalism must be established again with the aid of, and under the lead of the real sciences whose results are to be considered and worked out thoughtfully. To such a scientific philosophy the future belongs, according to Külpe. Consequently, Külpe calls his standpoint of reality quite opportunely neo-rationalism. The problem of reality, so concludes Külpe his *Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Philosophy of to-day), comes on the crest of the wave of the philosophy of the future.

CHAPTER VII

THE EVOLUTIONISTIC MOVEMENT

(Herbert Spencer and his successors).

The name Herbert Spencer signifies a programme. A world-view which became a ruling view even in the life-time of the philosopher—evolutionism—was incorporated in this great personality. Along with Darwin Spencer has left a spiritual mark upon the second half of the nineteenth century, and coming generations will, when expressing in the most concise form the significance of the age that lies behind us, speak of the age of Darwin and Spencer, just as we speak to-day of the age of Voltaire. To the experimental researches of Darwin, Spencer has given a logical support. Independently of each other, the investigator and the thinker, starting from different points and following different courses have reached the goal of their spiritual wanderings and to their confusion arrived at the same point. In a small essay, "The development hypothesis" which appeared in the "Leader" for March 1852, Spencer opposed, full seven years before the publication of Darwin's great work, the development-theory to the hypothesis of creation. Whilst in this essay the criticism of the creation-hypothesis predominates and the positive construction of the theory of evolution is more indicated than consistently developed, Spencer gives in the essay *Progress: its law and causes* (which appeared in 1857) a positive philosophical sketch of his theory of evolution to which two years later Darwin gave a zoological basis. In a third essay *The ultimate laws of physiology* which likewise appeared two years before Darwin's work, the laws of fitness and heredity in the later Spencerian sense were discussed, so that the

literary priority of Spencer is established, although it must be pointed out that Darwin's work was completed several years before the efforts of his friend Wallace led to its publication. Spencer's theory wanted only further development and a requisite experimental material of proof which Darwin now supplied so very fully.

The current view which was introduced by Taine, the view, namely, that without Darwin's *Origin of Species* Spencer's "synthetic philosophy" is not at all intelligible, requires to be corrected by the historical material before us. In the sketch which Darwin made of his predecessors, Spencer's work plays a most important part. There is no question of borrowing on any side but each side supplements and helps the other. Spencer took from Darwin the principle of "natural selection" which has so much furthered his theory; Darwin owes to Spencer, in the first place, the general philosophical basis, and then, especially, the theory of the "survival of the fittest" which Spencer has added to the Darwinian formula of the struggle for existence and which Darwin has thankfully accepted and completely incorporated in his formula. Spencer frankly says about the work of Darwin: "Darwin has built an enormous mass of facts into a powerful structure of proof. These proofs show that the preservation of the most favoured races in the struggle for existence constitutes the permanently effective cause of the divergence of organic forms. The most developed results of this process Darwin has followed with wonderful keenness of perception". Darwin on his side calls Herbert Spencer the "greatest living philosopher of England, perhaps equal to any of the previous philosophers."

Unfortunately, through modesty Spencer has not published all the letters which Darwin wrote to him. Especially, he suppressed the first letter Darwin wrote to him as it appeared to him too flattering. How his acquaintance with Darwin took place and how the epoch-making

publication of Darwin affected him, Spencer depicts (Autobiography, Vol II, pp. 27-28) most vividly thus :—

I had left London before the end of June ; and it was not until the first of July that the two papers by Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace on the operation of Natural Selection in causing divergence of species were read before the Linnaean Society. I have but a vague impression of the way in which this event become known to me, but my belief is that I remained in ignorance of it until my return to town in October.

A reason confirming me in this belief is furnished by a paragraph contained in a letter to my mother, dated 29th November, which ran as follows :—“ I have been distributing a few volumes of my Essays. Enclosed are some of the acknowledgments from Dr. Latham, Dr. Hooker and Mr. Charles Darwin ”. As the volume had been published in December, 1917, I was, when I came upon this passage, at a loss to understand why this distribution had not been made until November, 1858. But the probable explanation is, that when I learnt the nature of Mr. Darwin's papers and learnt that Dr. Hooker accepted his interpretation, I sent copies of the volume to them and to a few others, because of the essay on the Development Hypothesis contained in it. The following is Mr. Darwin's acknowledgment :—

No, it is not as follows ; for on consideration I decide to omit it. Notwithstanding the compliments it contains, which seemed to negative publication I was about to quote it, because it dispels, more effectually than anything else can, a current error respecting the relation between Darwin's views and my own. But the reproduction of it would be out of taste, and I leave the error to be otherwise corrected.

As now the pioneer work of Darwin appeared, Spencer found himself compelled to revise his firm convictions of twenty years (ever since the appearance of Charles Lyell's *Principles of Geology* in the year 1839) with regard to certain minor points, while the main structure of his world-view was not shaken but rather made more firm by Darwin. Spencer was occupied with a work on the “ physiology of laughter ” when Darwin's work appeared.

While these articles were in hand, the *Origin of Species* was published. That reading it gave me great satisfaction may be safely inferred. Whether there was any set-off to this great satisfaction, I cannot now say, for I have quite forgotten the ideas and feelings I had. Up to that time or

rather up to the time at which the papers by Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace read before the Linnaean Society had become known to me, I held that the sole cause of organic evolution is the inheritance of functionally produced modifications. The *Origin of Species* made it clear to me that I was wrong, and that the larger part of the facts cannot be due to any such cause. (*Autobiography* Vol. II, pp. 49—50.)

The Darwinian theory confirmed Spencer in the belief that the universal thought of evolution formulated by him in close connexion with Lyell's theory of evolution of the earth-crust received a powerful support from the side of biology. What Lyell has done for inorganic nature Darwin has proved conclusively for living organic nature. From this point the generalising philosopher Spencer found his way to his comprehensive world-formula of evolution. If the same laws of evolution hold good in geology as well as in biology, and thus in two of the most important divisions of the universe, then their applicability in the region of society, politics and history must be investigated before they can be raised to the rank of universal world-formulæ.

Organic evolution being a part of Evolution at large, evidently had to be interpreted after the same general manner—had to be explained in physical terms—the changes produced by functional adaptation (which I held to be one of the factors) and the changes produced by “natural selection” had both to be exhibited as resulting from the redistribution of matter and motion everywhere and always going on. Natural selection as ordinarily described, is not comprehended in this universal distribution. It seems to stand apart as an unrelated process. The search for congruity led first of all to perception of the fact that what Mr. Darwin called “natural selection” might more literally be called survival of the fittest. But what is survival of the fittest, considered as an outcome of physical action? The answer presently reached was this: The changes constituting evolution tend ever towards a state of equilibrium. On the way to absolute equilibrium or rest, there is in many cases established for a time, a moving equilibrium—a system of mutually dependent parts severally performing actions subserving maintenance of the combination. Every living organism exhibits such a moving equilibrium—a balanced set of functions constituting its life; and the overthrow of this balanced set of functions or moving equilibrium is what we call death. Some individuals in a species

are so constituted that their moving equilibria are less easily overthrown than those of other individuals and these are the fittest which survive, or, in Mr. Darwin's language, they are the select which nature preserves. And now mark that in recognising the continuance of life as the continuance of a moving equilibrium, early overthrown in some individuals by incident force and not overthrown in others until after they have reproduced their species, we see that the survival and multiplication of the select becomes conceivable in purely physical terms, as an indirect outcome of a complex form of the universal redistribution of matter and motion. (*Autobiography*, Vol. II., Page 100).

So also Darwin's work on the "expression of emotions" Spencer did not accept without some reservation; rather he opposed to it a "theory of music" of his own (See Spencer's letter to Darwin, *Autobiography* Vol. II pp. 238-39).

Only slowly and wearily did the Darwin-Spencerian thought of evolution propagate itself in England. Spencer complains repeatedly that his world-view met with a feeble response in England, while his doctrine found a powerful echo in America and Russia. In Germany, especially, the thought of evolution has been a familiar one from the fourteenth century: the German cardinal Nikolas of Cusa, especially, anticipated the fundamental thoughts of the doctrine of evolution. Even Spencer admits in his *Autobiography* that the supplementation and corroboration which his doctrine of evolution has received at the hands of Charles Darwin has materially helped to prepare the country for its reception and for its recognition.

At that date, as already pointed out, an evolutionary view of Mind was foreign to the ideas of the time and voted absurd; the result of setting it forth being pecuniary loss and much reprobation. Naturally, therefore, after the publication of the *Origin of Species* had caused the current of public opinion to set the other way, a more sympathetic reception was to be counted upon for the doctrine of mental evolution in its elaborate form. "Autobiography" Vol. II, Page 220.

And thus Spencer recognises most clearly that Darwin has explained perfectly a whole mass of otherwise inexplicable facts. The causes which Darwin accepts as such are, according

to Spencer, true causes which we see at work everyday. Darwin's results are therefore in agreement with all those phenomena which organic creation as a whole and also in its separate parts offers us. The personal relation of Spencer to Darwin is cold, tempered, indifferent and reserved; the scientific relation, on the other hand, is warm, respectful, full of mutual recognition and courteous.

How the leading spirits in England looked upon the works of Spencer long before the completion of his great life-work, may be seen from the example of George Henry Lewes, who in the fourth edition of his *History of Philosophy* (1871), when of the works constituting Spencer's synthetic philosophy only *First Principles*, *The Principles of Biology* and the first volume of *The Principles of Psychology* had appeared and of Spencer's proper work, his "Sociology," nothing beyond *Social Statics* had been published, spoke thus of Herbert Spencer: "Spencer's works exercise everyday a greater influence. In spite of the openly and dreadfully hostile attitude of his principles towards those of theology and metaphysics, even his opponents must recognise the force and clearness of his intellect and the breadth and depth of his scientific knowledge. *It is doubtful whether there has ever appeared a thinker of more beautiful parts among our people*; however, the future alone can judge what place he occupies in history. At present he is too near us to make any correct estimate possible. *Spencer alone of all British thinkers has created a system of philosophy.*"

Thus, Lewes judged Spencer when only the scaffolding was in view, when the second volume of the *Psychology*, the whole of his sociology, his philosophy of law and ethics had still to appear. Since Lewes placed the hero's cap upon the philosopher Spencer a generation has passed and in this generation the prophecy of Lewes has been completely fulfilled. Spencer was a spiritual force by the side of Darwin and was undoubtedly one of the "representative men" at the

close of the nineteenth century. The system of "synthetic philosophy" first conquered, as was natural, the English-speaking nations, especially, the North Americans. Spencer found in Ed. Livingston Youmans, a refined American, an enthusiastic apostle and a most effective interpreter. The personal acquaintance, on the other hand, with Carlyle, who expressed himself unusually warmly on Herbert Spencer's first work (*The proper sphere of Government*) brought out most clearly and sharply the opposition of both natures soon enough. For Carlyle Spencer was always, in spite of all counter-statements, the type of a positively, if not even materialistically, turned thinker. Positivism became in Carlyle's eyes from the time when he approached Goethe, when through Schelling's biography he came close to Kant and later, Fichte, *a horrendum pudendum*. In his youth no doubt the author of *Sartor Resartus* had also his materialistic period, when to him the whole world was "without life, end and will, an absolutely dead steam-engine." But the day of his re-awakening came when he became acquainted with German transcendental philosophy. Henceforth he ridiculed the utilitarian, especially, Bentham whom he called in his *Sartor Resartus* "motive-grinder" whose "logic-mill" produced godless confusion.

Notwithstanding the bitter attack upon utilitarianism the recognised leader of which, after the death of Bentham, was John Stuart Mill, this creator of the inductive "logic-mill" proposed to his opponent Carlyle to print his *Sartor* at his own cost, as Carlyle—as we know from the mournful history of this book—went from publisher to publisher without being able to find any shelter. The same loving service, it may be remarked here, was rendered by John Stuart Mill who was himself nothing less than a great capitalist, to Herbert Spencer when the latter found himself in a critical situation and there was difficulty in bringing out his system of "synthetic philosophy." All autobiographical records of

the Victorian age bring clearly into view the picture of the *man* Mill, whereas the *man* Carlyle throws out dark shadows, as the autobiography of Spencer once more brings to our view. Carlyle has not suffered from lack of attention so far as Spencer is concerned.

Through personal intercourse it could not remain undiscovered to the two men that a lasting mutual adaptation and common feeling was an impossible thing with such antagonistic natures, temperaments and tendencies. In Carlyle everything is glowing emotion, consuming, burning ; in Spencer, on the other hand, everything is reflexion, deliberate, measured, painfully careful. With a typical philosopher of feeling of the school of Rousseau there stood face to face an equally typical philosopher of reason who absolutely rejected *jurare in verba magistri*. Spencer refused to be under spiritual obligation to anybody. Mill, who stood nearest to him personally, he opposed dialectically ; Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, he rejected contemptuously, and Comte lastly, whom he sought in Paris but who did not succeed in creating in him any lasting impression, he threw up.

Of Carlyle's chief thought, *Matter exists only in a spiritual way*, Spencer could make nothing. Carlyle's *Teufelsdröckh* was to him only a comic figure. Fichte's *Work is the end of man*, Carlyle raised to a fundamental thought of his philosophy of life—in the eyes of Spencer, the exact empirical thinker, this romantic trifling, this artistic ebullition of feeling was nothing but pure froth. The Schleiermacherian element in Carlyle, the "belief in symbols" must signify for Spencer mysticism, pure and simple. For Carlyle's love for imperialistic socialism, especially, the always puritanically minded Whig in Spencer could only have contempt. For Carlyle Fichte is "a rock of granite in the storm clouds," for Spencer, an empty name. Goethe and Schiller were, as Carlyle remarks in his *Essays*, only possible in the land of Kant ; for Spencer, however, Goethe and Schiller are thinkers who do not concern

him philosophically, especially, Kant himself has nothing to say to him.

Carlyle is thus characterised by Spencer (*Autobiography Vol. I, App. 881-82.*): "It would take much seeking to find one whose intellect was perturbed by emotion in the same degree. No less when tested by various of his distinctive *dicta* and characteristic opinions does the claim made for him to the name of philosopher seem utterly inadmissible. One whose implied belief was that the rule of the strong hand having during early ages and under certain social conditions, proved beneficial, is therefore good for all time, proved by it how little he had got beyond that dogma which children take in along with their creed, that human nature is everywhere the same and will remain the same for ever. One who sneered at political economy as the "dismal science", implying either that the desires of men working together under social conditions do not originate any general laws of industrial action and commercial movement; or else that it is of no consequence whether we recognize such laws or not: or else that because the study of such laws is uninteresting, they may as well be ignored, betrayed neither the temper nor the insight which befits the philosopher. One who grew blindly furious over John Mill's work, *On Liberty*, one who scornfully called utilitarianism "pig-philosophy" and thereby identified the pursuit of utility with the egoistic pursuit of material gratifications, in spite of the proofs before him that it comprehends the pursuit of others' welfare and the exercise of the highest sentiments, displayed an inability to think discreditable to an ordinary cultivated intelligence, much more to one ranked as a thinker. No one to whom the name philosopher is applicable, could have acquired that insensate dislike of science which he betrayed and which, for example, prompted him, in pursuance of his school-boy habit of nicknaming, to speak continually of "Earth-flattener Maupertuis"; as though to have discovered the oblateness of the Earth's

figure was something discreditable. At the same time that he was continually insisting upon the laws of this Universe and the necessity for respecting them, he went on venting his scorn against those who devote their lives to learning what these laws are. Some of his dogmas, indeed, are such as would if uttered by a person of no authority, be inevitably considered incredibly stupid, as for instance, his assertion that genius "means transcendent capacity of taking trouble first of all": the truth being that genius may be rightly defined quite oppositely as an ability to do with little trouble that which cannot be done by the ordinary man with any amount of trouble." Posterity will never look at Carlyle through the spectacles of Spencer. Spencer lacked the humour to appreciate such an eccentric personality as Carlyle's in its deepest nature. His straight line in spiritual matters is opposed to all zigzag course and his upright character had no sympathetic perception of the ornamental and the fantastic.

In this way fine threads of thought of the one are bound with those of the other; for Carlyle the sensual world, like the veil of Mâyâ of Schopenhauer, is only a deceptive appearance. The visible universe is a deceptive garb, a symbol that causes confusion, behind which stand the great personalities, heroic natures, for whose philosophical eye all objects are only windows through which they look at the infinite. Understanding is the window, imagination the eye of great natures. With Goethe, therefore, he holds that all epochs in which faith rules are bright and ennobling for the present as well as for future generations. All epochs, on the other hand, in which unbelief, in whatever form it may appear, gains a melancholy victory, disappear before the coming generation. If one presses Carlyle's philosophical faith, it will cry with the English feeling-philosophers, especially, his favourite Goethe: Feeling is everything. And how does the last word of Herbert Spencer run? In his swan's song, in his *Facts and Comments*, Herbert Spencer

shortly before his death writes, as the scientific experience of his life, the words, "Feeling we are wont to ignore when we speak of the soul. And yet it is the most essential part of it. Feeling is the master, understanding its servant".

After the English came the French. The French thinker Jean Marie Guyau (1854-1888) who unfortunately died too early, an issue of the first marriage of the wife of Alfred Fouillée and author of the book *La Morale d' Epicure*, and later, of *Esquisse d'une Morale sans obligation ni sanction* and *L'irreligion de l'avenir*, was the leader of evolutionism in France in the sense of his stepfather in a direction different from that followed by Spencer. But he felt the necessity of approaching the otherwise so little accessible Spencer. Spencer replied surprisingly soon and extremely warmly, so that a friendship, unfortunately short-lived, sprang up between the prematurely ripe Guyau and Spencer when in the zenith of his power. Guyau and Fouillée have worked as much for the propagation of the Spencerian philosophy in France as Letourneau has done for the popularisation and recognition of his sociology.

Great and powerful was the influence of Spencer in the extreme north, in Scandinavia and Russia. Northern poetry is steeped in the ideas of Spencer. The relation of Ibsen to Spencer, especially, to the Spencerian doctrine of heredity, would require to be investigated with special care. In Russia Spencer became through Lawrow and Michailowsky a ruling force and a party-building power. True Spencerians existed in Russia long before they did anywhere else on the Continent.

Only Germany lagged behind. Whoever peeps behind the veil is not surprised at this seeming neglect of the greatest thinker of the age on the part of the German thinkers. Whereas at the extreme point of Eastern culture, at the University of Tokio, Spencer's philosophy is recognised and expounded as academic philosophy, no German academic

philosopher, so far as I know, freely and wholly accepted Spencer. The first trace of a notice of Spencer I find in a work of Fischer in the year 1875 and in an essay of Vaihinger in the year 1878. It was Wilhelm Dilthey, the opponent of Mill and Spencer, who showed respect for Herbert Spencer in his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (Introduction to mental sciences), 1883. Up to the present day Spencer literature which has filled a whole library and the title names of which in the latest Ueberweg occupy more than two printed pages, is very poor in Germany. There are—mostly in the form of dissertations—a few aspects of the Spencerian philosophy which are presented in monographs; since 1897 we have had a biography of Spencer by Otto Gaupp, but a book, a book on Spencer, is found wanting in a land which can proudly claim to be the classic land of modern descriptive works on philosophy.

In Spinoza and Spencer we come across, as I said in the preface to the German edition of Spencer's *Autobiography*, two complete world-views which from the beginning of human thought which attained self-consciousness in philosophy, are opposed to each other. Spinoza forms the conclusion of the philosophy of "being", Spencer the completion of the philosophy of "happening". Spinoza pronounces the last word of Eleaticism, Spencer discovers the highest formula of the doctrine of Heraclitus. There, an eternal simultaneity (*simul, nunc stans*) and permanent stationary condition (*sub specie aeternitatis*), here an eternal change and uninterrupted becoming. For Spinoza, being, for Spencer, doing, happening, process, is eternal; there, ontology, here evolutionism; there, pantheism, here, pandynamism. For Spencer the universe is no inert being but an eternal process, no logical but a physical evolution. Phenomena do not follow, according to him, as according to Spinoza, with logical necessity from one another, but succeed one another with mechanical necessity. The law of the universe is not rest

but movement, not death but life, not infinite unity, but infinite diversity, not eternal simultaneity but eternal succession.

If, consequently, in the mind of Spinoza, everything which we call a natural law is in the last analysis a logical law or law of thought, it is, according to Spencer, a physical law or law of motion. Spinoza constructs his world-system in his study, Spencer his in the laboratory. Spinoza requires for constructing his world-view only human thoughts, Spencer on the other hand, facts of nature. Spinoza distils nature out of thought, Spencer, thought out of nature ; for Spinoza, lastly, the *chambre d'étude* is his world, for Spencer, the world is his *chambre d'étude*.

The fundamental laws of motion Spencer applies to all forms of manifestation of lifeless and living nature. A philosophical system is indeed in the last analysis nothing else than the application of a discovered formula to all forms of manifestation of the universe. If this formula can be applied everywhere and freely, it shows that the generalisation that has been discovered fulfils the highest requirement of philosophical thought,—*the perfect unification of our knowledge*.

How Spencer from a given central position has sent rays to the periphery of the whole field of human knowledge, how he has illumined the darkest corner of science with the light of evolutionism, can here only be indicated and not explained. The words of the great scientist Huxley, an intimate friend of the evolutionary philosophy, hold good to-day : "The only perfect and methodical exposition of the doctrine of evolution which I know of is found in Herbert Spencer's philosophical system, a work which everyone must carefully study who wants to be familiar with the tendencies of scientific movement." Spencer has not grown out of fashion, for, in general, great and far-reaching views cannot grow out of fashion in spite of errors and slips regarding particular points which human imperfection unceasingly brings with it.

The classification of the History of Philosophy has brought forth an inadmissible 'and'—Comte *and* Spencer. As Spencer's name travelled over to Germany he became "liable for military service". People got hold of his military register, clothed him dialectically, dressed him in the uniform of Comte and thus Spencer advanced in the lists of the text-books of the History of Philosophy to the position of Colonel of the regiment of Guards of Comtean positivism. However energetically Spencer might have protested against this and asked to be transferred to another regiment, it was all in vain. Comte and Spencer—so it stood always.

For some years I have been advocating a revision of this 'and' which is fatal for both sides. It has long been clear to me that Spencer is the last follower or representative of German nature-philosophy (Schelling, Oken, v. Baer) and not a train-bearer of Comte. In my *Berner Studien zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte* many of my pupils, when Spencer still lived, discussed the question how Spencer's philosophy was related to the classic philosophy of the post-Kantian school. As Spencer, however, made no kind of reference to German predecessors and as it was known to us that the greatest English philosopher could not read a German book, we looked upon the analogy which forced itself upon one's view between Spencer's agnosticism and theory of evolution and Kant's unknowableness of the "thing-in-itself" and Schelling's doctrine of development, as a logical and not as a historical continuity. In logical continuity certain modes of thinking, so far as the premises are similar, follow from one another; in historical, they only succeed one another; a historical continuity offers a pure *post hoc*, a logical, a *propter hoc*. As we could not see the bonds which bound Spencer with the German nature-philosophers we had to content ourselves with interpreting his Schellingianism as the logical consequence of his own thought and not as the direct result of the influence of the Schellingians.

To-day new material for action lies before us and I can proceed with the suit *Spencer vs. Comte* by laying emphasis on points altogether different from those on which I formerly laid stress. In his confessions Spencer speaks frankly in favour of German nature-philosophers and denies equally strongly a decisive influence of Comte on the construction of his system. The earliest mention of Comte in his posthumous *Autobiography* shows that Spencer completed his first work without making more than a bare mention of Comte.

“It was unfortunate that I then knew nothing more of Comte, than that he was a French philosopher—did not even know that he had promulgated a system having a distinctive title, still less that one of its divisions was called “Social Statics”. Had I known this, and had I in consequence adhered to my original title, it would never have entered any one’s head to suppose a relation between M. Comte and myself, so utterly different in nature is that which I called “A system of Social and Political Morality” from that which M. Comte called “Social Statics”, and so profoundly opposed are our avowed or implied ideals of human life and human progress.” (*Autobiography*, Vol. I. p. 359.)

The opportunity for occupying himself with Comte’s ideas was given to Spencer through this, that his friend Lewes (whose *History of Philosophy* was the dark source from which Spencer drew his knowledge of the history of philosophy) and his lady friend Miss Evans (George Eliot) were disciples and adorers of Comte. Through intimate intercourse with this pair of friends, Spencer could not help reading Comte. On the 20th January, 1853, he wrote to his father :

“I am busy reading Comte and getting up a very formidable case against him.” (*Autobiography*, Vol. I., p. 444.)

He writes further :—

“Instead of the words, “I am busy reading Comte” the words should have been, I am busy reading Martineau’s abridged translation of Comte.....I have also read Mr. Lewes’s outlines of the Comtean system serially published in “The Leader”.

The disciples of M. Comte think that I am much indebted to him and so I am, but in a way widely unlike that which they mean. Save in the adoption of his word “altruism” which I have defended, and in the adoption

of his word "Sociology", because there was no other available word (for both which adoptions, I have been blamed), the only indebtedness I recognise is the indebtedness of antagonism. My pronounced opposition to his views led me to develop some of my own views. What to think, is a question in part answered when it has been decided what not to think. Shutting out any large group of conclusion from the field of speculation, narrows the field, and by so doing brings one nearer to the conclusions which should be drawn. In this way the Positive Philosophy (or rather the earlier part of it, for I did not read the biological or sociological divisions, and I think not the chemical) proved of service to me. It is probable that but for my dissent from Comte's classification of the sciences, my attention would never have been drawn to the subject. Had not the subject been entertained, I should not have entered upon that inquiry which ended in writing "The Genesis of Science". And in the absence of ideas reached when I was tracing the genesis of science, one large division of the *Principles of Psychology* would possibly have lacked its organizing principle, or probably, would not have been written at all. In this way, then, I trace an important influence on my thoughts of M. Comte; but it was an influence opposite in nature to that which the Comtists suppose". (*Autobiography*, Vol. I., pp. 445-46).

Spencer's article on Comte must have appeared in the "Edinburgh Review." On the 29th January, 1855 he wrote to his father, "To-day I first received the enclosed thing which related to my article on Comte. I can be so far satisfied with it". In February, 1855 he wrote to his father, "You see that out of my article for the 'Edinburgh Review' nothing came on account of a previous engagement". The personal meeting with Comte (October, 1856) not only did not deepen the spiritual relationship between the two thinkers but even loosened it. Of the dramatic tension of feeling which the personal intercourse of Leibniz with Spinoza (for particulars, see my book *Leibniz and Spinoza*, Berlin, Georg Reimer) engendered, we find hardly any trace in Spencer. The characteristic of this encounter is rather a studied moderation.

When one reflects how boundless was the adoration of Comte which the pair of friends Lewes and George Eliot showed in conversation and in their writings, and when one

further considers that John Stuart Mill whom Spencer esteemed as a man more highly than he did anybody else, at that time saw and was astonished to see in Comte the miracle of all philosophy, the shameful indifference with which Spencer mentions his return home with Comte can only be called intentional. A more strict adherence to Comte's doctrine or even a more intimate association with his captivating personality might have brought him into contempt as a follower of this Frenchman, and against this imputation he guarded himself instinctively. In the year 1864 he took advantage of a suitable occasion to express strongly his resentment at the imputation that he borrowed his philosophy from Comte. The occasion was the appearance of a criticism of *First Principles* by Auguste Laugel in the "Revue des Deux Mondes."

"Highly satisfactory to me as the review was in many respects, there was one respect in which it was unsatisfactory. M. Laugel tacitly implied that I belonged to a school of thought from the doctrines of which I dissent, having indeed, to sundry of the leading doctrines a profound aversion. That body of scientific truth and methods which M. Comte named "Positive Philosophy" he remarked, was analogous to that which had been in England called "Natural Philosophy", and by implication, the men of science who had been natural philosophers were regarded by him as positive philosophers. This naming or renaming led to an unfortunate confusion. The philosophy which M. Comte named "Positive Philosophy" came not unnaturally to be spoken of by his disciples as his philosophy; and gradually among them, and afterwards among the indiscriminating public, there grew up the notion that those who held the doctrines called by M. Comte "Positive Philosophy" were adherents of M. Comte. M. Laugel, if he did not fall into this error, at any rate used language which seemed to countenance it. He spoke of me as imbued with certain ideas (naming especially, the relativity of knowledge) characterising the philosophy called Positive; and though these ideas were manifestly not ideas originated by M. Comte, nor claimed by him, yet by calling them ideas of the Positive Philosophy which I accepted, he produced the impression that I was an adherent of M. Comte.

The impression, utterly untrue as it was, I thought it needful to dissipate and the greater part of March I occupied in setting forth my antagonism to all these doctrines which are distinctive of the Comtean Philosophy. On

the 26th March I wrote to my father as follows:—"I have just got rid of the last revises of my pamphlet the corrections and modifications of which have caused me a great deal of bother and delay. I expect it will be out towards the end of next month.

"You ask me about my health. I am happy to say that I am well, in spite of unfavourable circumstances. The writing the Appendix about Comte brought on a fit of excitement, moral and intellectual, which I could not subdue. I could not stop thinking day or night, and was in a great serious relapse. However I escaped it and now seem to be *all the better*. It seems to me that this fit of excitement has done something towards restoring my cerebral circulation, which, ever since my breakdown, has been deficient".

The fit of excitement here referred to was not produced wholly by the writing of this postscript setting forth "Reasons for dissenting from the philosophy of M. Comte." A private controversy which resulted had much to do with it.

Wishing to be quite fair to Comte, I thought it desirable that the proof of what I had written should be looked through by one who was in sympathy with him. Lewes, if not a disciple in the full sense of the word, was a partial adherent and was also his expositor. I asked him to oblige me by his criticisms, which he willingly did. Some of the minor ones I accepted and profited by, but against the major ones I protested; and this led to a correspondence between us over which I excited myself greatly in the way indicated. (*Autobiography*, Vol. II, p. 110.)

The letter to Lewes is still more moderate in tone:

"I contend that, starting with *Social Statics* passing through these several steps to the wider generalization of social phenomena given in the essay on Progress, and from thence by other steps to the views which I now hold, there is a development on lines of organization that cannot be traced to him; but are manifestly traceable to the extension of v. Baer's principle and to the rationalisation of it which I have since attempted.

The other important point is that raised in your question—"Was not Comte the man who first constructed a Philosophy out of the separate sciences—and is not that your aim also"? Here, it seems to me, is the chief source of difference between us. I venture to think that you are assimilating two wholly different things—endeavouring to establish a lineal descent between systems which are not only generically distinct or ordinarily distinct, but which belong to distinct classes. What is Comte's professed aim? To give a coherent account of the progress of *human con-*

ceptions. What is my aim? To give a coherent account of the progress of the *external world*. Comte proposes to describe the necessary, and the actual filiation of *ideas*. I propose to describe the necessary and the actual filiation of *things*. Comte proposes to interpret the genesis of our *knowledge of nature*. My aim is to interpret, as far as it is possible, the genesis of the *phenomena which constitute nature*. The one end is *subjective*. The other is *objective*. How then can the one be the originator of the other? If I had taken the views briefly set down in *The Genesis of Science* and developed them into an elaborate system showing the development and co-ordination of human knowledge in pursuance of a theory at variance with that of Comte; then you might rightly have said that the one was suggested by the other. Then you might rightly have asked—"Was not Comte the man who first constructed a philosophy out of the separate sciences—and is not that your aim also?" A philosophy of the sciences has a purely concrete subject-matter, and how the one can beget the other I do not see. A concrete may beget an abstract; but how an absolute begets a concrete is not manifest. Comte's system is avowedly an Organon of the Sciences. The scheme at which I am working has been called by Martineau a cosmogony. Surely, in the generation of thought, an organon should give origin to an organon and a cosmogony to a cosmogony. If you look for my predecessors, and if you point to the Cosmogonies of Hegel and Oken as being conceptions which may have influenced me, I do not say nay: I knew the general natures of Hegel's and Oken's Cosmogonies and widely different as their conceptions are from my own, they are conceptions of the *same class* and may very possibly have had some suggestive influence." *Autobiography*, Vol. II. Appendix B, pp. 488-89.

This letter is a human document. It clearly points out, on the one hand, his scientific independence of the positivism of Comte, and on the other, his absolute adherence to German nature-philosophy, especially, his dependence upon Oken and Karl Ernst von Baer. The logical affinity with Schelling and Hegel which I have long maintained, transforms itself through this documentary material into a historical continuity. The great English thinker now belongs no more as baggage to French positivism but represents the rear-guard of German nature-philosophy. The judgment about Spencer must in any case be revised. The usual designation "Comte and Spencer" belongs to the museum of erroneous classifications.

The auto-didactic temperament of Spencer closed for him the entrance to the temple of German philosophy. As all restraint was absolutely repugnant to his nature, so especially, was the restraint of language. Linguistic studies therefore were an eye-sore to him. And those who are acquainted with his philosophy have long felt that his want of familiarity with the past and his insufficient knowledge of all non-English idioms and literatures, especially, the radical want of knowledge of all that is called philosophy, constitute the weak point of his all-comprehensive system. It is not without self-contentment that Spencer says that he has never studied grammar, even English Grammar. Greek was to him an absolutely unfamiliar tongue. In Latin he did not advance beyond the elements. In French his progress stopped at conjugation; he could in all cases decipher a French text but he could not write a French letter.

Of German the leading philosopher of England knew absolutely nothing. His pre-eminently scientific self-culture did not allow him to feel how the essence of German philosophy, its deepest and inmost part must always remain a sealed book to him. Indeed, through inadequate translations one may have a substitute of this philosophy but can never know it. The important works on the history of philosophy of Ritter, Zeller, Erdmann, Fischer were not at all accessible to him, as they were not at that time translated into English. And thus Spencer derived his knowledge of German philosophy from the work on the history of philosophy of his friend Lewes which was not even popular in the best sense of the word. This Lewis was himself such an extreme positivist and blind adorer of the founder of French positivism, Auguste Comte, that he absolutely lacked the perspective for the right estimate of the post-Kantian classic period of German philosophy. Out of clumsy translations and one-sided representations Herbert Spencer thus had to get for himself a poor view of German philosophy. This

took revenge upon him in the form of the extreme self-conceit of the autodidactic Englishman who in his insular self-sufficiency deluded himself with the thought that the English language was *the* language and that whoever wanted to say something serious to mankind must take recourse to it. If Spencer had read the German philosophers in the original he could have avoided many slips and his philosophy would not have been a torso. At the most important point of his sociology where the transition from natural science to mental science is completed, where from the manners, customs, laws and institutions of uncivilised people, one is led to their highest spiritual culture, to language and religion, Spencer fails remarkably. The philological basis is wrong. Here the *Völkerpsychologie* (Folk-psychology) of Wundt has revealed the infinite superiority of the humanistically trained investigator over an auto-didactic view. The ignorance of literatures other than English, especially, of the German detailed investigation which comes here first under consideration and which has not travelled over to England, leaves a perceptible lacuna. And where the system should be rounded and completed, there an irremediable crack shows itself.

The name of the greatest German philosopher before Kant, the works of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, are, for example, not mentioned in the *Autobiography*. Here not even the excuse of insufficient knowledge of German would suffice, as the chief philosophical work of Leibniz, his *Nouveaux Essais* was written by Leibniz himself in French; the *Theodicée* itself was available in the English form. That Spencer knew so little of Leibniz, that at any rate he was not influenced seriously by him, for in that case he should surely have thought of Leibniz in his *Autobiography*, is the more to be regretted as the Leibnizian doctrine could have served as the model for his own if he had been well-grounded in the works of Leibniz. For the most pronounced personal note of Herbert Spencer, the philosophising *more biologico*, the

bringing of life into prominence, the tracing of the mechanical to the organic, the exhibition of the purposive and the fittest in nature, spirit and society, and lastly, his sociological optimism—all these were essentially Leibnizian tendencies, blood of his blood. And what is most remarkable, Spencer does not at all perceive how near he is to Leibniz. Not directly through acquaintance with Leibniz's works did he receive the Leibnizian philosophy but indirectly and in diluted doses: Schelling, Oken and Karl Ernst v. Baer who are all inspired and guided by teleologico-organic ideas, by the aesthetic pantheism of the hylozoists to whom also Bruno and the German romanticists swore allegiance, put latent Leibnizianism into the vein of Herbert Spencer. He was a Leibnizian indirectly through German nature-philosophers who exerted, as we shall soon see, great influence upon him without being able to give him the faintest idea, owing to his extremely auto-didactic rejection of all bases in the region of the history of philosophy, that the German nature-philosophy which influenced him obtained in its passage through Kant strength and support from Leibniz. While Spencer in his *Autobiography* swears allegiance to Hegel, Oken and Baer, he becomes a Leibnizian in spite of himself.

To German ears it seems a blasphemy when Herbert Spencer feels himself opposed to Kant, whilst he owes allegiance for a long time to the phrenologist Spurzheim who was accused by German science of charlatanism, but mildly called by the name of "deluded deluder." As early as his twelfth year his interest was roused in the phrenology discovered by Gall. In the years 1820-1830 people began to interest themselves in phrenology and Gall's follower, Spurzheim, came over to England to propagate his system. No doubt, Spencer in his mature years shook off his phrenologistic youthful dream. But he confesses that from several of his writings it appears that up to the year 1842 his belief in phrenology was unshaken. The queer and eccentric element in

Gall and Spurzheim caught strongly the still vagabond spirit of Spencer whereas the well-ordered, regulated and connected thought of Kant was repellent to him. The same spirit of opposition which was so evident and active in him from his childhood to all grammars and rules, moves with the force of an elementary feeling against the trained, disciplined, methodical and well-connected thought of Kant. His more clear and mature thinking drives him again and again to Kant, but his infernal opposition to the paragraphised, scholastically dressed thought of Kant always gets the upper hand. It was a wonderful coincidence that in the same year 1844 when he made a scientific examination of Gall and Spurzheim he began to read Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in its English translation. The impression produced by this study Spencer expressed in the following words:—

“Up to this time I had never paid any attention to mental philosophy, save under the form of phrenology; respecting some doctrines of which my criticisms, as we have seen, imply a leaning towards subjective analysis. But the science of mind had no temptation for me, otherwise than as affording these occasions for independent judgment; there had never been any deliberate study of it. All through my life Locke's Essay had been before me on my father's shelves, but I had never taken it down; or at any rate, I have no recollection of having ever read a page of it. My glance over a small part of Mill's *Logic* named in a preceding chapter, had, indeed, shown that there was a latent interest in psychological questions of the intellectual class, but nothing more has come of it. Now, however, I was left to consider one of the cardinal problems which the theory of human intelligence presents. For I found in Mr. Wilson's house (rather oddly, as it seemed, for there was not a *souppçon* of philosophy in him) a copy of a translation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, at that time, I believe, recently published. This I commenced reading but did not go far. The doctrine that Time and Space are “nothing but” subjective forms that pertain exclusively to consciousness and have nothing beyond consciousness answering to them, I rejected at once and absolutely; and having done so went no further. Being then, as always, an impatient reader, even of things which in large measure interest me and meet with a general acceptance, it has always been out of the question for me to go on reading a book the fundamental principles

of which I entirely dissent from. Tacitly giving an author credit for consistency, I, without thinking much about the matter, take it for granted that if the fundamental principles are wrong the rest cannot be right, and thereupon cease reading, being I suspect, rather glad of an excuse for doing so.

Though I was not clearly conscious of them, there must have been two motives prompting this summary dismissal. There was, in the first place, the utter incredibility of the proposition itself; and then in the second place, there was the want of confidence in the reasonings of one who could accept a proposition so incredible. If a writer could, at the very first step in his argument, flatly contradict an immediate intuition of a simple and direct kind, which survives every effort to suppress it, there seemed no reason why, at any and every subsequent stage of his argument, he might not similarly affirm to be true a proposition exactly opposite to that which the intellect recognises as true. Every coherent body of conclusions is a fabric of separate intuitions, into which, by analysis, it is decomposable; and if one of the primary intuitions is of no authority, then no one of the secondary intuitions is of any authority; the entire intellectual structure is rotten.

I must have dimly felt then what I afterwards clearly saw, and have set forth in *The Principles of Psychology* Sec. 388-91, the fact that belief in the unqualified supremacy of reason is the superstition of philosophers. Without showing any warrant (there being in fact no warrant to be shown) they assume that in each step throughout an argument the dependence of conclusion upon premises, which in the last resort is an intuition, has a validity greater than that of any other kind of intuition; the truth being, contrariwise that it has a smaller validity. A simple intuition, such as that by which we apprehend space as external, has a clearness and strength transcending the clearness and strength of any intuition by which we see in internal intuitions that given certain data a certain inference follows; and still more has it a clearness and strength immensely transcending that of a series of such internal intuitions, constituting an argument. All that it is competent for reason to do, as a critic of external perception, is to re-interpret its dicta in such a way as to make them consistent—not, for instance, to deny the apparent motion of the sun through the heavens from East to West, but to show that this apparent motion can equally be produced by the motion of the Earth round its axis from West to East; and that this interpretation of the appearance is congruous with various other perceptions which the original interpretation is not.

It remains only to say that whenever, in later years, I have taken up Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, I have similarly stopped short after its primary proposition. "*Autobiography*" Vol. I. pp. 252-54.

From this prejudice Spencer was not to be freed. However nearer he might have later come to Kantian ideas than he himself thought or would own, he was not to be induced to study Kant. The close analogy between his concept of substance, the Unknowable, and the unknowableness of the "thing-in-itself" maintained by Kant, Spencer of course could not avoid but a thorough reckoning with Kant which brought out all the differentiating characteristics presupposed that one studied Kant himself and not simply Lewes's account of Kant, and here Spencer lacked both the will and the capacity. Even in the question of the criterion of truth for which Kant claimed necessity and universality, Spencer really came nearer the apriorism of Kant, than the strict empiricism of his friend Mill. The reconciliation of empiricism and apriorism, of Mill and Kant, Spencer has effected in this way, that the fundamental elements of the understanding are *a priori* for the individual but *a posteriori* for the whole series of individual beings of which it forms the last member. This intermediate solution of Spencer to which scientific inquiry in these days in many ways adheres, would, it was thought, manifestly help the understanding of Kant. But this did not occur. Even in his *Principles of Ethics* the last part of which, Justice, contains the celebrated Spencerian formula of freedom in which Spencer comes near the Kantian formula, he lets the redeeming word regarding Kant unuttered. If by the law of association Kant appears once in his process of thinking, he only explains him in order to give expression to his divergence from him. In the description of his travels in Switzerland, in the graphic account of the snow-capped masses and descending avalanches there occurs suddenly a celebrated expression of Kant (*Autobiography*, Vol. I p. 431), but Spencer directly gives it a meaning which he rejects. The oft-quoted

saying of Kant, that two things could especially strike him with awe, "the starry heavens above him and the moral consciousness within him," says Spencer, he could not on his part accept. In him this feeling is originated by three things—the distant sea, the mighty mountain and sweet music in a cathedral.

Fichte, Herbart, Schopenhauer, Beneke, Lotze and Hartmann do not fall within his range of vision. Although Spencer may have read cursorily one or other of the above-mentioned German thinkers or have become acquainted with them through notices and criticisms—the *Dii minorum gentium* of German philosophy are to be ruled out of court because their works have not in general been translated into English—the impression left upon him obviously is not sufficient to rise above the surface of his consciousness. Herbert Spencer has never been a great reader. His weak health greatly undermined by sleeplessness stood in the way of his reading much. Thus he wrote once to the well-known logician and political economist Leslie Stephen, "I doubt whether during all these years I ever read any serious book for one hour at a stretch" (*Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer* by David Duncan, Methuen 1908 p. 418) and on another occasion he wrote to Stephen (*Ibid* p. 490): "All my life long I have been a thinker, and not a reader, being able to say with Hobbes: 'If I had read as much as other men, I should have known as little'". That a universal philosopher whose vocation it is to view from a higher point all manifestations in nature and spirit, in society and history, to conceive and interpret all connections, could pass over with neglect Fichte and Herbart, nay, even those who lived in his time, the contemporary philosophers, Schopenhauer, Hartmann and Lotze, is a truly monstrous phenomenon of splendid isolation. An investigator of the eminence and minutely painstaking nature of Herbert Spencer, to whom every insect and every fossil appears to be of fundamental importance for the comprehension

of the connexion of the universe, believes to be able to treat contemptuously with impunity men like Fichte or Schopenhauer without leaving any weak point in his system, as if the work of these persons, who as persons are portions of the phenomena of the universe, is not infinitely more important and valuable for the comprehension of the world than the knowledge of a new species of tool or type of plant. Could a German thinker dare pass over with such contempt and shrugging of the shoulders the leading philosophical spirits of France or England, as Spencer did Fichte and Schopenhauer?

If we have so far in a fault-finding manner brought into prominence the negative, wholly antagonistic relation of Spencer to the leading spirits of German philosophy, it remains for us now to show the reverse side of the shield. Spencer mentions David Friedrich Strauss and Haeckel with respect and the German-Russian nature-philosopher Karl Ernst v. Baer with great veneration. Hegel receives at his hands a wonderfully sympathetic treatment; finally, to Schelling and Lorenz Oken he swears allegiance.

Strauss's *Life of Jesus* Spencer welcomed with youthful enthusiasm. As with his Scripture-believing friend Lott, so with him, Strauss was a welcome companion. Spencer had very early cut himself off from belief in dogmas, but he respected the religious conviction of the intimate friend of his youthful days, Lott. In friendly controversies Spencer put forward three moments which seemed to him to speak against an uncontrollable supernatural intervention, namely, order in nature, the necessity of all occurrences and the unity of cause. As these reasons, however, were of no avail and his opponent held his ground, he came back with the weighty argument of D. Fr. Strauss's *Life of Jesus* (*Autobiography*, Vol. I)

Repeatedly does Spencer come back upon the critical works of D. Fr. Strauss with undiminished respect, but he

knows only the radical critic of the Bible and not the philosopher. The author of *Altes und neues Glauben* (Old and New belief) he would not have treated so indulgently if he had known all sides of Strauss. So also he seems to know and esteem in Haeckel only the zoologist and not the philosopher. Also the study of the *Life of Jesus* had only a verificatory significance for the strengthening of his religious radicalism which had grown out of his own thinking, and not an overpowering influence in the shaping of his theological views which had rather independently formed themselves in his mind before he became acquainted with Strauss's *Life of Jesus*.

A deep and lasting impression which became avowedly a determining and directing force for his whole system, the writings of Karl Ernst v. Baer made upon Spencer. Naturally, as he knew no German, he came in a roundabout way to a knowledge of v. Baer's ideas. Their first traces he found in Carpenter's "Universal and Comparative Principles of Physiology" and with perfect simplicity Spencer described the turn which v. Baer's formula had given to his philosophy.

"In the course of such perusal as was needed to give an account of its contents, I came across von Baer's formula expressing the course of development through which every plant and animal passes—the change from homogeneity to heterogeneity. Though at the close of *Social Statics* there is a recognition of the truth that low types of society in common with low types of organism are composed of many like parts performing like functions, whereas high types of society in common with high types of organisms are composed of many unlike parts performing unlike functions, implying that advance from the one to the other is from uniformity of composition to multiformity of composition ; yet this phrase of von Baer expressing the law of individual development, awakened my attention to the fact that the law which holds of the ascending stages of each individual organism is also the law which holds of the ascending grades of organisms of all kinds. And it had the further advantage that it presented in brief form a more graphic image of the transformation and thus facilitated further thought. *Autobiography* Vol. I pp. 384-85.

Spencer adds at other places that Baer's formula of transformation has produced in him a connection with a similar line of thought.

However repulsive and scornful Spencer's behaviour may be when any influence upon the fundamental direction of his thought is asserted, his behaviour is extremely obliging and gentle when the question is of the powerful influence which v. Baer's formula has exerted upon his chief thought of integration of matter and dissipation of motion. Spencer conceives his own formula directly as completing Baer's.

"The extension of von Baer's formula expressing the development of each organism, first to one and then to another group of phenomena, until all were taken in as parts of a whole, exemplified the process of integration. With advancing integration there went that advancing heterogeneity implied by inclusion of the several classes of inorganic phenomena and the several classes of super-organic phenomena in the same category with organic phenomena. And then the indefinite idea of progress passed into the definite idea of evolution, when there was recognised the essential nature of the change, as a physically-determined transformation conforming to ultimate laws of force. Not until setting down as above the successive stages of thought, was I myself aware how naturally one stage had prepared the way for the next and how each additional conclusion increased the mental proclivity towards further conclusions lying in the same direction. It now seems that there was an almost inevitable transition to that coherent body of beliefs which soon took place." (*Autobiography* Vol. II. pp. 12-13.)

One ought to remember that the following propositions contain the essence of Spencer's philosophy: Everywhere in the universe, in general as well as in particular, there occurs an unceasing transformation of matter and motion. This transformation is evolution, when integration of matter and dissipation of motion predominate; it is dissolution, if absorption of motion and disintegration of matter predominate. The evolution is simple when there occurs the process of integration or formation of a connected whole, without being complicated by other processes. The evolution is complex when this primary transformation from an unconnected to a connected state is accompanied by secondary changes which

result in this, that the several parts of the aggregate are subject to different external influences (Otto Gaupp: *Spencer* p. 39). If v. Baer only held that every organism in its embryological evolution represented a transition from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous state of the structure, Spencer draws from this formula the universal conclusion that it expresses not only a biological, but also a geological and sociological, in short, a universal truth. It is no less true of the nebula of stars, nay, of the whole planetary system, than of plants and animals to which v. Baer confined himself. It extends even to the human spirit as well as to all social structures and combinations. If v. Baer developed his law of evolution only from the seed to the plant and from the egg to the animal, and thus developed a "law of organic progress" for all living creatures, Spencer generalises Baer's formula in such a way that it embraces the universal formula of evolution and thus contains the law of every progress. Beginning with planetary systems, passing through the earth-crust, comprehending fauna and flora and ending in human thought-processes and social ramifications, the universal law of evolution "from simplicity to complexity, through successive differentiation" holds good everywhere.

The earliest writings of Spencer manifestly show traces of the Schellingian spirit. If Spencer defines life as a constant adaptation of inner to outer relations or as a fixed combination of heterogeneous changes, Schelling conceived it as the "co-ordination of actions". The analogies, moreover, between physics and physiology on which Spencer's doctrine of society as an organism or as a super-organism is based carry with them the unmistakable stamp of the Schellingian spirit, out of which circle of thought the historical school of law of Savigny and Bluntschli with its doctrine of State as an organism has grown. In strong contrast to the current conception of the history of philosophy which regards him as a follower of Comte, he emphasises, as we already know, the

priority of the thought of evolution of Oken and Hegel. If Spencer had a more accurate knowledge of Leibniz, Herder and Goethe, he would have presumably pointed to them, for they are in reality the proper bearers of that truly German theory of evolution the traces of which are to be sought as far back as the beginning of the Renaissance and the time of the German cardinal Nikolaus of Cusa. Spencer is of course not a romantico-speculative nature-philosopher in the sense of German classic philosophy which philosophises through imagination, but an inductive nature-philosopher and metaphysician, like our correlativists of to-day in Germany.

Also about the way in which Spencer was led to Schelling, we are sufficiently informed in the *Autobiography* (Vol. I). The works of Schelling were themselves not accessible to him but he had access to Coleridge's *Idea of Life* which was saturated with the spirit of Schelling and with which Spencer became acquainted in the year 1849-50. Coleridge's posthumous booklet *Idea of Life* was published in 1848 by Seth B. Watson. The line of thought is wholly Schellingian, but the name of Schelling I have not found in the booklet. Moreover, in the epilogue the sole authorship of Coleridge is doubted; rather, James Gillman is pointed as the joint author with Coleridge. This question is of no importance, so far as the influence upon Spencer is concerned, for it is the book and not the author that concerns us here. The Schellingian doctrine of individuation gave a shock to his thinking ("The doctrine of individuation struck me and entered as a factor into my thinking") and became a system-building factor of his philosophy. Has Spencer made the attempt to read for himself the works of Schelling (of course, through translations) or has he remained satisfied with Coleridge's booklet? It seems to us difficult to believe that Spencer got his knowledge of Schelling's philosophy through Coleridge's booklet and likewise accepted him. This possibility is, however, not wholly excluded if one considers, on the authority of

the *Autobiography*, how Spencer has come to terms with Hegel:

“Everybody has, so far as I know, passed by this revolutionary doctrine without remark. It should, I think, be either disproved or admitted; for clearly the issues involved are of some philosophical importance. Does not one of them touch fundamentally the entire system of Hegel? I express the thought interrogatively, because I know so little of the Hegelian philosophy. My impression is that it sets out with a proposition impossible to conceive. If this proceeding is legitimate, it is no less legitimate to make each step in the reasoning that follows, of like nature; and to assert that though a particular conclusion appears necessary and the opposite conclusion impossible to conceive, yet the opposite conclusion is true. As this course, actual and potential, is one against which I feel an obstinate prejudice, I never read further any work in which it is displayed. But I wish some one would put the proposition that Logic is an objective science, side by side with the Hegelian philosophy and see whether the two can co-exist.” *Autobiography*, Vol. II, pp. 239-40.

The naïve indifference of the Englishman towards the processes of thought of his neighbours could not be illustrated better than it was done here. Here one should try to realise that at the time when Herbert Spencer wrote these lines on Hegel, two Americans, William Smith and W. T. Harris, led a movement for creating among philosophers who spoke the English language an enthusiasm for Fichte and Hegel through good translations of their works. Spencer had thus only to work at a serviceable translation of Hegel's works in order to convince himself whether and how far his own evolutionism was related to the development of the logos in Hegel, of consciousness or ego in Fichte, of the merging of subject and object in the Absolute in Schelling, of the will in Schopenhauer or of the unconscious in Hartmann.

What Spencer shares with the German philosophers, especially, with the nature-philosophers of the type of Schelling and Oken, is the tendency common to them of referring all appearances in nature and spirit, in history, society and state to a common, single formula which comprehends all phenomena. What, however, essentially distinguishes him from them is the exact scientific method. They (with the exception of Baer and Oken who stand nearest to Spencer) start principally from the standpoint of mental science, he takes his stand exclusively upon the natural sciences. They proceed analytically, Spencer synthetically. Schelling gradually descends deductively from his formula which is "fired from the pistol" to the individual phenomena; Spencer, on the other hand, constructs his philosophy out of the individual facts in physics and chemistry, in astronomy and geology, in botany, zoology and physiology which he embraces under the common title *biology*, and in this way finally arrives at his world-formula. Spencer's "nature-philosophy" is the type of modern nature-philosophy, that of Mach, Ostwald and Reinke, which starts from the experiential sciences, in contradistinction to the older nature-philosophy of the type of that of Schelling which started from the metaphysical world-formula. On the Jacob's ladder of philosophy the German nature-philosophers are comparable to the angels who fell from heaven, the scientists of the type of Spencer, on the other hand, to those who rose from the earth to heaven. Our nature-philosophers of to-day of the school of Mach and Ostwald come therefore infinitely nearer the Spencerian ascent from the particular to the general than the Schellingian-Okenian descent from the universal to the particular. But the ascending and descending angels must arrive at a junction, a crossing of two roads, and it is precisely at this critical point that the Spencerian theory of evolution falls into German nature-philosophy. Mach and Ostwald are the legitimate heirs of Spencer.

CHAPTER VIII

THE INDIVIDUALISTIC MOVEMENT

What once among the Stoics and Epicureans the "wise man" signified, what in the Renaissance the *Uomo universale* denoted, the "great individual" signifies in these days. There are only two men who come nearest to the ideal of the *Uomo universale* of the Renaissance culture: Leon Battista Alberti and Leonardo da Vinci. All capacity and skill, all the power and knowledge of the age was centred in these two personalities. Of the many-sided there were many, but of the all-sided who could say with pride, "Men can do all things themselves whenever they want to do them," Burckhardt mentions only these two, with whom there can perhaps be placed, though at a respectable distance, Benvenuto Cellini.

The "all-sided individual" is a wonderful work of nature which has had the happy whim of forming out of a dozen great men a single towering genius, the "great individual". But the age, for example, of Alberti would not have been anything very different if Leon Battista Alberti had not lived. The *Uomo universale* can be thought away from his age without rendering this detached view faulty. "Great were the Italians of that time *only* as individuals" said Keyserling once. This is not true, however, of Voltaire. The physiognomy of the eighteenth century would be altogether different if one would think away from Voltaire. More correctly expressed: Voltaire cannot here be thought away, so powerfully is his name bound up with the whole age and such an indissoluble unity has it become with it. Alberti and Leonardo were geniuses in power and knowledge, Voltaire in effectiveness. They were a passive, Voltaire an active miracle. Voltaire is the "great individual" of modern times.

The secret of the powerful effectiveness of such a man of the century lies in the magical hypnotising power of his method of expression. All arts were within his reach, all instruments for winning the hearts of people were at his disposal. Wit, whim, satire, subtlety of thought and feeling and even bitter malice, bitter gall and deadly poison were at the command of Voltaire and he made an unscrupulous use of his talents. And if fault-finders object that in the scale of human feelings and moods with which Voltaire has played with such perfection, false notes spring up, prescribed measures are broken, in short, if in details there has been unskilful play, we maintain that the whole is one of great strength. And if the historians of literature tell us that Voltaire as a dramatist was no better than the average, as a novelist, he was without originality, as a lyrical poet, of false sentimentality, as an epic poet, prolix and unsubstantial, as an historian, in many ways unreliable, partial and superficial, as a philosopher, plain, without originality and full of contradiction, as a theological critic, cynical and frivolous, as a man, anything but spotless and unobjectionable, we reply : It is not the particular characteristics that are important but the total personality. Voltaire shows all the faults and merits of his age. It is precisely for this reason that he is encyclopaedism incarnate, the literary "world-soul" of the whole age. We go a step further in the estimate of the central position of Voltaire in the culture-system of the eighteenth century than Goethe, who only thought that just as in a family, gifted individuals represent in themselves the qualities, good and bad, of all the forefathers, so was it with nations. And Voltaire will in this sense be the writer who conforms most to the type of a Frenchman. This view seems to me too narrow. Voltaire is no Frenchman in the narrow sense of the word. The English deism, French encyclopaedism and the whole German illumination have said nothing more than Voltaire, for he has manifestly pronounced the last word of the eighteenth century.

Joseph Popper's (Lynkeus's) *Voltaire: the analysis of his character in connection with studies in aesthetics, morals and politics*, Dresden, Karl Reissner, 1905, has brought the man of the century, Voltaire, very near us. The literary physiognomy of Popper is well known. Engineer by profession and philosopher by love, Popper has in the spirit of his friend Mach cultivated both departments with equal success. Mathematics, physics, the technique of electricity, machines and of flying are ever his own professional province, while his philosophical writings *Das Recht zu leben, und die Pflicht zu sterben* (The right to live and the duty to die), 3rd Edition, 1905, *Phantasien eines Realisten* (Fantasies of a realist) (under the pseudonym Lynkeus, 2nd Edition, 1901) *Fundamente eines philosophischen Staatsrechtes* (Elements of philosophical politics) 1903, brought him to the notice and secured for him the recognition of a wider circle. Popper belongs to those energists among the nature-philosophers of the new century who under the lead of Mach have begun to create a school. Popper's *Physikalische Grundsätze der elektrischen Kraftübertragung* (Physical principles of the electrical transmission of force) which appeared as early as 1884 from the publishing house of Hartleben in Vienna, is, according to its plan and object, if not according to its results, an "energistic" treatise.

The "great favourite" of Popper is Voltaire. From the philosopher von Ferney Popper took in the first edition of his *Sozialphilosophische Betrachtungen* (Remarks on social philosophy), 1878, his philosophical starting-point, for he, as the sub-title of the book clearly brings into prominence, dealt with the problem of the "significance of Voltaire for modern times". And to this favourite of his youth Popper has remained true for a whole generation. To this bears witness the fact that he has collected the results of his study of Voltaire and set them down in a work consisting of 391 pages. No doubt in this work he has made excursions into neighbouring

provinces, as need hardly be said to those who are acquainted with Popper's writings. Consequently, this work is severely criticised by the professional philologists, such as Becker in Vienna. The unpleasant passage at arms between Popper and Becker does not interest us here. We judge Popper's work not by the philological standard nor by that of the history of literature but by that of aesthetics and the history of culture. Also for us Voltaire is not *a* great individual, but *the* great individual. With Voltaire and Helvetius there has begun that individualistic movement which flows into Stirner and Nietzsche. The main object of the book which is avowedly a polemical work, is the clearing of Voltaire "out of the great mass of dirt thrown over him." Popper's *Voltaire* is neither a "vindication of honour" in the ordinary sense, nor a literary whitewashing after celebrated models, but a *plaidoyer* for the man and writer, for the poet and thinker, for the historian and artist, Voltaire.

Popper's *Voltaire* is a forensic address couched in the Ciceronian style. As the best defence also, according to Popper, is a sword-thrust, the writing in defence of Voltaire transforms itself suddenly into an indictment against ungrateful posterity. He who has always attacked Voltaire's character or literary personality must himself stand on the dock. And a piercing cry, *Quousque tandem?*, shall awaken the scientific conscience of the present day and remind us of the duty which we owe to the Pope of free-thinkers, Voltaire.

The champion of Voltaire reveals himself very soon as an attorney-general in the realm of the history of culture, who has so very well brought charges against the whole of the Olympian gods of the nineteenth century so far as they have taken up an attitude with regard to Voltaire—and which of the Olympian gods has not done this?—and has transformed the charges against Voltaire into so many complaints against his scoffers. According to the usual practice of lawyers the oath is usually tendered by the opposite side. If weaknesses of

character, faults of thinking or defective work are discovered in Voltaire, Popper brandishes his sword with the favourite words of those who are on the defence : " Let him who considers himself better strike the first blow." When Schiller makes the charge against Voltaire that as a poet he has " impressed no heart" or Goethe says of him that he has no depth, when Carlyle admits that he possesses wit and spirit but denies that he has any humour, and David Friedrich Strauss finds fault with him because he " flickers" instead of " shining with a steady light," Popper not only knows how to meet the charges but turn them into so many attacks upon the complainants. To a complete statement of the opinions on Voltaire Popper attaches therefore no importance. Even valuable monographs, such as the French monographs of Brougham, Bersot, Renard are completely passed over. J. Pastor's *Life of Voltaire*, 2 Vols. London, 1881 and finally, J. Morley's *Voltaire* (4th Edition, 1882) have wholly escaped the notice of Popper. J. F. La Harpe's *Philosophie du dixhuitième siècle Oeuvr posth.* 2 Vols ; G. Duval's *Histoire de la littérature révolutionnaire*, Paris 1879 ; Pascal Duprat's *Les Encyclopédistes*, Paris, Lacroix, 1866 (from p. 63 onwards it gives an account of Voltaire's share in encyclopaedism) should have deserved notice. A complete bibliography relating to Voltaire Popper could have found in George Begnesco's *Voltaire: Bibliographie de ses Oeuvres* 3 vols. 1882-89. Only, Popper did not like to write any learned work on Voltaire but only bring home to his contemporaries the significance of Voltaire which had been obscured, if not wholly lost by all sorts of attacks of his innumerable opponents. Voltaire is for Popper that " individuality" which Nietzsche brought into prominence as the meaning of our culture. Nietzsche himself came through his relation to Jakob Burkhardt, to think of the type of the people of the Renaissance age, especially, the *uomo universale*. Only, the intellectual worth which the individuality of Voltaire

represents escaped him more and more; the figure of the powerful man Cesare Borgia overpowered him.

In his campaign against superstitions in all their grades and shades, Voltaire is fearless to the point of self-destruction. He is, like Nietzsche, afraid of neither statutes nor revelations, of neither heavenly nor earthly despots, of neither written nor unwritten laws, of neither the crown nor the episcopal rod, of neither dogmas nor systems. He has, moreover, absolutely no respect for hoary history, for the dust and rust of tradition, for the verd-antique that has grown upon ancient proverbs and customs. Voltaire like Nietzsche was a genius of irreverence.

Can such masters of the art of destruction do any good to mankind? That depends upon the man and the age. If in a given age there is accumulated a great heap of prejudices, then Herculean strength is needed to clear the stables of Augeas of stagnant forms of beliefs and superstitions. When the prevailing ideas lose their strength, when widespread forms of belief decay, when rotten institutions begin to collapse, then one must witness the pitiful spectacle of branches of the longstanding culture-system withering and falling leaf by leaf. If then there blows a powerful wind which sweeps away at night all that cannot be preserved, we ourselves welcome such a hurricane. Great personalities whom Hegel calls the "lighthouses of the human race," often appear with the force of such a hurricane. Only, let there be no melancholy stages of transition. What must die should die. And Voltaire has shortened this process of decomposition of the mediæval culture-system by perhaps a whole century. If the lightning of the Voltairean spirit had not struck the gunpowder stocked from the days of Humanism, Renaissance and Reformation, then that explosion which we celebrate as the great French Revolution would have been neither so violent nor so widespread.

The youthful Nietzsche who dedicates a book to the memory of Voltaire with great devotion is such a destroyer

for modern times. With his club he might destroy our young culture which was with difficulty working its way onward. But neither is our age ripe for this man nor this man for our age. To-day the question is not, as in former times, of destroying superstition in all its forms—this destructive work Voltaire has done better than any man before or after him has done—but of building new castles, sowing fresh seeds, maturing more lasting forms of beliefs, in a word, suggesting to the people of the twentieth century again a single creed. What we lack is not a destructive genius, such as Voltaire was, but a constructive genius. We have criticised ourselves to death. What is important now is to carefully preserve this growing new life, to protect the germinating seeds of these fruits from hypercriticism.

That Friedrich Nietzsche as a writer is of European fame, as once Voltaire was, is not called in question to-day by even his most pronounced opponents, of whom, now as before, I am one. From Stirner and Nietzsche there flows the individualistic movement in aesthetic literature and art which is peculiar to all romanticism. Tolstoi and Ibsen have through their poetry made the path smooth for this spiritual movement. If one places Nietzsche among the great poet-philosophers of the human race who could never become true poets because they had too much of the philosopher in them and who could never become philosophers because the poetic element in them was too strong, I will unhesitatingly accept this characterisation. The characterisation "poet-philosopher" does not carry with it the reproach of an unsteady hybrid character or even the suspicion of spiritual half-heartedness; in fact, the oldest form of Greek philosophy is that of a didactic poem. The venerable forms of a Xenophanes or an Empedocles are not any the less esteemed because they are called poetic philosophers. And even the favourite philosophical book of Kant, the magnificent didactic poem *De rerum natura* of Lucretius, does not suffer in point of dialectic on account of its poetic

form. Finally, one should remember that even Plato who so happily weaves Greek mythology into the texture of his dialectic and shapes it poetically, was known as early as the age of Homer (?) as a philosopher.

As a "poet-philosopher" even the opponents of Nietzsche must regard his peculiar genius—a genius of an undoubtedly personal stamp. Nowhere steady symmetry—always and everywhere eruptive outbursts.

The problem *Nietzsche* one has then finished when one looks at it from the artistic and only the artistic side. Kuno Fischer has shown us that one must examine Schopenhauer with the artistic measuring-rod although one has to do here with a true philosopher. Regarding Nietzsche, however, every account is wholly wrong which starts from a pure standard of the history of philosophy, instead of from a purely artistic one. It is one thing to oppose Nietzsche and quite another thing to help in the understanding of his works. If one writes a book against Nietzsche, as I have done immediately after the end of his career as a writer, then swords must necessarily be crossed, argument met by argument. If one, however, feels the necessity to-day, when the whole literary remains of Nietzsche lie before us complete, in a big edition, for writing not *against* but *about* Nietzsche, every writing misses its object which undertakes to describe his "philosophy" schematically, instead of trying to delineate his artistic personality. The "philosopher" Nietzsche requires no such description! Did he not write with Schopenhauer and Bismarck the best German? Who can interpret him better than he himself? Are then the works of Nietzsche written in Chinese that hundreds of externally busy but inwardly idle pens strive with one another in "describing" Nietzsche? Against this wild movement round Nietzsche there was only one pen, namely that of Nietzsche himself. As this pen, however, has for ever stopped, a lesser one must try to protest against the odious "commenting," "paraphrasing,"

“dissecting,” “analysing” and “interpreting” of the works of Nietzsche.

A cousin of Nietzsche, Dr. Richard Oehler, a classical philologist by profession, publishes, on being urged by Professor Vaihinger, a study called *Friedrich Nietzsche und die Vorsokratiker*, Leipzig, Dürr 1904. His attempt Oehler justifies with the characteristic words, “Such inquiries as the following seem to me hardly so necessary in the case of any other thinker as in the case of Nietzsche”. If this is not philosophical Byzantinism and literary idolatry, I do not know what idolatry is. Everybody builds his own Nietzsche altar and burns a little incense in order in his way to make offerings to the philosophical demi-god or full god. To such excesses of an extravagant cult of learning one might oppose Nietzsche’s “crown of roses for those that laugh”: Ye gods in Olympus, where do ye get your holy laughter?

What would the “old-fashioned man”, the born critic of culture, say to that artificial culture which moves to-day towards its gilded throne in order to wipe away carefully every particle of dust?

That we have in holy Weimar archives for Nietzsche guarded by the highest priestess of Nietzsche-cult, Frau Förster Nietzsche, ought to satisfy this good society. Schiller and Goethe certainly attained this position in the Valhalla much later, Leibniz and Kant have not yet reached this stage of a separate cult. But finally, this temple of worship is not without an historical example. One should think of the analogous Comte-cult in France. What Frau Elizabeth in a thoroughly devoted spirit has done for his brother, Comte once in his last religious period did for his greatly adored friend Clotilde de Vaux. Indeed, the Comte-cult has caused an altogether different current in France from that which the Nietzsche-cult has done in Germany. If the Nietzsche society contented itself with making a pilgrimage to Weimar in order there, in the silent joy of confession to make

known their adherence to the creed, it would be wicked to oppose this; for awe is the only kind of fear which even the Zarathustra of Nietzsche respects as a virtue (Works Vol. VII p. 249). We think ourselves, however, justified in openly protesting against the din and hubbub caused by the interpretation of Nietzsche. The works of Nietzsche, lie before us, thanks to the efforts of Frau Förster-Nietzsche, perfectly complete. Here we have an authentic text. The master wrote no apocalypses, left no runic inscriptions or thought-hieroglyphics, introduced no enigmatic language, but coined words with great ability which have now obtained currency. Every educated man can understand him or at least, with some effort have a knowledge of Nietzsche himself and even of the prophetic Zarathustra. Spare us therefore the commentaries, especially, as the clear text of the Zarathustra Bible lies before us in all its purity. Of a well-known commentator of Kant it was once wittily said that to understand him one had to understand Kant himself. Similarly, we might say of the numerous interpreters of Nietzsche: The best commentary for understanding Nietzsche is a thorough study of his works.

If one, however, wants to use an introduction to the study of Nietzsche, then I recommend principally the monograph of Raoul Richter. Here we have to do with no partisan, no clever expert belonging to the Nietzsche-society, but with an artistically minded philosopher who with congenial tastes has conceived in Nietzsche the artist, the prophet, the poet-philosopher in his deepest essence. "Where science in regard to life becomes powerless, art appears in its place" says Richter (p. 86). Richter shows that a certain connecting line can be traced in the thought of Nietzsche through all three periods—a fact which has, moreover, been pointed out by Drews, Willy, Hollitscher and Oehler. Of the Zarathustra period Richter has made the pertinent remark that Nietzsche has acquired the right to remain silent as a philosopher and to appear as a

speaker, as an artist, as a prophet. And thus Richter is very happily reminded of a conversation of Goethe with Eckermann (*Goethe's Conversation*, edited by Biedermann, Vol. VII p. 112) in which Goethe made the following remark: One should look at a work of art which has been composed by a bold and free spirit wherever possible with the eyes of this spirit. This requirement of Goethe has been satisfied by Richter's Nietzsche book better than by other books. That we have to do with a prophet and "poet-philosopher," that thus to the artist in Nietzsche there is attached the most important personal note, this thing in my opinion is best developed by Richter along with Riehl.

As we have brought into special prominence the poet-philosopher in Nietzsche, it is necessary for us to add what we mean by "poet-philosopher." The poet and the thinker have in fact got as many common points of contact as lines of cleavage. Both seek the permanent in the changeful, unity in plurality, the eternal in the transitory, the typical in the causal. Only, the poet makes use principally of intuition and its mode of expression, the concrete picture, the plastic metaphor; whilst the thinker works principally with the deduced concept and makes use of the mode of expression of definition. The Kantian word is, moreover, also true here, the word, namely, that intuitions without concepts are blind, concepts without intuitions empty. Consequently, poets will sometimes philosophise and philosophers poetise. As the poet has to respect correct rhyme, so the thinker has to respect correct inference. For the thinker, especially, the metaphysical thinker, meditates on the world-connexion. Consequently, conceptual composition must also be an in-itself-complete and closed conception. As the poet seeks the beautiful, so the thinker seeks the true. The one as well as the other will avoid a hiatus. The argument must not be defective, as beauty must be faultless. A disturbance of the order of Nature or of the world, such as perhaps the concept

of miracle of the Church requires, would serve to give the hiatus a recognised place. The conceptual poet (Begriffsdichter) will not therefore rest till he has filled all the holes dialectically, avoided all apparently lawless and arbitrary cracks in Nature and thought away all arbitrariness in the occurrences of the world. Poetry and Philosophy are border-provinces; they cut each other like two circles which have a common loop and this common element is called aesthetics on its philosophical and poetry on its imaginative side.

The line of demarcation between poetry and philosophy is not to be found only in the mode of expression—there, picture, here, concept—but also in the conception of their respective objects. The common object of both is the world with its endless joy and eternal misery, its “starry heavens and the moral law,” its heights and depths, its explicable things and inexplicable mysteries. “When scepticism and longing unite,” says Nietzsche, “mysticism is the result” (Works, Vol. XII p. 259). Only, the poet sees in the Absolute the individual, while the philosopher sees in the individual the absolute; the former is, according to his object, wholly subjective, the latter, in all respects, predominantly objective. Consequently, with the poet work comes after personality; with the thinker, on the other hand, personality comes after one’s work. For “the world shapes itself in a poet’s head in a way different from that in which it shapes itself in others’ heads.” The poet shows us a reflected image of the world-connexion as it is formed in his head without caring whether it has a necessary or universal validity; the philosopher, on the other hand, composes a world-connexion which in itself may rest on a *petitio principii* but which in the assumption of its correctness claims its absolute, and for all logically thinking men, compelling, validity. Philosophers require to be contradicted. Poets cannot, on account of their very nature, at all be refuted. Philosophers think principally discursively, the poets intuitively.

Philosophers have talents and only among poets are there geniuses. Talents are teachable and imitable, genius not so. Arguments can be met by counter-arguments, but pictures cannot be replaced by counter-pictures. As the poet, so the poet-philosopher, whose constructive power lies in words and whose effective power does not lie in arguments, cannot be refuted; one either feels genius or one has no relation to it. As there are in dead languages words which appear only once, so poets as well as "poet-philosophers" are personalities which exist only once. Every one of them is a *homo sui generis*, an ἀπαξ λεγόμενον and only under this point of view is to be judged artistically.

If Nietzsche is a genius, then Stirner is the Don Quixote of individualism. Georg Adler to whom we owe so many important contributions and whom an early death (he died at the age of forty-five in June 1908) has snatched all too early from science, has very well conceived the scientific position of Stirner. The idiology of Stirner is to be conceived, according to Adler, as the philosophy of the Bohemians, as the expression of the vulgar rabble of a large town. Stirner is to be looked upon as the "progenitor of an anarchistic doctrine free from morality." Stirner justifies the "morality-free" life of the vulgar rabble which Marx once branded vehemently as the "hangman's standpoint." A serious and deep estimate the philosophy of ethical solipsism of the ego-centric negation of mankind and assertion of self is nowhere found so well as in Adler's booklet *Stirners anarchistische Sozialtheorie*, Jena, Fischer 1907. Either apologists like Mackay have raised this hero of egoism to heaven or pamphleteers have thrown him into hell as a Herostratos of dialectics. To the apologists the poor wizard with his adoration of might-is-right-morality, of Rinaldo-Rinaldini philosophy, appeared as the essence of superhuman wisdom, as the revelation of a genius which only was not favoured by God, because for Stirner no God existed above and beyond the man of

genius who could alone confer a favour upon him. To others, on the other hand, Stirner was the embodiment of downright folly, a devil incarnate whom one may at best laugh at as a demented representative of an egoism that has degenerated into a stream of ideas and whom at worst one would send to the "gallows." The former see him with the magnifying glass of the affectionate and pious disciple, the latter through the wrong side of the telescope, through uncomprehending and violent enmity which undervalues all things. For the former, Stirner is a superhuman, for the latter a subhuman species. It was Georg Adler who first obtained the calm and correct historical perspective from which to view Stirner as an all-too-human figure. Relevantly and dispassionately he develops in six chapters the fundamental doctrines of Stirner in all their finer shades and in the last three chapters establishes calmly this critical standpoint and justifies the classing of Stirner with the social philosophers of the vulgar rabble. Very exquisitely has Count Hermann Keyserling in his book *Unsterblichkeit* (*Immortality* 1907) in the Chapter entitled *Man and Humanity* characterised the "intellectual countenance" of Max Stirner and thereby thrown critical light on the individualistic movement of all ages. That through extreme individualism we land in bottomless nihilism and are stranded there Keyserling no doubt perceives. Only, he ought not to have done our age the injustice of asserting against it that it stands "under the sign of Stirner's ideal" (p. 182).

Schopenhauer says somewhere that solipsism cannot be logically refuted. And thus Adler also has not properly refuted Stirner, but has only, through a psychology of the formation of his system, brought him nearer to us, so far as the man and science are concerned. That Proudhon, Moses, Hess and Feuerbach were his foster-fathers we of course knew. That, however, Fichte's "I am all" has become of no consequence to Stirner we cannot conceive. The

starting-point is naturally Hegel, to whose radical left wing (represented by the Bauer brothers, Ruge, Richter, Strauss, Feuerbach) Marx belongs as the standard-bearer and Stirner as the freebooter. But Fichte has influence, not only according to Lassalle, but also according to Stirner, and that as a romanticist. The Utopian romance of the ego, and as such one must conceive Stirner's *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* (The individual and his property), is an expression of that essentially romantic temperament which begins with Fichte's placing of the ego in the front rank and performs true orgies of the "ego-cult" in Friedrich Schlegel. Stirner is a political romanticist of society in somewhat the same sense as Callicles or Polus, that is the later sophists, and he is related to the romanticism of Fichte, much as the later sophists were related to Protagoras.

Adler says quite correctly that Fichte's "I am all" is true of the absolute ego, of the world-ego, at least of the human race-ego, whereas Stirner's ego has for its contents the transitory, individual, particular ego. There was exactly this opposition between the early Sophistic conception of the Protagorean *homo mensura* doctrine and the later Sophistic one. In the beginning, the doctrine ran, *Man*, that is, the human race-reason, is the measure of all things. Later, the doctrine was transformed and corrected thus: *The* man (Stirner's "only one") is the measure of all things.

The originality of Stirner is not worth that which Adler thinks it is (p. 35). We may put up with the "hypercritical social philosopher", but "the finely written and ingeniously conceived book" we can only leave unchallenged if the word "finely" is replaced by the more apt word "with subtlety" and the expression "ingeniously" by the expression "with the ingenuity of force". The genealogy of his morals is so very obvious that there can be no question here of any creative originality. One has to read the word of Helvetius—Man likes instinctively in his descendants the capacity of being

enemies of his enemies and one will have the egocentric immoralism of Stirner into the bargain. Consequently, I should have been pleased if Adler who is so very familiar with the history of ideologies had not stopped at Feuerbach and Proudhon, but had pointed to the line—Helvetius, Mandeville's *Fable of the Bee* and Hobbes's *Leviathan*. The same is true of the beautiful chapter *Man and Mankind* in Keyserling's *Unsterblichkeit* (Immortality). The individualistic movement has received here an interesting illumination, but reference to Hobbes, Mandeville and Helvetius is wanting. On the other hand, the historical perspective in Keyserling (especially, at p. 208) is very remarkable. As regards the English, the political nation *κατεξοχην*, Keyserling remarks: Everywhere and in all ages, the condition of a nation was happiest and most powerful where the individual, as in England, felt himself autonomous and yet an organic member of the whole. The individualistic movement always finds a home in England. English nominalism is only an epistemological type of ethical individualism. The English nominalists, later, the free thinkers, like Toland and Mandeville, are the proper bearers of individualism in modern times, as Macchiavelli's "Principle" was during the Renaissance and as the later Sophists, whose type (Callicles) Plato has sketched with an immortal pen in his *Gorgias*, were in ancient times.

If one wants to class Stirner, one must place him at the tail-end of the extreme left of the social philosophers, namely, as the leader of that "might is right"-theory which was represented in ancient times by Thucydides and Epicurus. The "autonomy of the individual" which Adler values greatly in Stirner (p. 3) was proclaimed long before him by the Cynics and the later Sophists. "Man is the measure of all things" and "I see only an *individual* horse, a horse in general I do not see" are the models which "The individual and his property" has followed. Stirner only speaks the last word of that sociological

nominalism which explains all universal concepts, such as, mankind, fatherland, nationality, State, as arbitrary symbols, or, in the terminology of Fritz Mauthner, as "word fetishes". Of course, such a vagabond-philosophy can have its special charm as the expression of intoxication of a tipsy logic, like the jolly expression "I let things drift" or the songs composed by wandering students or the poetry of drains and the lyric of sewers which Ostwald once collected. Only, we refuse to acknowledge in Stirner a man who "has emphasised more than any other person the principle of free individuality and the right of personality to the peculiar development of its essence and protested more than others against all attempts at a spiritual training and levelling" (Adler p. 35f). The historian of socialism and communism in ancient times knows from his own works, as from the whole literature on the subject (especially, from the two volumes of Pöhlmann), quite as well as we know, those anarchistic and egocentric tirades, the echo of which reaches us through poets (Euripides and Aristophanes). Stirner has only further expressed in the framework of the Hegelian philosophy what the Cynics and the later Sophists proclaimed in the framework of sophistry in the manner of a charlatan. And let us not have any illusions about these : these diatribes are nothing more and nothing less than dialectical athletics, a hand-to-hand-fight, jugglery. What a contrast does this self-styled great present to the giant Nietzsche who is really consumed in his flame ! Even as conceptual poetry, the "loud hurrah" of the philosopher of the vulgar rabble cannot be placed by the side of the poet of the "over-man". The truth of the following proposition is illustrated clearly in these two *compagnons d'armes* of anarchistic individualism : "When two persons do the same thing, it is not the same thing that they do." If one comes from Stirner to Nietzsche, one has, in spite of all affinity of ideas, even on account of this, a painful feeling as if one has seen Francis Moor in a strolling theatrical company

or in the Court theatre in Vienna. The impulse for writing *Faust* Goethe, as is well known, got from the sight of a Punch and Judy show. Stirner's "individual" who shrinks from no crime, to whom "perjury, robbery, murder and bloodshed" seem, as they did to the ancient cynic, to be some of the "well-acquired rights" of the individual (Adler p. 24f), is related to the wandering animal of the primeval forest, to the "over-man" of the last phase of Nietzsche, somewhat as the "flaying freebooter" is related to Goethe's *Faust*.

Walter Calé who died recently, made the characteristic remark in the *Neue Rundschau* for September 1906, p. 1143, in which he was anticipated by the Bern theologian Lüdemann in his rectoral address, the remark, namely, that "personality is the opposite of individuality." Keyserling sees in this, as in Georg Simmel's *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche* (1907), the key to a deep understanding of the individualistic movement of thought as well as a deepening of our grasp of the problems of Nietzsche. Nietzsche had, so thinks Keyserling, undoubtedly agreed with the word of Calé. For personality, so interprets Keyserling, is an idea, a timeless eternal power, a force which oversteps all bounds. "Individual" is an essentially limited and transitory thing, unattainable and dark, indifferent and irrelevant. He who adores "personality" in the true sense, adores the over-individual, adores the idea, adores mankind.

The all-too-individual, as it is called by Keyserling (*Unsterblichkeit* 1907) remains sterile. The isolating of personality must react upon itself. If solipsism as an epistemological doctrine is indeed wholly fruitless, then sociological solipsism, the ego-craze, the individualitymania, the crass, wild, egoistic individualism with the formula, "To me there is nothing above me," is a delirium which is injurious to all. The emancipating word of Auguste Comte is always true: The individual is a **fiction** like the atom. Through every drop of blood in our veins there flows the history of our race. The recent doctrines of "race-memory"

(Hering) or “mneme” ” (Semon) have biologically made closer the connexion between the individual and the race than the Buddhistic (?) * metaphysical *Tat twam asi* (*That thou art*) could do.

* This is evidently a slip for *Brahmanic*—Translator.

CHAPTER IX

THE MENTAL SCIENCE MOVEMENT

(WILHELM DILTHEY)

The division of the totality of science into natural and mental sciences is a comparatively recent event. Wilhelm Dilthey was perhaps the first to emphasise the separate character and independence of mental sciences. Heinrich Rickert no doubt made a proposal for substituting for the current term "mental sciences" the term which Dilthey's writings principally helped to gain currency, namely, "sciences of culture". Rickert, however, has not succeeded in introducing the word "sciences of culture". Now, as before, that movement of thought which proceeds from Wilhelm Dilthey and his strict school (Frischeisen-Köhler, Menzer, Groethuysen, Misch, Heubaum etc.) is best characterised as the theory of "mental sciences". In the reports of the sitting of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1905, Wilhelm Dilthey has set down the result of his many years' work in his *Studien zur Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften* (Studies for the establishment of mental sciences) thus : 1. Problem and arrangement of the basal principles. 2. Descriptive preliminary concepts.

The method of mental sciences advanced by Dilthey, ~~the~~ meaning, province and extent of which ought to be brought clearly into view as against the encroachments of natural sciences which mistake their limits, lays the burden of the inquiry upon introspection. With the help of this a closed system of mental sciences with which "the knowledge of reality, determinations of value, norms and purposes are connected", should be worked out, in order that it may

appear in opposition to the system of natural sciences as its great rival. For Dilthey the basal principle of philosophy lies in introspection, for "in philosophy the single being of man which divides itself into different spheres of life and expresses itself in temporal determinations is raised to the consciousness of the connexion of these expressions and thereby to the autonomous self-certainty of existence and action". For the consciousness of reality, determination of value and fixation of purpose, introspection is in the last analysis the most important thing in the organic connexion of spiritual life. Behind this organic connexion thought cannot go. In his contributions to "the study of individuality" (Report of the sitting of the Academy in 1896, Vol. XIII) Dilthey expresses himself in greater detail on the organic connexion of spiritual life. All single formations and all particular connexions are comprehended under the organic connexion of spiritual life. It is the condition of unity of life and knowledge. This organic connexion should make intelligible the living connexion of effects within spiritual life and the world of history, at least up to a certain extent. For this purpose, Dilthey opposes to speculative psychology, on the one hand, and experimental, on the other, his descriptive and analytic psychology which first makes possible a comprehensive system of mental sciences in the sense in which Dilthey and his school understand it. If, consequently, the mental sciences rest upon inner experience and the artistic perception of others, then Dilthey's descriptive and analytic psychology naturally becomes the foundation of the mental sciences.

The most important of Dilthey's works is, however, his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (Introduction to mental sciences), 1883, in which, in order to establish a theory of knowledge of history, he has attempted to place the mental sciences on a deeper basis than anybody before him has done. According to his own admission, the first thing he has to do

is to establish philosophically the principle of the historical school and the work of the particular social sciences which is determined by it, and thus to reconcile the opposition between this historical school and the abstract theories. A "theory of knowledge of the mental sciences", as has been represented for a generation by Dilthey, who has not, however, found time to develop the well thought-out scheme completely into a compact whole, is the essence of his scientific efforts. Here are gathered together all the threads of his great and deep personality.

The most holy thing of the human race, namely, truth, is invisible and therefore difficult to obtain. The choicest spirits among all nations and in all times strive, through powerful constructions of thought, to pave the road to this shrine and make access to truth possible for their disciples. Apart from innumerable impassable side-paths and obviously wrong roads, four great paths of thought rise into prominence and these four principal roads are : God, Spirit, Nature and History. In order to ascertain the final and highest truth about the meaning of the world-existence, as of all particular existence, people tried during the whole of the Middle Ages to question God, fathom His being and deduce earthly truth from the attributes of God of which veracity is one of the foremost. People at first showed a preference for supernatural light, revelation and inspiration, and later, by reaction, for natural light, human reason. From the sixteenth century there has dawned the light of natural light, of reason, in such a manner that it eclipses the supernatural light. Philosophers no more ask the theologians but the mathematicians what truth is. The most ancient doctrine of "double truth" which took in the didactic poem of Parmenides the form of the antithesis of the doctrine of "being" and the doctrine of "appearance", in Plato that of idea and phenomenon, in Aristotle that of the super-lunar and the sub-lunar world, gets in the Middle Ages the characterisation, natural light and revelation, and receives finally in these days

the form of the contrast between *vérités éternelles* and *vérités de fait*. Instead of the authority of the dogma there has appeared the authority of human reason. Every age, even the most revolutionary, has the tendency to stiffen into a dogma. Revolutionaries have their fanatical dogmatists as much as the reactionaries have. The rebellious triad—Humanism, Renaissance and Reformation—has no doubt in solid phalanx helped to destroy the natural light of human reason as against the supernatural light of revelation, if not intentionally, yet through its effects. But at once a new dogma announces the infallibility of human reason. The authority of the Church creed is only removed in order that the autonomy (self-legislation) of human reason may be proclaimed. And this struggle between authority and autonomy which brings about the transition from the mediæval age to modern times, nobody has conceived more thoroughly than Wilhelm Dilthey has done in a series of exquisite works on the history of philosophy which appeared in the “Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie” (Vols. IV-VII). We believe we are not wrong in thinking that the essays of Dilthey which appeared in the “Archiv” contain materials for a second volume of his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (Introduction to mental sciences).

In the transition from the dogma of the Church to the dogma of reason the following subterranean psychological process takes place. The mediæval Church as the guardian of supernatural light assigns to human reason strict bounds that cannot be overstepped. “Your natural light, understanding” it says, “can only move within the two extremities, the old and the new Testament. God has proclaimed it to the Jews in the old, to the Christians in the new Testament and to the Muhammadans in the Koran. If you wish to illumine truth with your natural light, nothing stands in your way, for supernatural light can only help us when it is strengthened by the illuminating power of natural light, but one condition is indispensable, namely, that you must accept

God as the only gateway of truth. Either reason follows *the* path or no path whatever. Every other path is closed to it once for all. And now human reason has met with the same fate as Krapotkin in the Peter-Paul castle. In his autobiography (*Autour d'une vie*, Paris, Stock, 1902), Krapotkin narrates how after his capture he took care "to preserve his physical vigour". For this purpose he paced backwards and forwards one thousand and fifty times in his cell; that made a day's march of two miles. This exercise kept up his physical vigour.

If one carries this procedure from the physical to the mental sphere, transforms bodily habits into dialectical ones, then one gets an approximately correct view of the work of scholastic philosophy. Human reason could not quit the prison of the dogmas of the Church. But within these four walls it could, in order to strengthen its powers through gymnastic exercises, walk to-and-fro one thousand times everyday. This then it also did. He who finds himself compelled in the course of his studies to work through this literature knows very soon the ways and means of this spiritual rumination—this intellectual treadmill, an eternal up and down, an endless to-and-fro, a thousand times the same thing with only such differences as result from small shades of personality. But the Nemesis of world-history is always at work underground, causing breaches in the walls of this prison. As Krapotkin preserved his physical powers, so the Scholastics exercised and strengthened their spiritual powers through logical gymnastics everyday. The forced to-and-fro march on beaten tracks produces in them a remarkable refinement. Their instrument, intellect, is sharpened and polished. Their art of disputation which in subtlety and acuteness, in fineness and elegance, not only comes near that of the dialectical athletes of ancient times, the Sophists, but even excels it, improved and refined their mental powers in so many ways that the Scholastics began in

the thirteenth century with this fine, everyday-polished instrument to undermine the walls which surrounded them. The free spirits (libertarians) at Sorbonne in Paris, the nominalistic Scholastics in England, the Averroists among the Arabs and in Padua, the followers of Gersonides among the Jews—they all make use of human reason refined by Scholastic philosophising, to bore through the wall of dogma, till they succeed in peeping through a loop-hole at that which is beyond dogma.

Here opens before thinkers a new horizon. There are created ways of truth of which the closed thought of the Scholastics has never thought. God is no more the only door of truth, as men have so long accepted. There are rather opened two new doors through which the philosophy of modern times makes its way to truth. The one is called Spirit, the other Nature. The first we characterise as rationalistic and idealistic, and since Kant's days, dogmatic, philosophy (Descartes, the occasionalists, Spinoza, Leibniz); the second as realistic, empirical philosophy (Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, the philosophers of the English Enlightenment, French Encyclopaedists, Hume). There, Nature is brought forth and deduced from the spirit; here, on the other hand, spirit is distilled out of Nature. There, Nature is logicised, unceasingly derived from "Reason"; here, on the other hand, spirit is naturalised; there, one proceeds, so far as methodology is concerned, deductively; here, inductively. There, one erects a cult of *reason*; here, a cult of *fact*. There, one holds entirely and exclusively to the sovereign human spirit whose self-legislation (autonomy), certainty and absolute as well as boundless capacity are maintained with the strictness of a dogma; here, one is content with attending to facts, observing and grouping methodically, grasping and classifying reality in its connexions, in short, in reducing all truth to objective reality. For the idealists, that is true which can be proved mathematically, for the naturalist, that which can be observed

and described as a real phenomenon of Nature. The new creed of the idealist is therefore spirit (ratio), and the new evangel is mathematics. The new creed of the realist, on the other hand, is fact (res), reality, and the new evangel has been—since the days of Leonardo da Vinci, Kepler, Galileo and Newton—physics.

These two gateways of truth—mathematics and physics—appear to the scientists of the present day as wide enough for a part of truth but as too narrow for the whole of truth. If, for instance, to know, as Comte says, is *savoir pour prévoir*, then we can no doubt know from mathematics and physics what is and what must be, but never what *should* be. The descriptive natural sciences make an inventory and catalogue of the three realms of nature, according to their class, type, species, genus, as they really are and represent themselves to our senses. The inductive natural sciences place the eternal connections under the forces of nature, and regulate, according to the mathematical method, the existence of things, “so far as it is determined by universal laws” (Kant). The former thus establish firmly what is true in nature, the latter group and classify the constant relations of natural forces to one another and find the formula for what is necessary, that is, what must be necessarily thought. What man *should* do, however, one can learn neither from mathematics nor from physics. Thus, spirit and nature give only partial truths, they place us upon an *is* and *must* but not upon a *should*.

We men are, however, first acting, and then thinking beings. It is incomparably of more importance and value to us to know what to do and not to do than to understand clearly how we can explain the connexion of natural phenomena. Kant calls this the primacy of practical over theoretical reason. Whether the universe is composed of atoms or energies is a question which affects our impulse for knowledge very much, but our individual life is not at all affected by it. We can regulate our relation to the universe as well according

to the first conception as according to the second. The opposite is the case with questions of *should*. With the answer to these questions stands or falls our personality. Man requires at every moment of his conscious existence measuring-rods for his actions, direction-lines, mile-posts, norms by which to regulate in every particular case his actions and his relations. To these norms the mediaeval Church held fast as its strong points and they everywhere preserve their value where the deep-rooted respect for a supernatural origin of these norms has maintained itself undiminished to this day.

In our culture-system there is, however, a large class of men who absolutely deny the super-sensible origin of the measuring-rod of human action. Not a few among the people of to-day refuse to ask genial legislators, who lived thousands of years ago and who thus in other zones and in other times, under essentially different historical principles and conditions of civilization, revealed their sacred power of work, how they should act to-day. And yet these advanced men require criteria of action, or else they fall into licentiousness and absolute anarchy. If, however, neither theology nor mathematics and physics can direct the path of their actions, then they are compelled to have a new gateway of knowledge and this fourth and last gateway is called history.

Nature, as we have emphasised before, is the kingdom of laws, history, the kingdom of ends and values. As now all *should* is synonymous with *is* in the future, with the realisation of a willed condition and a striven object, human ends cannot be obtained and derived from nature but from history. I should do that which in the first place would further my self-preservation and in the next place the preservation of the species. What has elevated my race—in this case the human race—educated, shaped, ennobled, advanced it, I never learn from mathematics or physics, but from history in its widest sense, in the sense, namely, of the universal history

of human culture. *This* is the great laboratory of the spiritual inquirer. If we glance at the group of actions of leading spirits who have advanced the life of their race, served to preserve and elevate it and separate those who have proved themselves pernicious, reactionary and destructive, then we get through these reflexions criteria of our own conduct. We ought to do all that has been proved by history to preserve the species, further the interests of the race, elevate the type of man. On the other hand, we ought to refrain from everything which has proved itself in the course of history corrupt and injurious, decomposing and destructive, retarding or hindering the welfare of the race. Droysen gives this thought the following expression: "History is the knowledge of mankind from itself, its self-certainty. It is not light and truth but an effort after them, a sermon about them, an inspiration to them." Universal history as the highest teacher of mankind—this is the summit of the hopes and dreams of the historical school as well as of the culture history movement in these days.

Wilhelm Dilthey is called the "philosopher of the historical school." We believe we have given in our account the meaning and justification of that to which has been given, ever since the days of Winkelmann and Herder, Savigny and Niebuhr, Jakob Grimm and Böckh, Burke, Guizot and Tocqueville, the collective name "historical school." Our analysis of the psychological process which tries to reveal the inner necessity of the origin of the "historical school," does not claim to have indicated the only effective causes of the origin of the "historical school." We are rather fully conscious that we offer here only a psychology of the "historical school" as we picture it to ourselves and as the reader may picture to his own mind in order to estimate truly the position of Dilthey as a philosopher of the "historical school" and a leader of the "culture history movement" of the present day.

He who knows the work of Robert Flint (which is to be read with care), entitled *The Philosophy of History*, will be very much inclined to trace the historical school back to the father of the Church, Augustin, and connect it forwards with Schmoller and his school. In Flint's *History of the Philosophy of History* which appeared in 1893 and thus ten years after Dilthey's *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (Introduction to the mental sciences) which appeared in 1883, no mention is made of Dilthey's work. And yet Dilthey had a deeper insight into the "historical school" than the host of scientific small spirits, with whom Flint has filled whole chapters of his big work, and exhibited more thoroughly than anybody else the want of a healthy relation to epistemology and psychology. He who has got the power of estimating historical values sees in Dilthey not only *a* philosopher but *the* philosopher of "the historical school" and founder of the theory of the "mental sciences." He who seriously studies the problem of the philosophy of history cannot pass over Dilthey without endangering his scientific reputation.

Very clearly should here the philosophical attitude of Dilthey towards the "historical school" be characterised. When, for instance, the door of the knowledge of truth is opened to history, then the first *Stürmer* and *Dränger* rushed through the opening with great speed. Bodin, Bossuet, Montesquieu, Turgot, Condorcet and especially, the Italian Vico in his *Scienza nuovo* (1725) worked without a licence the mine of the philosophy of history. Their fancy created wings with which they flew in the ethereal region of bold dreams of the metaphysics of history. In their youthful excessive joy of discovery they thought they had discovered the laws of history and through these laws found the key to the world-riddle. It was the dream of a God in history—one of those hasty metaphysical generalisations in which the history of literature—this temple of human ideals—is so very

rich. God was sought at first in the Church, then in the human spirit, then in nature and lastly, in history. And thus there arose in the philosophy of history a new kind of metaphysics which Dilthey who has a deep insight into metaphysics, seeks to drive out from all corners.

But even the naturalistic sociology of Comte, Mill or Spencer finds in Dilthey a sharp and untiring critic. These positivists confound, as Herder did before them, nature and history, the kingdom of laws and the world of ends and values. Out of protoplasms and cells they tried to find out what man ought to do. According to them, man is even in his actions only a part of the whole Nature and is subject therefore to the general world-laws and not to special laws of ends. This naturalism finds a most crude expression in sociology in the prevailing organic method of sociology, as founded by Spencer and sanctioned by Schaeffle.

In the eyes of Dilthey, sociology is no less metaphysics than the philosophy of history; only, there the question is of naturalistic and here of idealistic metaphysics and Dilthey has let fall opportunely the much-quoted words: "This superstition which places the works of a writer of history under a secret process in order to transform alchemistically the concrete substance found in them into the gold of abstraction and compel history to yield its most precious secret, is just as odd as the dream of an alchemist nature-philosopher who thought of extracting from nature her great word".

To this metaphysics Dilthey opposes a psychology and epistemology of history. The epistemologist is in his eyes the true successor of the sceptic. Dilthey represents the standpoint of introspection based on an epistemological explanation of history. The great work of Dilthey which promises to save us from the doubts raised by him, has up to now remained unfortunately a headless trunk, like his famous *Life of Schleiermach*. But the foundation-stone of this grand work is to be found in the numerous articles which he

has written for the "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie" as well as in numerous publications of the Berlin "Academy of Sciences." If only it was allowed to Dilthey, as it was done to his great models in Berlin, namely, Ranke, Mommsen and Zeller, to bring this great life-work to a successful termination !

In "the race of thinkers" much has changed since its adoration by Frau von Stäel. The days are gone when every German was looked upon as a dreamer, every German professor as the most ancient picture of unworldly contemplation, every German philosopher, finally, as the type of world-renouncing speculation, removed from the reality of life. In the province of industry, trade, navigation and colonisation the German seeks to bring now what was withheld from him by territorial distribution. The German professor has in course of time perfected the awkward and clumsy art of seeing men and things only with the light of a one-sided intellectualism and in his habits has gradually given up the fatal privilege of laziness and dissipation. The German philosopher, finally, no more eschews real life, but he seeks, on the contrary, to hold fast to it where it offers itself to him in an intelligible form. No more, as was once wholly the case, from the pulpit does the rising generation of our young philosophers grow, but from the laboratory, and the licentiate of theology is no more the rule but rather the exception among philosophers ; on the other hand, the doctorate of medicine is more frequently the stepping-stone to a professorship in philosophy. This training in the natural sciences, especially, in mathematics, we do not propose to underrate here. Well may we, however, give expression to the fear that through the sort of one-sided training in the natural sciences which we get to-day we are very near creating a form of specialisation which is anything but beneficial to the general tone of our science. The examples of Lotze and Wundt, who came from the side of

physiology, of Helmholtz, Fechner, Mach and Stallo who proceeded from physiology or physics, of Herbert Spencer, who had been originally an engineer, of Hartmann, who was an officer in the army by profession, of Reinke and Haeckel, the two antipodes in biology, who came from the region of botany and zoology, and lastly, of Ostwald, who was a physical chemist by profession, are no doubt tempting enough. But these modern thinkers whom we reckon as the greatest, are precisely those who fix their gaze on the whole, as one must require of a philosopher, whereas our philosophising youth has in several ways fallen under a one-sided specialisation. The metaphysicians separate themselves from the epistemologists, the logicians from the psychologists, the moralists or the philosophers of law from the sociologists, the aesthetes, lastly, from all philosophy. Quite apart stand the philosophers of religion and writers of the history of philosophy who earnestly cultivate their fields but are unconcerned about others. The aesthete hardly understands to-day the terminology of physiological psychology and conversely. Where lies then the universal science? How will philosophy get the right to take the lead in the hierarchy of sciences, because it unites into a connected system the *disjecta membra* of the remaining sciences when it cannot even bring unity into its own province? Happily, there are still thinkers of great power of the "good old times" and as one of these, we may mention Wilhelm Dilthey, who comprehends with a philosophical glance all provinces of mental science.

The Berlin philosopher Adolph Trendelenburg to whom Dilthey has dedicated his *Leben Schleiermachers* (Life of Schleiermacher) has left his mark upon Dilthey's mode of philosophical thinking. Trendelenburg's method which Rudolf Eucken has so happily sketched, became a guide for Dilthey. And as this method agreed with that of Schleiermacher in its principal features in this, that careful consideration and minute investigation of the details of the history of philosophy formed the base of the structure and the stronghold

of the philosophical system, it at the same time indicates the characteristic nature of Dilthey's method of work and his near relationship to Eduard Zeller by whose side he could develop his great activity at the Berlin University. We see in him, as well as in Eduard Zeller, the continuation of Trendelenburg's line and the legitimate heir of that great philosophical tradition of the Berlin University which could count Schleiermacher and Fichte among its founders and Hegel, Schopenhauer, Beneke and Schelling among its teachers.

The comprehensive spirit of Schleiermacher is discerned in the writings of Dilthey. Schleiermacher's "political sense and effectiveness" Dilthey sketched in the "Preussische Jahrbuch" (Vol. X 1862), and Schleiermacher is also the subject of Dilthey's dissertation with which he was promoted to the Berlin University, the dissertation called *De principiis ethicis Schleiermacheri* 1864. The *Life of Schleiermacher* Dilthey began to portray in the great year 1870 which enjoys among professional people the reputation of being a biographical model and those who are familiar with these things wish nothing more than that Dilthey had the power, inclination and perseverance to preserve his *Schleiermacher* from the fate of a torso. His Schleiermacher studies have never been finished. To this bears witness the memorial which Dilthey has made in the "*Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*" (Universal German biography) where he has also dealt biographically with Süvers and Nütkemann. Dilthey knows how to create in his pupils a lasting and vivid interest in Schleiermacher, as the work of J. Halpern on the evolution of Schleiermacher's dialectics (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. XIV, 1901) has quickened the interest of those that are familiar with things philosophical.

Dilthey studied in Berlin; here he was promoted; here he settled himself as *Privatdozent*; here he was recalled after he had adorned the professorship at Basel, Kiel and Breslau, in order to work with Eduard Zeller as a philosopher. For

more than twenty-five years Dilthey has been instilling into the young minds of the students of Friedrich Wilhelm's University those universalistic and idealistic tendencies which lead to Schleiermacher and Fichte. The Schleiermacherian method, however, of looking upon the history of philosophy as the base upon which a system is to be built, has found in Adolf Trendelenburg, Eduard Zeller and Wilhelm Dilthey not only a further development but also the highest expression. What the laboratory is for the scientist, what history in its widest sense is for the spiritual inquirer, the history of philosophy should be for the system-building impulse of thought. As we owe to the microscope the deepest insight into the essence of nature, so should philological micrology, the painfully minute scientific investigation of the details of the history of philosophy, sharpen and widen the view of the great facts of human spiritual evolution. And the Berlin school, especially, Zeller and Dilthey, with whom was associated the author of the *Doxographi Graeci* and *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Hermann Diels, has brought vividly to all of us how one has, on the one hand, to deal methodically with history, and on the other hand, to make the results serve the ends of creative synthesis, that is, of philosophical system-building. And the three advocates of mental sciences solved their problems in this way, that Diels controlled principally the first, the philologico-critical half of the common efforts, whilst the second half, the development of the results of the inquiry into the history of philosophy to serve the ends of system-building, fell to the portion of the leader of the history-of-philosophy movement, Eduard Zeller, and to the formative imagination of Wilhelm Dilthey.

An exhaustive estimate of the total work of Wilhelm Dilthey is at present not possible ; moreover, Dilthey is, as always, a creative genius. I confine myself to bringing clearly into view the many-sidedness, or, as one may say without exaggeration, the all-sidedness of the philosophical

interest of Dilthey, as contrasted with the specialised one-sidedness of the younger generation. There is absolutely no special province of philosophy which Dilthey has not enriched or at least cultivated.

Like his universalistic model Leibniz, Dilthey is a philosopher who philosophises for an occasion, and as one has to judge Leibniz not only by his two philosophical works, but essentially and principally by his essays scattered over the magazines, so one cannot do justice to Dilthey if one knows him only as the author of the two unfinished works (*Schleiermacher* and *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*) without being aware of his numerous essays in the "Preussische Jahrbücher", in the reports of the proceedings of the Berlin Academy, in Westermann's magazine, in the "Deutsche Rundschau" and, above all, of his important contributions to the "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie". A perfect idea of the totality of his writings which unfortunately he has never collected in a volume, as he has done his literary-historical studies of Lessing, Goethe, Novalis and Hölderlin in the collection *Das Erlebnis und die Leistung* (2nd Edition 1907), can only give us a deep insight into the machinery of thought of the Berlin philosopher. According to the temperament, inspiration, reading, momentary whims or external causes, the refined, predominantly aesthetic spirit of the thinker grasps the individual problems, or, more correctly, *the problems grasp him*. He fights for their solution with all the force of a nature which is stirred with enthusiasm to its inmost depths but yet preserves in the matter of feeling a sober and dignified aspect. Dilthey has not come from the romantics in vain. Not only with Schleiermacher and his romantic circle of friends, but also and especially, with Novalis and Hölderlin, he has in common the tendency towards internalisation and introspection.

Among the historians of philosophy Dilthey undoubtedly occupies a leading position. The researches of Dilthey on

the pantheism in the history of evolution in its historical connection with the older pantheistic systems, on the natural system of mental sciences in the 17th century, on Giordano Bruno and Spinoza, on the Rostock manuscripts of Kant, on Goethe's philosophy of Nature, on Sigismund Beck, the Kantian, and lastly and principally, the monographs on Carlyle (which all appeared in the "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie") all constitute an eloquent testimony to the comprehensiveness and many-sidedness of his work in the province of the history of philosophy. The origin of hermeneutics has been sketched by Dilthey in the philosophical essays dedicated to Sigwart (Tübingen, 1900). All the great thinkers of antiquity and of the Middle Ages, Dilthey has examined in his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (Introduction to the mental sciences), so that it may very well be said that Dilthey has examined historically all the important philosophical systems of thought from Thales to Nietzsche and has given everywhere clear expression to his personal attitude. As formerly, Schleiermacher research, so recently, Hegel research has been much illumined by him. "The history of Hegel's youth" which Dilthey, a man of seventy-two summers, published in the year 1905 in the "Publications of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences", not only threw a powerful light on the hitherto most obscure and unexplained productive period of Hegel, his youthful days, but it gave the recent Hegel research an altogether new impulse. It is true that Rosenkranz (*Hegels Leben* 1844) and Rud. Haym (*Hegel und seine Zeit*, 1857) had drawn upon the manuscripts of Hegel at the Royal Library in Berlin for their biographies, but regarding the youthful days which were important for the evolution of Hegel, Rosenkranz and Haym were silent. Here Dilthey, as in his biography of Schleiermacher, has penetrated further and has turned the glance of his historical method upon the early life of Hegel. Especially, regarding the "beginnings of the system"

and "mystical pantheism" of the first phase of thought of Hegel, Dilthey has given much information (p.152 sq). Very interesting is the delineation of the relationship with Hölderlin (p. 154; *Erlebnis und Dichtung* 1907 p. 391 sq). The agreement, says Dilthey, between the poet and the philosopher arises from the similarity of their methods. Even Hegel proceeds at that time from life ; with the help of the categories contained in life he determines the Absolute. Immediately after the appearance of Dilthey's *Jugendgeschichte Hegels* (History of Hegel's youth) the inspired Dutch Hegelian apostle, Professor G. J. P. J. Bollandin Leiden, edited the "Encyclopædia" of Hegel for "academical use" (Leiden, Adriani, 1906), whilst Hermann Nohl took charge in the year 1907 of the editing of the youthful writings. And thus the revival of the study of Hegel in these days receives a new impulse at the hands of Dilthey.

The organisation of research on the history of philosophy Dilthey has advanced in two directions in a striking manner. In the year 1887 we founded with Eduard Zeller, Hermann Diels and Benno Erdmann (now working in Bonn) the "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie" published by Georg Reimer in Berlin. Also in the transformation which took place in 1895 of the "Philosophische Monatshefte" into the "Archiv für systematische Philosophie" which was amalgamated with the long established magazine under the joint editorship of Paul Natorp and Christian v. Sigwart, Wilhelm Dilthey took an active part. His numerous pupils who in the spirit and method of the master apply themselves to studies in the history of philosophy, represent a welcome contingent for the joint work of our "Archiv."

As for the organisation of the philosophical magazine, so for the perfect critical edition of the works of Kant which has been started by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, Dilthey deserves great credit. This powerful undertaking which will comprise in 22-25 volumes the works, the

correspondence, posthumous manuscripts and lectures of Kant (the publisher will be the same as that of the "Archiv", Georg Reimer) required a strong staff of distinguished workers. As France brought out a national edition of the greatest French thinker (Descartes), so the Berlin edition of Kant promises to be the national monument which will give the German people their thinker. At the head of the committee for this undertaking which requires not only time, patience, capacity for work, but also much tact, a diplomatic head and cleverness in the selection and division of the materials that have reached a colossal magnitude, stands Wilhelm Dilthey from the beginning. Many rocks and shoals had to be avoided, for in such ticklish personal questions one could not expect to get always the thing desired. Yet Dilthey succeeded in bringing out the most important editions of the isolated works of Kant in a manner which the professionally interested people cannot fail to approve heartily. The Kant-edition is proceeding rapidly. The letters, especially, have in many ways rendered things clear. We expect more still from the publication of the reflections and loose pages, especially, from the nature-philosophy of Kant the publication of which has hitherto been characterised by anarchical arbitrariness. In the new edition of Leibniz which the Prussian Academy has started conjointly with the French Academy, Dilthey likewise has an important share.

If we have to speak even briefly of Dilthey's share in the structure of all the remaining branches of philosophical sciences, we must mention that even pedagogy which has long been raised to a special discipline does not come out of the hands of Dilthey quite barren. In the year 1888 he discussed at length in the Proceedings of the Berlin Academy of Sciences the possibility of a universal pedagogic science. The most favourite province of Dilthey is, however, aesthetics. Especially, he brings to the analysis of poetical works of which he is a master, as very few people are, the most congenial

understanding. Through the combination of historical with psychological facts which constitutes the peculiarity of his method of inquiry, Dilthey has undertaken to explain the imagination of the poet. In a much-quoted speech he tried long before Lombroso to draw the line between poetical imagination and madness (1886). Here it was not, as in Lombroso, the psychiatrist with a somewhat crude dialectics who spoke, but the refined aesthete, the born artist. Dilthey's aesthetics reaches its highest point in the essay dedicated to Zeller (Philosophical Essays dedicated to Eduard Zeller, Leipzig, 1887) entitled *Die Einbildungskraft des Dichters* (The imaginative faculty of the poet). *Baustein für eine Poetik* (Foundation-stone of a critique of poetry) pp. 305-482. Here the acquired connexion of our spiritual life is brought into relation with the creation of the poet; in the great man laws, determination of value and ends unite to form a single structure. "Thus the work of the poet becomes the mirror of the age." Art becomes for him an organ for understanding life. Out of the actual manifoldness of existing life in an age and only through the work of a poetic genius arises a *form* and consequently, the *technique of a poetic art*. "Thus this is conditioned by history and relative." The historical types of this technique which Friedrich Schlegel once designated as "schools" are illustrated by Dilthey in the drama. Dilthey bases his critique of poetry, as indeed, of all mental sciences, upon psychology and thus makes it possible to discover the function of poetry in society, and on this discovery rests the feeling of the value of the poet's profession. Dilthey's critique of poetry solves three kinds of problems: it offers the modern poet the principles which underlie the poetic expression of our sensibility of to-day, it lays down the norms which direct the creative work of the poet, it shows finally, "the historical relativity of even the most perfect form." Nevertheless, there is a germ of life which remains true for all ages, and "therefore the great poets have

something eternal in them". Ferdinand Jakob Schmidt (*Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus*, Leipzig, Dürr 1908), calls Dilthey's critique of poetry a fine study and pronounces Dilthey a "classic type". Apart, however, from the monographic studies which Dilthey has made of Shakespeare, the German classic poets, the romanticists, especially, Novalis and Hölderlin, and lastly, Dickens and Alfieri, it is the peculiarity of his writings that they cite the works of poets as authorities for his psychology, epistemology, or ethics whenever an opportunity presents itself. Few philosophers show such an intimate acquaintance with the great poetical works of all nations and ages, as the writings of Dilthey, especially, his *Einleitung* (Introduction), show. His collection of essays, *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung* (Experience and Poetry) 2nd Edition, Leipzig, Teubner, 1907, has only brought out more sharply and made accessible to a wider circle of readers what was no secret to those who were familiar with these things, namely, that Dilthey occupies the same rank among the aesthetes and historians of literature as among the narrow circle of professional philosophers. The standpoint of universal history which he shared with Eduard Zeller did much good to his inquiries into the history of literature, because here his always poetic temperament which reacted artistically on the slightest excitement, wove the particular experience into the fabric of the world-connection.

The essay on Friedrich Hölderlin is, with the exception of a few portions taken from an article of May 1867 (in Westermann's magazine), quite new, and in the second edition the characterisation of Goethe from the point of view of world-literature appears so clearly that it has become the central point of the book. Dilthey sees in all real poetry an organ for understanding life. This organ, however, draws its strength from experience, especially, from experience of high feeling. Of the experiences which the poet has in common with every ordinary man, the most prominent are those occurrences

which contain, on the one hand, a liberating element of freedom, and, on the other, an element of meaning, as Jakob Schmidt has very well pointed out in his work *On the rebirth of idealism*, 1908 p. 191. The liberating element lies, as in dream and play, in that playful impulse to which Karl Groos has given a scientific shape (in his researches on the "plays of men" and the "plays of beasts.") What is significant in poetic experience is that it teaches what is deep in life and preserves what is new in it. Dilthey calls this the "powerful, absolutely arbitrary constructive impulse" as it appears especially in Goethe's life and creative activity (*Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung* (Experience and Poetry) 2nd Edition p. 169). The unique combination of the singular and individual with the general and universal, as the mental science methods of Dilthey, especially, his descriptive and analytic psychology require, appears in the "great poetic personality". Consequently, there is in every poet a looker-on, a "spectator", a prophesying interpreter. Life, picture and poetry are most intimately connected with one another. (Ibid p. 178). Every poetical work, so continues Dilthey, is the description of a single occurrence. But every true poetical work brings into prominence through the reality which it represents, an impulse of life such as has not been seen before. "Thus. poetry completes for us the understanding of life. With the eyes of the great poet we perceive the value and connexion of human objects" (p. 179). Here Houston Stewart Chamberlain comes very near Dilthey, which may remind one that Dilthey has started from Schleiermacher, whereas Chamberlain starts from the circle of Wagner, so that the agreement of their ends is to be explained from the fundamental romantic tone of their starting-points. Chamberlain, besides, nowhere tries to conceal his great respect for Dilthey (see his work on Kant p. 298sq.).

The small booklet on *Experience and Poetry* (2nd Edition pp. 177-83) contains the essence of his poetics. A "philosopher of the mental sciences" and of the "historical method"—and

indeed, the history of philosophy will class him and permanently look upon him as such—he has made that philosophical method underlie the mental sciences in general and aesthetics and poetics in particular, which can establish them most strongly and lead them most clearly on to scientific victory. Where science has reached the limit of its capacity for work, there religion and art step in. Poetical fancy in its highest manifestation—Goethe—completes the secret of nature and of art. Art, however, is for Goethe the “highest manifestation of the work of Nature” (p. 177). Thus one can understand the word: Art and Nature are only one and the same thing.

His writings on *systematic* philosophy, to the principal thoughts of which we shall return should be grouped as follows: * To epistemology belong the “contributions to the solution of the question of the origin of our belief in the reality of the external world and its validity” (Proceedings of the Berlin Academy, 1890). Under psychology come the “Ideas concerning a descriptive and analytic psychology” (Ibid, 1894). The sharp polemic of Ebbinghaus against Dilthey’s descriptive and analytic psychology in his magazine (October 1894) and Dilthey’s defence (Proceedings 1896, p. 297ff) have caused great and just excitement far outside the bounds of professional psychology. History of philosophy has already been raised to a special study in his pamphlet on Schlosser (Preussische Jahrbücher 1862). His pronouncements on universal history are for this reason important that they contain in essence the later attitude of Dilthey towards sociology which he has recently described with great subtlety and acuteness. As showing how Dilthey’s *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, Leipzig, 1883, has enriched the philosophy of law and natural economy, I refer to Otto Gierke’s *Grundlegung für die Geisteswissenschaften* (Principles of Mental Sciences) (Preussische

* His philosophy of religion is easily obtained from the two chief works. Only one must add to these for purposes of comparison the article on the dogmas of the Reformers (*Preussische Jahrbücher*, 1894).

Jahrbücher 1884) and Gustav Schmoller's *Zur Methodologie der Staats-und Sozialwissenschaften* (in his "Jahrbuch" 1883) in which the contribution of Dilthey's *Einleitung* to jurisprudence and political economy is greatly utilised. A rich material of mental sciences is put by Dilthey into his article *Die Function der Anthropologie in der Kultur des 16 and 17 Jahrhunderts* (The function of anthropology in the culture of the 16th and 17th centuries) Proceedings, 1904. A sociological exposition of Wilhelm Dilthey O. Spann undertook in the "Tübinger Zeitschrift für Staatswissenschaft", 1903 No. 2. Dilthey's contemptuous treatment of sociology as a science is rejected; the "inner impressive originality and the bold energy" of Dilthey's conception is, however, treated with becoming respect. What Spann has not very well considered is Dilthey's positive enrichment of sociology and ethics which is found in *Beiträge zum Studium der Individualität* (Contributions to the study of individuality) (Proceedings of the Academy, 1896). Here the fundamental principles of one of the most important and difficult chapters of sociology are laid down.

As every thinker proceeds at first critically and negatively from his own standpoint, in order to build the sub-structure for his own work and then justify positively its existence as a theory demanded by logical necessity, so Dilthey destroys with a sure hand all metaphysics, in order to provide room for his psychology and epistemology. The analysis of the facts of consciousness is the highest principle of his teaching. In inner experience he finds the strong point of his thought. All experience lies enclosed in the conditions of our consciousness. From this centre rays must be sent with the help of the special sciences to the periphery of the universe; the right of the mental sciences must be maintained and their boundaries must be determined with reference to the sphere of validity of the special sciences, as Windelband and Rickert have in great measure done from the standpoint of the philosophy of norms. The historical school to which Dilthey belongs

requires a psychological grounding and epistemological basis which Dilthey has supplied in his work *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, originally spread over five books. The positivists, Comte and Mill (and not, it is to be noted, Feuerbach, the deeper positivist) maimed historical reality through arbitrary adoption of the methods of natural sciences. Not through the door of nature but through that of history, can one reach the kingdom of mental sciences. Only *historical* introspection reveals the full knowledge of *philosophical* introspection (Epistemology).

The French and English positivists (Comte, Mill and Spencer) against whom the German Wilhelm Dilthey at first appeared with the whole weight of a culture and training in universal history, have, according to him, erected only one necessary structure which can no more be maintained than the bold speculation of a Schelling or Oken about Nature. Nature, however, is dumb. Only "the power of our imagination throws upon it a light of inwardness and life." It is for us only external, not internal, like society which *we experience* in ourselves. "The waterfall is composed of homogeneous, adhering particles of water, but a single sentence which is only the breath from a mouth, scatters the whole living society of a continent through a play of motives into pure individual units". It is, consequently, a great mistake to try to construct the mental sciences after the model of the natural ones. Much more justified would, on the other hand, be the attempt on the part of the investigator of nature to explain the essence of nature on the analogy of the better known (because created by us) sociologico-historical facts. For sociohistorical reality forms the starting-point of all knowledge. The knowledge of the totality of this reality, Dilthey calls opportunely the most universal and final problem of the mental sciences.

What a pity that Dilthey has passed over Ludwig Feuerbach! The more strongly he feels his distance from

the French and English positivists, the nearer he approaches this father of German positivism. Their point of coincidence is Schleiermacher, from whom they have in the same manner started in their philosophy of religion and whom they have both left behind at the same time. The "feeling of dependence upon Schleiermacher" as the note of all religious constructions to which Dilthey gives expression repeatedly in the *Einleitung* (pp. 84, 141, 170, 173sq.), is developed in Feuerbach as much as can be desired. For him the God of natural religion is nature, the god of spiritual religion is spirit, especially, the essence of man. Man should henceforth seek the determining reason of his actions, the object of his thought, in *himself*, not *outside* himself like the heathen, nor *above* himself like Christ. Along with Feuerbach David Friedrich Stauss also says, "Man makes his God that which he himself might have been but is not, he makes his God create that which he might have done but does not know how to do." It is thus not only the dependence in which he finds himself but also the need of fighting against it, of freeing himself again from it, from which for man religion arises. Now one ought to take into consideration what Dilthey has said about the conditions of human consciousness as the fundamental facts of experience, especially, the following quotation:—"An arrangement of reality can have no value in itself but only in its relation to a system of energies. From this there results, further, that we naturally rediscover in the historical course of this world as its valuable and significant contents, that which is perceived as value in the system of our energies and placed as law under the will: *every formula in which we express the meaning of history is only a reflex of our own animated interior*. This expression exhibits much more consistency and grandeur of conception than anything formulated by Feuerbach, not to speak of Strauss. Not only the origin of the religious feeling but the source of all

values, ends, categories, norms and measures is always, according to Dilthey, human consciousness and nothing but human consciousness. What Feuerbach has done for the philosophy of nature to which he principally confined himself, Dilthey would and should do for psychology and epistemology. He still accepts with the positivists, even with Comte whom he opposed so strenuously, the word *Down with metaphysics*.

The principal objection which Dilthey raises against the philosophy of history of the Hegelians and the sociology of the type of that of Comte and Spencer is always that metaphysics lurked in the methods of all of them. They therefore represent no real sciences; their problems are insoluble and their methods false; they misconceive, especially, the attitude of the mental sciences towards the remaining special sciences. Hegel's "world-spirit" and even Schleiermacher's "reason" are abstract general ideas, *notiones universales* which spread their dark net over the historical world. It is worse still with the naturalistic metaphysics of Comte and his interpreter Mill. Dilthey recognises Comte's Law of the three stages (fetishism, metaphysics and positivism) as a real discovery, although in this Turgot comes before Comte. Also he takes a good view of the relation of dependence of the historical succession of events to their logical order. Kant also thought similarly. But the confused and indeterminate universal ideas which Comte introduced into the historical connexion, the "stormy generalisations" of Comte, he cannot understand. These outlines he compares to "brick-built houses which through plaster imitate the blocks, colours and decorations in granite which are the result of long and patient work upon a hard substance." All this is "a metaphysical nebula" which is nowhere denser than in Comte who transformed the Catholicism of De Maistre into the phantom of a hierarchical government of society through science.

Here we cannot help making two observations. We do not like that the Caesaropapism of Comte, which belonged to the last period of his creative activity—a period which was at least darkened by the preceding spiritual darkness—should be used as an argument against the author of the *Course of Positive Philosophy*. The position of Dilthey as against Comte whose philosophy had neither a psychology nor an epistemology for its base, is so strong that it can very well renounce such a cheap triumph. Further, it is a reasonable requirement of the sense of justice not to treat Mill *after* his quarrel with Comte any more as a train-bearer of the French positivist. The recent publications of Lévy-Brühl, moreover, throw much light on this point. Of course, we cannot here take upon ourselves the task of weakening the arguments of Dilthey against sociology. Our only task is to exhibit Dilthey's philosophy in its essential features. We believe we have exhibited the negative-critical part; mental science must be freed from the slavery of the methods of the natural sciences; at the same time, however, the logical connexions which bind the separate sciences with one another must be shown. For the "isolated philosophy of the spirit is a chimera; the separation of the philosophical view of historico-social reality from positive reality is the *fatal inheritance* of metaphysics"

As Kant has opposed a "critique of pure reason" and Avenarius a "critique of pure experience" to all dogmatism up to their times, so Dilthey begins his epistemological foundation of the mental sciences with a *critique of historical reason*, that is, of the power of man to know himself and the society and history created by him. Formal logic, the doctrine of method and epistemology are subjected for this purpose to a strict examination from the side of their forms which have become historically effective. Against empiricism, on the one hand, and speculative idealism, on the other, *the standpoint of introspection*, of inner experience, is firmly established, historically

developed and exhibited as the strongest proof against all metaphysics. Metaphysics cannot explain the world-connexion without falling into inconsistencies. It is inevitably involved in antinomies. Its thought-materials, substance and causality, are neither self-evident nor capable of being determined in only one way. Therefore it takes shelter, exactly as it did in Hegel and Comte, behind religion. Religious life is not with Dilthey, as it was with them, a passing phase in the evolution of mankind, but it represents with psychological necessity its experiences in the symbolic language of myths and dogmas ; it is the "lasting basis of intellectual evolution". In this he resembles Feuerbach.

The self-disintegration of metaphysics to which is devoted the historical portion of the *Einleitung* with its fine perception of details and its great insight into the whole, leads to this, that all metaphysics "is dumb". Materialism, pantheism, monism and idealism are struck directly at their roots by the irrefutable sceptics. Concepts, like force, atom, molecule are for most scientists only a system of auxiliary constructions with the help of which we develop the conditions for the given state of things into a connexion which is clear for thought and useful to life. If Dilthey had not pronounced this sentence (p. 465) a quarter of a century ago, one should not have been surprised to hear our modern nature-philosophers, Ostwald, Mach or Stallo speak most favourably of it as the newest view. That thing and ground, substance and causality are only "ideas grounded in experience" is a fact our modern energists can very well find in Dilthey. For everything else, he thinks, the legitimacy of the origin fails. The same is true of atom, force or law. Natural science is limited to a partial view of external reality and does not reach a single connexion of all conditions of the existing world. Where the former philosophers spoke of substantial forms or matter, there the physicists of to-day place natural laws and mass-particles, and

the Darwinians speak of forms, species and races of nature—metaphysics pure and simple. These are only other names for the discarded inner adaptation to an end. Does one remember, however, the historical fate of the most highly valued of all metaphysical concepts, *i.e.* substance and causality? And Dilthey shouts with Kant as the last word of his *Einleitung*: Metaphysics as science is impossible! Every metaphysician doubles only his ego, as Aristotle held against the doctrine of ideas of Plato; he exhibits in the final analysis only a gigantic play of his own self. “The metaphysical spirit sees itself in fantastic magnification, as if in a second face”. Consequently, the epistemologist who investigates this self becomes the true successor of the sceptic. Epistemology is thus, as it were, the euthanasia of metaphysics.

In a story of great beauty adapted from Novalis Dilthey arrives at the conclusion: If the soul seems to succeed in removing from the subject of the natural process itself its veil, then it finds in this its own self. If only Feuerbach had lived to see the appearance of the *Einleitung*! Here anthropomorphism as the prime source of all our forms of thought and values is exhibited more deeply than it is done in Feuerbach. Chamberlain and Keyserling in their deepest essence touch one another and Dilthey. Not only myth and religion, but even metaphysics is nothing else than an idealisation and generalisation of human race-properties which we substantialise, hypostatise and place over against ourselves as our “second self.” Here the cord snaps. The positive structure of epistemology falls to pieces.

We get a faint, distant glimpse of that philosophical new land which Dilthey has tried to discover but has not yet conquered for us. If I interpret correctly the signs that appear to us I find them in the sentence (p. 505): “Thought cannot find anything else in reality than logical connexion”. If it were permitted to Dilthey to bring his

great work to a termination, he could hardly succeed better than Kant who has destroyed metaphysics as a science, only to support it again in the form of the "metaphysical need". Only, the sensible, delicately strung poet-philosopher who reacts more than anybody else upon lyrical tendencies of thought, will replace the hard metaphysical *need* of Kant by the softer "irresolvable metaphysical *temperament*". My historical authority for this is no other than Wilhelm Dilthey himself. After metaphysics had appeared "dumb" to him, there was perceivable something like a longing for it in the sentence (p. 464) which we quote at the same time as a sample of the style of the great linguistic artist, "But from the stars there rings, when the stillness of the night comes, even to us, that harmony of the spheres, of which the Pythagoreans said that only the noise of the world could drown it, an indissoluble metaphysical union which is at the base of all arguments and survives them all."

As the bold champion and never-tiring defender of that theory of "mental sciences" which is associated with his name, Dilthey has appeared again in the arena of philosophy. In the collection of essays, entitled *Systematische Philosophie*, Dilthey's article, to which we shall presently come, has uttered the herald's cry. The inner experience, the facts of consciousness are, and will always remain, the immovable starting-points of Dilthey. All science is for him science of experience, but all experience with its original connexion and its value determined by it, is in the conditions of our consciousness within which it appears, given in the totality of our nature. With this fundamental thought of his theory of "mental science" Dilthey has materially advanced the German philosophy of the present day.

The German philosophy of the present day maintains, for instance, so far as the outward extension and internal worth is concerned, that traditional sovereignty in the world-literature of to-day which has been undisputedly

if not unenviously, accorded to it ever since the time of Kant. In the German language alone more philosophy has been produced than in all the other languages put together. The comparatively large number of philosophical publications, naturally, is most intimately connected with the re-awakening of the philosophical interest which is characteristic of the period of transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. In the last decade of the last century there was completed, contemporaneously with the beginning of the Nietzsche-cult, an important movement in favour of philosophy which had been thrown into the shade for a long time by the exact sciences. The thirst for facts which the natural sciences with their powerful success tried to quench is once more succeeded by the thirst for causes. The lecture-rooms of the professors of philosophy begin to be filled and their text-books live to see various editions—a fortune which was denied to the great masters and leaders. Unfortunately, quantity does not change into quality, as the doctrines of the dialectic method and the triadic rhythm of Hegel thought. The over-production of philosophical works in Germany is not so much the outcome of that philosophical *Hang und Drang* which characterises the nation of “poets and thinkers,” but rather the result of our traditionally strong academic scientific impulse.

The great majority of dissertations, treatises submitted by *Privatdozents*, speeches on suitable occasions, programmes of gymnasia, which deal with philosophical topics, principally relate to philosophical exegesis and small works. From the time of Schleiermacher and Brandis, Eduard Zeller, and Joh. Ed. Erdmann, particular studies in the region of the history of philosophy, treatments of problems, investigations of details, editions of texts and monographs have come to the front, whilst the system-building power has remarkably declined. The effort to construct a great connected world-survey lags behind the learned mosaic and Alexandrine

commentaries. The courage to err has almost disappeared from us. Dilthey's warning against a relapse into metaphysics served to frighten men away. It was first in recent years that scientists of the rank of Ernst Mach, Wilhelm Ostwald and Johannes Reinke put forward their own philosophical conceptions and were looked upon with jealousy by the professional philosophers, whilst the scientists *pur sang* treated contemptuously with a shrugging of the shoulders the above-named philosophical scientists as scientifically fallen, if not as complete deserters from the ranks of exact thinkers. In Ostwald's "Annalen der Naturphilosophie" (up to now six volumes have appeared from the publishing house of Veit and Co., Leipzig), the movement of nature-philosophy in these days is well depicted. Wilhelm Ostwald, especially, has himself made a critical estimate at the end of each number of the most important publications in the book-market. The systematic thinkers among the academic philosophers follow willingly the lead of Dilthey or Wundt.

The richest philosophical production of these days is, however, that collective work which we owe to the combined labours of the professional philosophers. The great work *Die Kultur der Gegenwart* (Culture of the present day) Leipzig, Teubner, which has supplied us with the maturest and noblest fruits of German culture brought us as the sixth book of the first part of this monumental work a volume entitled *Systematische Philosophie* in which the leading German constructive philosophers have expressed themselves systematically on their special subjects. Thus, Wilhelm Dilthey has dealt with "the essence of philosophy," Alois Riehl with Logic and the theory of knowledge, Wilhelm Wundt with Metaphysics, Hermann Ebbinghaus with Psychology, Rudolf Eucken with the philosophy of history, Friedrich Paulsen with Ethics and Theodor Lipps with Aesthetics.

Important considerations have been urged against this sort of aggregation of systematic *disjecta membra* to form a disjoint

whole. One cannot understand why leading systematic philosophers, like Wundt and Dilthey, agreed to such a one-sided selection. Especially, a name like that of Windelband and a province like sociology are unfortunately omitted. If one grants pedagogics which can only teach us to explain ourselves clearly, an important place in the structure of systematic philosophy, then sociology could not at all be passed over, the more so, as there was in Berlin a suitable contributor in the person of Georg Simmel whose great work "Sociologie" appeared in 1908. Have, then, Comte and Spencer lived in vain? Lastly, we cannot pass over the fact that the psychological intellectualist Ebbinghaus who cannot recognise the will-act as a spiritual element—"Outside of sensations, feeling of pleasure or pain, representations, nothing exists" (p. 205)—goes rather strangely arm in arm with the voluntarist Wundt. That the nature-philosopher Ostwald, of whose system (pp. 138-172) an account is given without hesitation and which is reckoned by Wundt, immediately before Ostwald's article (p. 125), among the long-refuted metaphysical types of thought, will strike many as very odd. That thus disagreements have arisen should not here be denied and no attempt should be made to minimise their importance. Perfect agreement is shown only in the refusal to accept Rickert as one of the contributors. Eucken no doubt shows some warmth for him, but Dilthey, Wundt, Ebbinghaus and principally, Riehl (especially, at pp. 101 *sq*) are very hostile to him. This explains why the Windelband-Rickert system finds no representation in the collective work *Systematische Philosophie*. If we are to make a careful consideration and just estimate of all effective attempts at a philosophical system-building of the present day, the object-philosophers under the lead of Meinong and the Neo-Kantians of the school of Cohen have a claim to be heard. But the correlativists with Erhardt and Külpe and the immanence-philosophers with Schuppe at their head, should also not have been left wholly unrepresented. A full and exhaustive picture of the

philosophical movements of thought, of the new and fruitful beginnings of system-buildings, as they have appeared during the last ten years in the younger generation of degenerate German thinkers, this collection of essays, which was consecrated by the programme-like introduction of Dilthey, does not surely offer. But I add that the end aimed at was not to be attained by following the way proposed by and shown in the "Culture of the present day". A mosaic of systematic philosophy, as was intended, has not been produced. For this the individual stones were of too many colours and too dissimilar polish, even if we pass over those which had the defect of exhibiting troublesome gaps. There is only this feature that individual stones send out rays of their own which compensate us richly for the unavoidable want of unity of the whole. None of the works enumerated is of an inferior rank, each is rather full of originality, though of course it cannot tell anything new to those who are acquainted with the authors' works, as every contributor naturally gives the essence of his former works for *usum Delphini* and puts it into the most compact form. And although a thousand lightning flashes do not make a sun, we welcome this collective work as by far the most important philosophical publication in the whole philosophical literature in these days.

Wilhelm Dilthey's prefatory article *Das Wesen der Philosophie* gives the collection *Systematic Philosophy* its character. Philosophy is for him the doctrine of the world-view. By philosophy or doctrine of the world-view is to be understood first, with Plato and Kant, the reflexion of the spirit upon all its modes of action. If the sciences of experience seek to reveal portions or sides of reality, philosophy seeks with Comte to conceive the whole of reality and with it to build the logical connexion of all sciences into a system of perfectly unified knowledge. This logical connexion which Comte probably takes for granted but has not proved, especially, as in his system of positive philosophy a psychology

is no less wanting than a proper logic, is only to be established through inner experience, and therefore philosophy is called by Beneke and Lipps the "science of inner experience or mental science" (p. 21). But even this definition does not satisfy Dilthey, although he approaches it. The object of the mental sciences is, according to Dilthey, created by the reality of the experiences themselves given in inner perception. In his beautiful book *Erlebnis und Dichtung* (Experience and Poetry) Dilthey has followed this connexion of thought from the side of poetry (Lessing, Goethe, Hölderlin, Novalis). Here, however, Dilthey has merely to do with the definition of philosophy itself which, in contradistinction to the separate sciences, has for its problem the solution of the riddle of the world and of life. In the historical solution of this problem it shows itself as a permanent function in the connexion of ends of society and indeed, as that function which reveals a "uniform state in society." These connexions of ends Dilthey indicates by an expression which has received the rights of linguistic citizenship, namely, *systems of culture*. As art and religion, so also philosophy belongs to the structure of society. "For in the co-existence of persons and succession of races those who possess the function of placing themselves, through universal concepts, into relation with the riddle of the world and of life are bound into a connexion of ends" (p. 34). He who analyses philosophy, therefore, must, according to Dilthey, seek the types of world-views and recognise order in their formation. The types of religious philosophy transform themselves gradually into conceptual thinking and thereby affect the philosophical world-views. With art in general and poetry in particular, philosophy shares greater mobility and freedom. Its object is the world. To understand the value, meaning and significance of this world and that in the form of conceptual thought—this problem it has taken up from the beginning of historically creditable thought. And however much Dilthey may refuse to acknowledge metaphysics as a science, he cannot

deny it, as an important member in the culture-systems, its claim, nay he must acknowledge it, that conceptual thought proceeds to the highest generalisations, rises to an architectonic whole with lofty peaks and even contains in itself the "reference to an all-comprehending connexion and the establishment of a final principle" (p. 9). If we, however, admit a world-principle, a world-reason, especially, a world-end or a world-cause, then we cannot escape long the eternally tempting siren song of the "metaphysical need."

CHAPTER X

THE HISTORY-OF-PHILOSOPHY MOVEMENT

(EDUARD ZELLER, 1814-1908)

The history-of-philosophy movement which has drawn to it great circles of men and for a long time grew in such a fashion that people came very near resolving philosophy into a history of philosophy, proceeds from Germany where it always has an honourable place in academical teaching as well as in the scientific investigation of particular problems. To that "historicism" which in the second half of the nineteenth century represented a characteristic of the work in the department of mental sciences of the time, just as the Darwin-Spencerian evolutionism represented the views of natural science of that epoch, the history-of-philosophy movement which is associated with the brilliant names of Schleiermacher and Hegel, Baur and Böckh, Ritter and Brandis, Schwegler and Zeller, Erdmann and Fischer, Windelband and Höffding, Freudenthal and Gomperz, has not contributed a little. The definition of philosophy itself has been much handled in recent years. One sees in philosophy no more, as formerly, a "doctrine of the world-whole" or "a doctrine for the guidance of life," but a "theory of science." The term "doctrine of science" coined by Fichte rules all spirits very much to-day. In his well-known inquiry, "What is philosophy?", Windelband (*Präludien*, 3rd Edition, 1907, pp. 24-78) arrives at the following result: Philosophy is no "metaphysics of things" but a "metaphysics of knowledge" (p. 42). In the sense of his "philosophy of norms," Windelband characterises philosophy more narrowly as the science

of universal values. By this certain judgments are to be understood which are of absolute value, even if they do not at all obtain or do not generally obtain actual recognition (p. 60). In this way Windelband reaches his "consciousness in general" and philosophy transforms itself for him into the "science of normative consciousness." From this point the way leads to Windelband's method, as sketched in *Geschichte der Philosophie* (a writing in honour of Kuno Fischer) 2 vols. 2nd Edition, 1907. The inquiry into the history of philosophy which Windelband has kindled and rendered fruitful has been from the days of Tennemann and Buhle native to the German soil, and here it has up to this day maintained its scientific importance. On the German soil the humanists since the time of Reuchlin and Melanchthon have led the way. Christian Thomasius and Joachim Jungius maintained the tradition of German humanists and paved the way for the transition to the modern conception of the problem. Friedrich August Wolf lays the foundation of that philosophical method based upon exactness and accuracy which has placed the German antiquarian researches at the head of the civilised world, whilst Herder with his creative poetic spirit widens the horizon for world-historical connexions. There, "devotion to trifles"; here, grand attempts. There, the exact historical investigation which Böckh and Welcker have made so fruitful for the Greek, Niebuhr and later, Mommsen for the Roman history; here, the method of the history of philosophy, the more speculative method of Hegel, which in its gigantic main and auxiliary structure of world-history reaches its highest point with the help of the dialectical method and its triadic rhythm. Valuable theoretical discussions about the essence of the history-of-philosophy-movement are found in the introduction and the concluding paragraphs of Windelband's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 4th Edition, 1907.

The history-of-philosophy movement in the centre of which Eduard Zeller stood for more than two generations, is

characterised by this, that it represents a synthesis of the exact-philosophical method and the method which is speculative and characteristic of the history of philosophy, such as has been sketched by Schleiermacher in his *Heraclitus* and in his Plato-studies and has been adopted successfully by Zeller's father-in-law, Ferdinand Christian Baur, for his investigation of the New Testament and revived with the help of his true disciples who form the "Tübingen school". The connexion with universal history advanced by Herder and Hegel, which Baur in his investigations of the comparative history of religion had never lost sight of, Zeller could so well consolidate by a painfully accurate working of details, with philological accuracy and with the calm patience of the investigator, that he gave the strongest impulse to the history-of-philosophy movement.

Eduard Zeller was the last survivor of that generation of mighty men to which the entire scientific world in the widest view of things, German science in the narrower, and the Berlin University in the narrowest view of things, could point with justifiable pride—the generation distinguished by the double constellation of three stars, Helmholtz, du Bois-Reymond and Virchow on the firmament of the natural sciences, and Ranke, Mommsen and Zeller on that of the mental sciences. The light of this double triad has contributed not a little to make Berlin the scientific metropolis of the civilised world.

A conqueror who has not only opened a new province of knowledge but has thoroughly surveyed it, mapped it out and made it arable and fertile for us—such is Edward Zeller. "Philosophy of the Greeks" and Edward Zeller have become synonymous terms. The important colleagues of Zeller—Brandis, Ritter and Schwegler—who, like him, have undertaken an account of the philosophy of the Greeks, furnished with the whole machinery of historical criticism, have all been thrown to-day into the background. Even the most recent

compact account of the "Greek thinkers" by Theodor Gomperz cannot replace the "great Zeller." Sixty-five years ago (1844) the first volume of this monumental work appeared. Of serious works there had been before this the great monographs of Schleiermacher, Böckh and Karl Friedrich Hermann. With his *Platonische Studien* (Platonic Studies) (1839), which every student of Plato even to-day, seventy years later, will consult with advantage before he goes into a special Plato-problem, Eduard Zeller made his *début*. The "Theologische Jahrbücher," the organ of the "Tübingen school," he edited from 1842 to 1857. His critique of "the history of the apostles," an example of his theological works, shows already that historical method which has been made by him the ruling method. And here were apparent all those advantages which later secured the lasting success of the *Philosophy of the Greeks*, namely, a large angle of vision and a painfully minute working out of details. What his father-in-law Fred. Chr. Baur has done for the ancient history of Christianity, Zeller has done for the foster-mother of the dogmatically developing Christianity, the philosophy of the Greeks. From Wolf and Niebuhr Zeller took the strict historical method, from Böckh and Schleiermacher, philosophical accuracy in the criticism of particular points, from his teacher and later, father-in-law, Baur, he acquired that severe and acute habit of carrying thought to the root of things, the never-tiring patience of the investigator. Lastly, he was united with his friends and fellow-combatants, David Friedrich Strauss and Fr. Th. Vischer, by the same effort after inner clearness and complete exposition of that which they knew to be true. Especially, however, Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy, of which the first series which treated of the Greek thinkers, appeared in 1833, set the direction of his inner development. Hegel had that comprehensive historical view, that universal insight into every occurrence in nature and spirit, which in the hands of a

powerful thinker gives rise to a single world-picture, but he lacked "the devotion to small things," the scientific knowledge of details, the philological-exact method. The classical philologists of that time, on the other hand, in whom the criticism of texts and particular exegeses had obscured the view of the whole, were wanting in the perception of the great connexion, of what is permanently valuable in the household of the total culture. The Hegelians overlook in the total plan the particular reality, the philologists sticking to texts, like scientists nailed to balances and retorts—short-sighted philologists and narrow-minded experimentators, it may be remarked in passing, are twin-sisters of the pedantic mother, exactness—lose the sharpness and range of vision required for perceiving great connexions. Eduard Zeller completed the synthesis of the two for the philosophy of the Greeks. With Hegel he had an eye for the powerful contours of the occurrences in the world and the history of mankind, with Wolf and Niebuhr, Böckh and Schleiermacher, he trained his eye for the minutest details, for philosophical exactness and certainty. In his speech full of emotion in memory of Zeller (Publications of the Prussian Academy of Sciences of the year 1908, p.21), Hermann Diels says that greatly as Hegel lacks a critique and knowledge of particulars, he has, as Zeller gladly acknowledges, correctly sketched atomism, sophism, Socrates, the lesser Socrateans as well as the central parts of the Aristotelian system. And thus Zeller obtained the correct perspective, the requisite critical distance for the comprehension of the great questions of the past. The secret of his enduring success lies in his combination of passionless calmness and unbiased love of reality, which brings him close to Baur, with that Hegelian breadth of the scientific horizon which stamps him out as a classicist, so far as descriptions in the domain of the history of philosophy are concerned. Wilhelm Windelband says in his *Präludien* (3rd Edition, 1907, p. 13): "By the side of Liebig and Helmholtz we place

unhesitatingly Ranke and Mommsen, and by the side of the great works of Kirchhoff and Bunsen stand the monumental works of Eduard Zeller and Kuno Fischer on culture history." For the method introduced by him has not been useful to the philosophy of the Greeks alone, but has been equally useful to his classic history of German philosophy, his monographs on the philosophy of Frederick II, and lastly, and especially, to his numerous isolated researches in the field of the history of philosophy which he has set forth in the three volumes of *Vorträge und Abhandlungen* (Lectures and Essays) as well as in the seven volumes of the annual reports of the "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie". Zeller's method of description of the history of philosophy has created a school. The history-of-philosophy movement dates from Zeller. Joh. Eduard Erdmann and Kuno Fischer have perfected for modern times what Zeller began for ancient times. His annual reports on the Socratic, Platonic and Aristotelian systems which he has published continuously for fifteen years in our "Archiv" with that straightforward intelligence which distinguished him from others, form a source of inexhaustible wisdom and unabated power from which coming generations will get their scientific orientation.

Sixty-five years have elapsed since the appearance of the first volume of the *Philosophy of the Greeks*, seventy since that of the *Platonic Studies*. Since then Zeller has chiselled unceasingly with skilful hands this monument of German learning and boldly repaired all places where leaks and cracks, irregularities and angularities appeared—a "true literary martyr's work," as D. Fr. Strauss once said. A few years ago he for the first time gave up writing the annual report in the "Archiv." But the energy for work was yet not at all exhausted. In October 1899 Zeller published in his "Deutsche Rundschau" a very bold essay, "On systems and system-building." In 1902 our "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie" (Vol. XV) brought a vigorous essay from the pen of Eduard Zeller, entitled "Zu

Leucippus." And the year 1903 gave us a new, much longed-for edition of the last volume of his *Philosophy of the Greeks*. A nonagenarian, who still with undiminished mental power hammers and chisels for ten years his work as Goethe did his *Faust*, is such a strange phenomenon that one will excuse us if we, pupils of the great master himself, feel a temptation to exaggerate.

In fighting qualities the man who was called to Bern as professor of theology was surely not wanting. But the Bern professors have not to exhibit such a combative spirit as the Zürich men have. The business of Zeller was easy compared with that of the men at Zürich. A few stones hurled by childish hands at the wrong moment, a few polemic writings here and there, somewhat jealous and suspicious treatment from the people of Bern, especially, from the "tradespeople," who, as Frau Zeller laughingly narrates, refused to sell articles to the wife of "the hated unbeliever"—that was all. But the stay of this married couple was very much like life in their own home. For here began the happiness of their marriage. It was the professorship at Bern which made it possible for Zeller to take home the "spiritually akin" daughter of the great father and here he passed the honeymoon of his young marriage as well as of his young fame. "Joyfully thou lookest back," so apostrophises Th. Vischer happily on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his doctorate, "I know, upon thy work in the land of the Alps. To have spent some time in Switzerland as an active man is a thing of which no German of healthy strong nerves repents. But thy fatherland called thee back: it is indeed better for one to consecrate one's forces in the cause of one's country, of one's own people."

The somewhat crooked path of Zeller led over Marburg and Heidelberg to Berlin and over the theological faculty to the philosophical. In Marburg people found the abilities of the theologian of 1849 of Tübingen school less unsuitable for

the philosophical faculty than for the theological. A wonderful change no doubt ! The author of the *Philosophy of the Greeks* obtains at first by underhand means that final profession for which nature has manifestly fitted him. From Marburg he goes directly upwards "from State to State, still not very rapidly" (Vischer). In Heidelberg (1862-72), ties were formed with Helmholtz which were continued in Berlin and led to an intimate friendship. Through Helmholtz Zeller was brought into close touch with the sciences of experience. Helmholtz's speech on vision (1855), Zeller's celebrated inaugural address at Heidelberg on the "Significance and problem of epistemology" and Kuno Fischer's *Kant* pronounce that catchword "Back to Kant" which has found in the Neo-Kantian school such a powerful echo and which has for some time ruled the German professoriate.

In the year 1872 Eduard Zeller was called to Berlin under conditions which could be called brilliant not alone for that time. Here Lotze spent only a short apprenticeship. The Trendelenburgian professorial chair was vacant. There came Zeller then fully sixty years old and he put life and movement into the philosophical study at Berlin. The biography of Zeller offers now the character-sketch which was most lovingly drawn and painted with great devotion in the already-mentioned speech of Hermann Diels in his memory. On account of the close personal relationship of Diels with Eduard Zeller it is conceivable that Diel's biography of Zeller will have value for a long time ; moreover, it is supported by documents and indeed, by nothing less than an autobiographical sketch which reaches up to the year 1868 and is published in Strieder-Gerland's *Hessian Lexicon of learned men*, Vol. 21. By the side of this there still lay in the form of manuscripts the chronicle-like autobiography, *Erinnerungen eines Neunzigjährigen* (Recollections of a nonagenarian) which the guardian of his posthumous works, his son Prof. Albert Zeller in Stuttgart, preserves. What concerns me here is rather

the sketch of the teacher Zeller. Zeller's lectures had that great force which distinguished them from so many others. In Tübingen "clear Zeller" became a common saying. There was nothing of the brilliant lecture or the flashing oratory which we admire in Harms. Simple, calm, dignified and measured, sometimes only illumined by clever humour and fine wit, the whole had style and power. One seemed to be wrapped in the folds of a strong personality. The historian of philosophy not only filled us with enthusiasm for "historicism," for the purely historical conception of problems, but inspired us with that "enthusiasm of speculation" which Lessing regards as the essential condition of every true philosopher. The memory of Zeller was an exceptional one. The *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Fragments of the pre-Socrateans) which lies so handy and clear and set in such wonderful German before us in the edition of Hermann Diels, flowed at that time with unerring clearness from Zeller's mouth. I listened in the course of ten years (1877-1886) thrice to Zeller's lectures on the history of philosophy but I do not remember having ever seen his memory fail him even for a single moment. And in the year 1895 when Zeller was eighty-one and was thinking of resigning his university appointment and taking leave of his pupils, while still in the full possession of his mental powers, I took the opportunity to hear a lecture of Zeller and I came away with the impression that energy of thought and memory were still preserved in undiminished strength.

"Many people remember still," so Dilthey says in his sketch of him in the "Deutsche Rundschau" (1887, p. 280) "the slender and nimble form with the clear-cut features of the scholar which reminded one of Kant's figure in his old age, as it walked with an elastic, quick step through the Zoological Garden along the lime trees of the University." In the most important work of the Academy and the University, his mild, well-thought-out word which reconciled

contradictions and yet grasped the kernel of things, was of great force to the last day of his official life; he, however, wanted to give up his office and his duties before any diminution of his powers was perceptible and so he proceeded (1895) from the place of his far-reaching activity with Schwabian fidelity to his narrower home, to Stuttgart.

Zeller's significance as a theologian and historian of the Christian Church, his construction of the theory of knowledge and philosophy of religion, his mature pronouncements on politics in its relation to law, on nationality and self-determination of nations, and lastly, on nationality and humanity, I cannot in this connexion rightly estimate. He who knows only his *Philosophy of the Greeks*, his *History of German Philosophy*, his *Frederick the Great as philosopher*, his work on Zwingli, his correspondence with Strauss as well as the numerous essays and annual reports in the "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie" and does not know the three volumes of *Vorträge und Abhandlungen* (Lectures and Pamphlets), as well as his pronouncements "on systems and constructions of systems" (Deutsche Rundschau, 1899) knows only half of Zeller. The true Zeller, the whole and undivided Zeller, is not only an incomparable exponent of the ideas of others but a thinker of original power. The historian of philosophy has not choked the philosopher in him. The history of philosophy is for Zeller, as for any of those who have seriously advanced it, no end in itself, but only an excellent means for philosophical clearness and self-reflexion. It is only through perfect knowledge of that which has hitherto been thought that the insight into that which is to be done grows. If one calls history the world-court then we might designate the history of philosophy as the world-court of ideas. Through the purgatory and purifying flame of the critique of the history of philosophy the way leads to the paradise of the absolute clearness of thought. "The history of philosophy", so concluded Zeller his essay on "Systems

and constructions of systems" (1899), is therefore truly in the first place history of philosophical systems, and if as such it can never say anything about the perfect and complete system and has even never fully solved its own problems, it shares this defect with all human actions and all human history."

Eduard Zeller, the recognised head of the history of philosophy movement, quietly passed away on the 18th March 1908 at Stuttgart whither he had gone after resigning his Berlin professorship. From my *Nachruf* (In Memoriam) in our "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie" Vol. XXI No. 3, April 1908, something should here be quoted. Valuable writings in honour of Eduard Zeller we find in Wilhelm Dilthey in the "Neue Freie Press" of the 5th April 1908 and in Felice Tocco in the magazine "Atene e Roma" Vol. XII No. 112 for April 1908. A fine estimate of Zeller G. Barzelli makes again in *La Storia della filosofia*, Nuova Antologia, January 1908. The most rich biographical material contains the repeatedly mentioned speech in memory of Zeller by Hermann Diels which first came into my hands during the examination of the proof-sheets. Up to his last days Zeller possessed that spiritual freshness and activity which all of us who had the fortune of walking with him through a part of our life's way, admired in him. That chapter of the history of German culture which will be explained to the coming generations as representing the success which has attended the German spirit of investigation, German method and thoroughness, German patience and devotion to research, in creating out of the thousands and thousands of scattered pieces, remote traditions and forgotten accounts, such a lively and warm whole as the five-volumed *Philosophy of the Greeks*, will always remain impressive and will always serve as an example. The monumental work of Eduard Zeller has succeeded in penetrating more deeply into the machinery of thought of the Hellenes than a Greek himself could do, so that, thanks to his direction-

giving life-work we are incomparably better grounded in the world of thought of Greece, Rome and Judaea, than the best educated among the ancient civilized people themselves.

The sun shines upon the life of Eduard Zeller. A man of ninety-four summers who towered high above the proverbially philosophical age, might very well enjoy the rare fortune of surviving all his great colleagues and spiritual kinsmen and yet not outliving his own fame. His friends at the Tübingen seminary, David Friedrich Strauss, Friedrich Theodor Vischer, Schwegler etc.,—how rapidly did they all grow old! David Friedrich Strauss to whom Zeller dedicated a most feeling biographical monument on the occasion of the appearance of the edition of his complete works, complained bitterly in the preface to his "Old and new belief" that he felt that he had gone down in the estimation of the German people. These are the tragic accidents of remaining too long in this world. In the life of Eduard Zeller these notes are entirely wanting. His last letters breathe the calmness of the sober-minded and self-dependent, as the works of his youthful days show the clearness and ripeness of mature years. Perhaps Eduard Zeller has never been wholly young, surely he was never wholly old. The personality of Zeller had something timeless in it.

We shall never forget the celebration of the ninetieth anniversary of his birthday at Stuttgart. Sigwart in Tübingen, the joint-editor of our "Archiv," was still living. Wilhelm Dilthey and Hermann Diels from Berlin, the former by order of the University, the latter in the name of the Academy of Sciences, appeared. Most of the universities in which Zeller had worked were represented by their professors of philosophy. I myself represented Bern, our "Archiv" and the narrower circle of pupils. We read together our addresses and joined our speeches to the reading of these. The "timeless" Eduard Zeller, who a short time ago had met with an accident from the consequences of which he suffered several months, heard

all our addresses *standing*, in spite of the prohibition of his son, the celebrated surgeon Professor Zeller. With that inimitable smile which beautified in a way which defied all description that upright philosophical head which reminded one of Kant, as the Berlin people knew him in the statue of Empress Friedrich and in the National Gallery, the nonagenarian refused to sit or even to be supported, and he did this because he thought it would be showing respect to the associations we represented to receive their addresses standing. And this was not all. To all our addresses Eduard Zeller replied always standing, in strict succession, lighting up with graceful pleasantries, joining reminiscences, renewing old connexions, full of humour and grace.

Humour is always young. He who knows the earnest inquirer and strict critic from his works or from his professional chair cannot imagine that Zeller could develop social talents in social life. His conversation had nothing of the dry professional talk or prosaic professional chatter about it, but to the dignity of the whole personality there was throughout united harmoniously the charm of a conversationist. The Swabian was deeply ingrained in his blood. He was a very good gossip. High-minded ladies, like the Empress Friedrich, Frau Curtius or Frau v. Helmholtz sought his company. With the wonderful memory which filled us his juniors with awe mixed with respect, when in his lectures on the history of philosophy—quoting verbatim the Greek fragments—he tried to place before our mental eye the ancient thinkers, he knew how to shine in the society of ladies of consequence. For every turn of conversation Zeller had a suitable anecdote, experience or happy analogy at hand. The annual meetings of the “Archiv” in the house of Zeller in which the “great man” of the Berlin University took part, cannot be forgotten by those who attended them. The lively, energetic vivacious house-wife, the worthy daughter of the worthy father, the head of the Tübingen school, F. Chr. Baur, struck the keynote. Eduard

Zeller followed her as a rule with soft, inaudible humour which was suitable to the friends at the table. To be able to take part in this symposium of the "Archiv" was to us his disciples an experience. At our common summer resorts, at Engadin in former times and later at Baden-Baden, I could examine the man Zeller very closely. Through travels on foot of which nothing was too much for the vigorous octogenarian, the "pathos of distance" disappeared even for the juniors and an Alpine gay spirit appeared. How often have I seen him in the company of Helmholtz and Röntgen in Pontresina, with Curtnis and his family in Baden-Baden flashing with wit and mirth!

These human traits I must especially bring into prominence for this reason that what we are concerned with here is to bring out clearly the personality of Zeller when we are under the painful stroke of his death and to remove the false conceptions which those who saw him from a distance might have formed of him by reading his works. The human traits in Eduard Zeller his admirer Wilhelm Lang has very feelingly pointed out in his *Erinnerungen* (Reminiscences) ("Deutsche Rundschau" for May 1st 1908 pp. 186-204). The sovereign dignity in the realm of thought which was unanimously accorded to him, as Eduard Zeller possessed perhaps critics who challenged his theories and perhaps also politico-religious opponents, but never proper enemies, had nothing inaccessible about it. Good will, united to that austerity with which he viewed things but which never attached itself to his person, was the fundamental characteristic of his being. In his seminaries Zeller revealed a goodness of heart and angelic patience which encouraged the beginners and trained the advanced pupils to become true teachers. The pedantry of the schoolmaster, as those who were not familiar with him believed he had from his external appearance, was absolutely foreign to his nature. Zeller never choked his pupils. However much one may find in his lectures the breath of the unattainable,

the breath of the human freshened us in the seminaries. Undoubtedly, we must thoroughly possess our Aristotle if we would interpret him in Zeller's seminary. But misunderstanding and mistake,—these pardonable characteristics of most of the young peoples' art of interpretation,—were not treated with harsh and discouraging words which damped all energy, but with indulgence which cheered and encouraged.

To estimate Zeller as a writer of the history of philosophy, as one of the founders of the neo-Kantian movement, as epistemologist and philosopher of law, as a theologian, philologist and politician, is in this connexion not our work. Long preliminary studies, and perhaps even the joint work of several investigations, will be necessary for doing justice to the scientific personality of Zeller. Our duty is only to discharge a portion of that debt of thought which we owe to the co-founder of both divisions of our "Archiv." Eduard Zeller was our patriarch. In our cares and needs from which no German magazine of a scientific type has been free, we used to make a pilgrimage to him at first to Berlin, and after his retirement from the professorship in 1894, to Stuttgart. He could always give advice and find out with infallible tact the right thing. For he was not only a philosopher or a mere classical writer of the history of ancient philosophy, but much more than all this—he was a wise man.

As everywhere, where Zeller's word determined a thing, his upright nature, his straightforward bearing and his unerring and sound commonsense found in cases of doubt the emancipating expression which reconciled all contradictions, so did they in his founding and working both divisions of our "Archiv" in company with others. Zeller was already a good septagenarian when I first made in the year 1887 the proposal for starting the "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie." With youthful enthusiasm Zeller readily took up the idea. Moreover, Georg Reimer at the same time declared that he would publish such an "Archiv" if Eduard Zeller would appear at the head of

the editorial staff. Wilhelm Dilthey, Hermann Diels and Benno Erdmann, the nearest colleagues, pupils and friends of Zeller, were in a few days won over. We sketched that first prospect which found a powerful response, especially, in foreign countries. Moreover, we tried to preserve the international character of our "Archiv" by the system of four languages probably first introduced by us. The attempt proved a success. The name of Zeller signified a programme. We got appreciatory notices and contributions from all quarters. And as early as the October of the same year the first number of the "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie" could be published. Eduard Zeller's article *Die Geschichte der Philosophie, ihre Ziele und Wege* (The history of philosophy, its aims and methods) opened the first number of the magazine started under happy auspices. It was the fortune of all the founders of our "Archiv" to work full twenty-one years under Zeller. Our senior was the first to depart from our midst.

Not only did Eduard Zeller lend his name to our "Archiv" but he devoted to it his full, unimpaired working powers. No less than sixteen articles were written by Eduard Zeller for our "Archiv" (the last in the 15th volume) and thirty yearly reports (the last in the 13th volume). These articles and especially, these annual reports, which form a model of exquisite love of reality and benevolent nobility of sentiment, no professional man can ignore. They form a fountain of comprehensive learning in combination with a happy nobility of sentiment. The polemic is moderate and measured. It is our boast that during the more than twenty-one years of our existence, even after our undertaking the "Archiv für systematische Philosophie," we have introduced no polemic, no rejoinder, no counter-reply. Everything personal has been absolutely rejected. We want only that measure of truth which is accessible to us erring men. The halo of scientific infallibility no one can claim but still we recognise it in others. For this reason we religiously keep aloof from all notes of personal bitterness and animosity and give them no place in the "Archiv." That is

wholly in the spirit of our leader Zeller and we think we shall be able to maintain the honour of our chief so long as the magazine gets its character from the man Eduard Zeller.

What has been said of the "Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie" holds good also of its younger sister, the "Archiv für systematische Philosophie." For here also the share of Eduard Zeller, as in the starting, so in the development of the magazine, was very great. When we incorporated thirteen years ago Paul Natorp's "Philosophische Monatshefte" in our "Archiv" and formed it into the "Archiv für systematische Philosophie" under the joint editorship of Paul Natorp and Christoph. v. Sigwart, there appeared Eduard Zeller, already eighty years old, who readily took up the idea of amalgamation and developed it with youthful enthusiasm.

Eduard Zeller started our "Archiv" with the following words: "The history of philosophy has, like all history, a double problem. It should *report* the occurrences and it should *explain* them." In these words the programme of the history-of-philosophy movement is laid down.

"What you strictly know of yourself is a play of your fancy, in spite of logical thinking. The idea should not soar in the air without a foundation. Experience should first be heard, pressed down to its inmost essence; Nature and its laws should first be examined and with our greatest philosopher you should examine first the power, the extent of our faculty of knowledge, before you undertake the fundamental problems, the world-mystery." Thus the aesthete Fr. Th. Vischer welcomes his classfriend and companion of youth, Eduard Zeller, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of his doctorate. As happens so often with his aesthetical judgments of value, Vischer is very happy also here. The philosophy of Eduard Zeller Vischer has put into the most convenient shape in these dedicatory words.

Of visible statues Eduard Zeller had no lack. The sculptor Schaper twenty-two years ago cut his figure with a sharp

chisel. In the National Gallery in Berlin hangs the portrait of Zeller finished by order of the old Kaiser William. What the Prussian State had of titles and honours at its disposal for conferring upon scholars fell to the lot of Zeller (including the title Excellency). Zeller took title and order with a Stoic calmness as something appointed by fate. Zeller himself was far from overrating the history-of-philosophy movement which will always be associated with the name of Germany, far from reducing philosophy to its history which a few firebrands of historicism want to do. We will therefore show how the historian of philosophy became its systematiser, that is, bring out clearly the *philosopher* Zeller who not only could speak to us with incomparable clearness and wonderful elegance of style about what others thought, but threw out suggestions as to the way in which the world-picture shaped itself in his head. Zeller was not only the centre of the history-of-philosophy movement but a thinker of original power.

Bismarck has set before us a glorious example of how one can not only make history but even write it clearly. Zeller has given a happy proof how one can exhibit a model of a description of the history of philosophy and also himself create a philosophy. That historians of philosophy are at the same time also philosophers, is not self evident. Librarians are only very rarely great writers. How easily one gets a disgust for all writing when one has to register and arrange, day in, day out, in that church of ideas which we call library! Likewise professional writers of the history of philosophy may very well think how idle it is to add a new world-view to the thousands of contradictory systems. In reality, the *wholly* great historians of philosophy who, like Zeller, have started from Hegel and his school—I have in mind Johann Eduard Erdmann and Kuno Fischer—are very weak builders of systems of philosophy. The head is much too full of others' ideas to leave any room for their own. According to the prevailing principle of division of labour, this is quite conceivable. Thus sometimes

the implements of the historian of philosophy—painful accuracy in details, philological exactness and micrology, close application to texts and ancient traditions, complete absorption in the co-existence and succession of particular systems—injure the philosophical brain. By reason of continuous occupation with the problems of the history of philosophy carried on for years together, it can very well happen that for the sake of a pure description of, and inquiry into, particular stars in the sky of philosophy, the whole planetary system and its composition are neglected. To be a historian of philosophy without making any attempt at an explanation and construction for oneself is to confuse the means with the end, to stick to the technique without attaining artistic power in the realm of thought. Every tenable philosophical system is, as Lang says, a poetry of thought, a creative work of art, a logical inspiration. As in social life the efficiency of the self-made man lies in this, that he raises his handicraft to a work of art, so among the historians of philosophy he stands highest who raises himself above his learned implements and uses his powers in the service of creative synthesis. The more clearly we look at the great and enduring thoughts of philosophers and also understand and perceive the errors of others, the easier it becomes for us to avoid them in future. As universal history gives us a mausoleum of historical characters upon which we can build, so the history of philosophy can give a pantheon of eternal thoughts by which we can measure and examine our own. He who is content with a study of the history of philosophy without attempting a world-view of his own, resembles a man who knows only foreign languages and has not thoroughly mastered his mother-tongue. The world-view of a mature, intelligent educated man is the mother-tongue of his personality.

This now has to be learnt. A grammar of this mother-tongue does not yet exist. Zeller has never written a system of philosophy, but only thrown out hints in the three volumes

of his *Vorträge und Abhandlungen* (Lectures and Essays) as well as in an essay, entitled *Ueber Systeme und Systembildungen* (On Systems and Constructions of systems) which he wrote in his 86th year for the "Deutsche Rundschau," out of which his philosophy can be constructed with comparative ease.

Eduard Zeller has not handled all branches of philosophy with the same interest. Epistemological logic and philosophy of religion, the philosophy of morals, law and politics are his special domain, whilst metaphysics and psychology are considered with less care and aesthetics is wholly neglected. The central problem of Zeller is, as Fr. Th. Vischer has seen correctly, the epistemological one and we shall do best to take our stand here. In his inaugural address at Heidelberg of the year 1862 on "the meaning and problems of epistemology" which he amplifies through notes in 1877 and has published in the second collection of his *Lectures and Essays*, Zeller proclaims with a certain ceremoniousness that catchword *Back to Kant* which brings him close to Helmholtz and Kuno Fischer. Zeller here departs from Hegel and Schleiermacher with whom he was formerly associated, whilst he announces the necessity of falling back upon Kant's critical standpoint. The Neo-Kantians (Cohen, Liebmann, Riehl, Lange, Volkelt, Paulsen, Göring, Lasswitz, Natorp, Stadler, Vaihinger, Staudinger, Vorländer; on the theological side, Albrecht Ritschl, Wilhelm Hermann Julis Kaftan, Hermann Schultz, R.A. Lipsius and Julius Köstlin) have taken up enthusiastically this catchword and tried to possess it exclusively, which later made it impossible for Zeller to banish the spirits whom he once invoked.

As Marx once wittily said of himself, "I am no Marxist at all", so might Zeller, the official founder of Neo-Kantianism, later say seriously of himself, "I am anything but a Neo-Kantian in the scholastic sense of the word." In fact, our "Archiv" was then in no way friendly to the then official monitor of the Neo-Kantians, the "Philosophische Monatshefte,"

till the reconciliation and incorporation of the "Philosophische Monatshefte" with our "Archiv für systematische Philosophie" was effected in the year 1895 with the help of Natorp.

The official separation of Zeller from Hegel took place, if expressed in simple words, thus: It is a hollow assurance, says Zeller, when the philosopher promises us from a single standpoint alone without any external help, through the inner necessity of things, to bring before our eyes the world-whole by means of immanent dialectical evolution. If this promise could be fulfilled, then we should obtain a view of the connexion, the reciprocal relation and the conditions of all existence, such as could not be attained in any other way.

But that it may be fulfilled, it is necessary that Hegel should prove it, however grand his system may be and in whatever spirit and with whatever dialectical art it may be expressed. An impartial examination of this system shows only too many points in which the results of philosophical deduction do not agree with facts and a still greater number, in which that which stands for a product of dialectical evolution is only apparently discovered through it, and really given from another quarter, from the experiential knowledge of the philosopher, and when we examine closely the conditions of human knowledge and the origin of our ideas, we can convince ourselves that all true knowledge has to be obtained from the observation of phenomena from experience. The operations of thought with the help of which we know the essence of things are, however, somewhat different from that which is known through them; only then can the two be placed on the same footing when the object simply exists in our thought, or when it, on the other hand, remains unchanged therein, without any intervention of the activity of our self. For the more undeniable it is that our representations are not poured over us from outside but arise out of us by virtue of our outward impressions, that therefore their origin and their composition are determined by the inner laws of representation, the less clear does it appear how any

contents of representation can be given us in any other way than through the perception of real occurrences in the other world and in our interior, or how such a representation, especially, at a time which preceded our personal consciousness, could come to our minds. The beginning of the evolutionary series in which the philosophy of to-day lies, is Kant, and the scientific work with which Kant opened a new path for philosophy is the theory of knowledge. To this inquiry, everybody who wants to improve the basis of our philosophy will assuredly have to go back and the questions which Kant placed before himself must be investigated anew in the spirit of his critique, in order, enriched by the scientific experiences of our century, to avoid the errors which Kant made.

What perception offers us, it is said in the "Notes" (p.498), is not the things themselves but pictures of things, representations which *we* have. Whence do we know that things outside us fit in with these representations, that they are not pure fictions but only a little more lasting and consistent than a dream?

The most important proof against the possibility of an illusion in waking consciousness similar to that in dream-life—this is the dramatic problem in Calderon's *Life a dream*—is, according to Zeller, the constancy of our sensation-complexes. The dream-ideas are variable, without strict order and connexion; the waking ideas, on the other hand, show a strict rhythm, a closely connected order-series which constantly repeats itself. This constancy must be at the root of the psychological conformity to law *in us*. Thus, not representations, but laws, in accordance with which we proceed in the construction of our representations, must lie in us independently of all experience. The "subjective condition" that an experience may at all occur, is contained in the forms of connexion which we bring to bear upon experience. Such forms of connexion are not only, as Kant will have it, space and time as forms of perception *a priori*, but—and this is Zeller's strong

postulate—also number. Zeller is at one with Schopenhauer in thinking that causality is the central category by the side of which the other categories appear like blind windows. "All categories of objectivity are determinate applications or modifications of the category of causality."

Zeller's theory of knowledge is not far different from the newest conception of the fundamental epistemological questions which we owe to Ernst Mach. With Mach "bodies or things are abbreviated thought symbols for groups of sensations, symbols which do not exist outside of us." And with Zeller (*Notes* p.528) "our sensations show us not things or properties of things as such, but only the way in which under the conditions of our organisation we are affected by things, or rather only the way in which we react upon certain affections." To this fundamental proposition of Zeller's epistemology, Mach could subscribe without hesitation. Zeller's most important argument against the subjectivism of Kant is the following proposition which brings him close to the doctrine of the "functions of consciousness" of Mach and Stumpf: "That the external world *appears* to us as a material world is a fact of our self-consciousness, that it also *is* this, an assumption which we derive from this fact."

Upon the constant element of our inner experience Mach also lays great stress. All our efforts, he says, to have the world mirrored in our thoughts would be fruitless if we did not succeed in finding in the midst of disorderly change *something enduring*. Hence the impulse towards the concept of substance, the sources of which are not different from those of the modern ideas on the conservation of energy. And Zeller still laid down in his eighty-sixth year the proposition: All our causal concepts are nothing but hypotheses for the explanation of the phenomena given through experience. The correctness and completeness of our propositions about the causes of phenomena, and consequently, about the whole objective world, depend partly upon the accuracy and range of

the observations from which they are derived and partly upon the validity of the conclusions upon which this derivation rests."

And here Zeller separates himself from Kant, just as much as he approaches the fundamental thoughts of Lotzean occasionalism and Trendelenburg's realism. The fundamental error of Kant's criticism is, according to Zeller, the fatal step towards that idealism which was developed so one-sidedly in Fichte. We conceive things only under the subjective forms of representation, but does it follow from this that we do not conceive them as they are in themselves? Is it not also thinkable that our forms of representation of nature are occupied in making a correct view of things possible? Nay, will it not appear to us far more probable when we mention that it is a nature-whole to which things as well as we belong, an order of nature out of which the objective phenomena and our representations of them arise? When we see how the most divers objects are conceived under the same forms of representation, how, on the other hand, the same object can be conceived in different ways and from different points of view; when we find that not only the different sensations but even the perception and thought of the same object in certain relations assert the same thing, that, on the other hand, a multitude of divers perceptions affects the same sense and when we reflect upon the conditions under which one or other of these cases occurs, then we are in a position to determine what in our experience proceeds from objects, what from ourselves and how this is related to that, and to separate the objective phenomena and properties of things and further, the causes on which they depend.

All these epistemological propositions lead Zeller to a result which is midway between the phenomenalism of Protagoras, Hume and Mach and the idealism of Kant and the Neo-Kantians. In his essay "Ueber die Gründe unseres Glaubens an die Realität der Aussenwelt" (On the grounds

of our belief in the reality of the external world) he holds the following valid proposition against the pure phenomenologists : Consciousness is not the *ground* of spiritual activities but only a *consequence* of it, appearing under fixed conditions. Against speculative idealism Zeller raises the objection that it spoils the concepts which in reality are abstracted from experience, for even the concepts of spirit and nature give us only experience.

For Zeller only the proposition that the universe, seen from outside, meets us as a well-ordered phenomenon, and seen from within, as a well-ordered experience, is true. Everything real must be traced to a single final ground, otherwise this order can neither be perceived by our senses nor derived from our understanding. Whether this "eternal order," in accordance with the Buddhistic-Neo-Platonic interpretation of the phenomenon of the world, leads outwards, or goes forwards, according to Hegel's "objective movement of the Idea," cannot be conclusively settled for all time but can only be settled for its age and for its man. Only this much is certain that we shall never again be tempted by the metaphysical attempt to "deduce all things from a final cause," whether this is called "absolute identity" with Schelling, 'I' with Fichte, the 'Idea' with Hegel, the 'Will' with Schopenhauer or the 'Unconscious' with Hartmann.

Zeller takes his stand upon experience and only upon this. All knowledge, Zeller teaches us, has to come from experience. Only with the help of experience can it penetrate deep into the essence of things. This experience is, however—and in this he is at one with Dilthey—rooted in the rational basis of the human race. As experiences change, there can be no final philosophy. Every age has therefore necessarily *its* philosophy with its changing experiences. Every cultured nation must have some philosophy or another, just as it must have some art or some religion. But just as the forms of religion and art change, so also the philosophy

of a given age has to find out the formula valid for the *time being* with regard to the immovably fixed fact, the fact, namely, that the "world is a system regulated and shaped by strict laws." But surely no system, as Zeller says with regard to "systems and system-building" (1899), can do more than join the knowledge accessible to *its age* to a harmonious and inwardly connected world-view. The impulse towards philosophical system-building, the "metaphysical need", so happily characterised by Kant, can and must never be extinguished. The systematic connexion of our knowledge must rather always be sought anew. Every such attempt when it is made by a competent person, is, according to Zeller, *an account which the total scientific knowledge of an age itself gives of the result of its activity.*

Zeller has brought home to everybody and rendered fruitful for the philosophy of religion and morals the result of the total scientific knowledge of his age. Zeller's attitude towards the great problems of religion and morality, of law and politics should here be indicated.

The autonomy of human thought, the hypothesis-free nature of scientific methods and freedom of conscience are for Zeller the atmosphere of scientific life which he must breathe. The great tradition of the Tübingen school which his father-in-law Baur founded and his friend D. Fr. Strauss strengthened, is philosophically living in Zeller. Positive theology, says Zeller, can only then do justice to its problems when it rests upon the universal history and philosophy of religion. And here the "rational will" is the determining life-element in Zeller's method of thinking. Of a mild, clear, reconciliatory nature, Zeller in the earliest phase of his philosophy of religion which stood under the flag of Baur, took an intermediate standpoint between Hegel and Schleiermacher; in the second phase, which was characterised by the appearance of Strauss's *Life of Jesus*, he moved diagonally between Strauss and Feuerbach but in such a way that his sympathy

did good to Strauss, whereas the concessions in favour of Feuerbach were only halting and contradictory.

According to Zeller, the value of all tradition must be measured by the concept of religion. The value and worth of religion, however, cannot depend upon how it arises but exclusively upon what it in itself is and does for the spiritual life of mankind. Consequently, "free spirit" is as much dismissed as orthodoxy. It is not dogma and cult upon which the religious character of the individual depends but the mode of feeling which serves both for expression. The higher a religion stands, the more correct and worthy its ideas of God are, the more will purity of life, honesty and love of humanity be looked upon as indispensable requirements of the religious spirit, as the most important part of the worship of God. Against the believers in revelation it is held that whoever lets religion come as a direct revelation of God from heaven must as a consequence take its first form as the only correct one. This, however, the science of to-day cannot allow. It feels itself bound to refuse to believe in the Biblican, and specially, evangelical works on history, so far as a great part of their narratives is concerned and therefore, *in all narratives of miracles as such*. And thus the essay on the philosophy of religion entitled *Ueber Ursprung und Wesen der Religion* (On the origin and essence of religion) concludes with the following thoughtful words: "He who maintains that every historical phenomenon must arise in a natural way out of its historical conditions *can make no particular phenomenon the norm of all later ones.*"

Eduard Zeller is the philosopher of "the middle line, of that *μεσότης* which characterised the philosophy of Aristotle. By nature and impulse, in inner disposition and personal inclination, there was no philosopher of ancient times whom Zeller approached so much as Aristotle, to whom he devoted the most brilliant volume of his *Philosophy of the Greeks*. The Aristotelian theory of the right mean

controlled Zeller's sensibility and philosophical mode of thinking. Where the question was of finding the mean between two extremes, Zeller stood in the front rank. Thus Zeller strikes the mean between nationality and humanity. "We cannot forget that our nation itself serves a higher whole and that its value will be estimated by history according to what it has done for mankind. The interest of nationality is only too often in conflict with that of humanity.....Our age and our nation have before them the problem of getting rid of this, among other prejudices, and the means to this is the perception that the duties to one's own people and the duties towards humanity are not to be separated from one another, that the highest perfection and most valuable *result of a successful national life is humanity.*"

Man is a rational being, a rational will—this is the alpha and omega of Zeller's philosophy of religion and morals as well as of his philosophy of law and politics. In all questions of practical and political life Zeller is always *liberal* in the best sense of the word, illuminating in the highest degree, a rationalist of the type of Socrates, with whom Fr. Th. Vischer classes him. As a scientific character Zeller comes nearest to Aristotle. That exquisite calmness and self-possession which Theodor Gomperz has so happily pointed out in the personality of Aristotle, characterises also the mode of work and direction of thought of Eduard Zeller. And what Zeller once said of his father-in-law, Fred. Ch. Baur, is also true of him, "The centre of all his action, the proper passion of his life was the scientific investigation of truth."

The philosophy of Eduard Zeller has, above all, nothing of forced ingenuity about it. Nothing is more odious to him than "a play of imagination in place of conceptual thinking". Powerful natures, like those of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, repel him strongly. His philosophy is rather the purified and mature result of a mild view of everything so far won and attained by the human spirit. Consequently, Zeller as a

builder of a system of philosophy will never be able to point as his own to a visible notch or indicate as belonging to him a groove in the process of philosophical evolution. The mediators and reconcilers have everywhere—in theory and practice—the most thankless task: Reconciling natures, however necessary their work in practice may be, are disowned in theory.

If one, however, esteems the philosopher Zeller as the loving eye of the pupil sees him, or, more strictly, as the feeling of distance necessary to a critical examination requires, he will surely take his place among the leading spirits of the German nation as a guide and leader of the history-of-philosophy movement. He has raised the inquiry into the history of philosophy to the rank of a proper scientific discipline and Felice Tocco has in his already mentioned poem in memory of Eduard Zeller characterised Zeller without exaggeration as follows: The life work of Zeller is *il condensamento del lavoro colossale, che per mezzo secolo i maggiori filologi, filosofi e storici fecere intorno del pensiero greco*.

The lasting service of Eduard Zeller in the cause of the history-of-philosophy movement is to be sought in this, that he has raised the inquiry into the history of philosophy, with the help of that method of universal history which he owes to Hegel and Baur, from a descriptive to an explicatory science. To the earliest writers of history, the Greek doxographers, there were only persons who philosophised but no national thought. With Hegel, on the other hand, it was the spirit of the people which philosophised and the individual philosophers were only its media. It was Zeller, the representative of the Aristotelian *μεσότης* who first completed the synthesis between the philosophising individual and the national spirit. The philosopher is a necessary *representative* of the spirit of his nation. Universal connexion is *prior*, individual characteristics on the part of

individual philosophers are *posterior*. Every philosopher can only be explained and derived from the structure of his age as from the national spirit pressing upon him. The method is not a purely narrative, chronological one as with the doxographers, still less a predominantly speculative one, as with Hegel, but critico-genetic. Zeller only narrates, in order, on the one hand to describe, on the other, to explain. Consequently, Zeller is far from driving the philosophical movement inaugurated by him to the farthest end. The Hegelian exaggeration, especially, that the succession of systems in history is the same as the succession of systems of philosophy following logically from the definition of the Idea (*Philosophie der Geschichte*, Vol. I, p. 43), is absolutely rejected by Zeller. Much nearer does he come to the moderate, well-thought-out view of Windelband with whom Giacomo Barzelotti ("La storia della filosofia," Nuova Antologia, January 1908) and Alois Riehl are of the same way of thinking. In his earliest writing *Ueber Begriff und Form der Philosophie* (On the concept and form of philosophy) 1872 p. 84 sq., Riehl has given a programmatic view of the history-of-philosophy movement. Riehl sees the first effect of the historical study of philosophy in this, that it produces a conviction of its scientific character. The problem of the history of philosophy was critically examined by Reinhold (Fülleborn's *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. I. 1791). But Riehl has first shown, essentially along with Herbart, how "philosophical problems are directly connected with the history of philosophy". And when Hegel postulates a strictly logical conformity to law in the history of philosophy, so that there has been in all ages only one philosophy which has developed itself dialectically, Riehl puts against this paroxysm in the logicising of the history of philosophy the thoughtful words: "What in spite of the different stand-points and starting-points of inquiry, in spite of the exclusiveness and even hostile attitude of the system and finally,

of the diversities of ages and persons, showed itself as the common, accepted doctrine, may unhesitatingly enter into the philosophy of to-day as the sure basis and true product of the philosophical inquiry.”
